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My Country – Wrong or Right! Ambassador's Note

By
A. H. Omari (PhD)¹

An Overview

In the generic sense, diplomatic representation is meant to harmonize inter-state relations. It is that representation that is expanded into many directions – friendly relations, economic and other ‘diplomacies’, negotiations, etc. In this short note, I emphasize some aspects of being an Ambassador – the individual – by looking at national interests, tacit and skills, culture, and some deliverables.

To Serve the National Interests

It is a cliché to say that an Ambassador, the person and the office s/he occupies is an extension of the Presidency (Head of State). An Ambassador is a ‘personal representative’ of the Head of State in whose credentials the envoy functions. As such, the main functions of the Ambassador are to safeguard, negotiate, procure and deliver national interests.² In this role, the Ambassador is a key person who occupies the frontline in the execution of the country’s foreign policy, while other institutions occupy a second place in the continuum. For example, although defence policy provides the weapon of last resort, in practice, it is an executing arm of foreign policy – when diplomats fail to negotiate for the nation’s vital interests, negotiations take a twist and citizens in uniform (military) are called to reinforce negotiations in terms of war.

The basic problem for an Ambassador is to identify the elements, which finally add up to national interest. Which core values are fundamental, and which are not? This and other subsequent questions become challenging because an Ambassador is a ‘lone ranger’ in the field. What s/he personally considers fundamental may not be so at that particular time in the sending state. This is so despite the guidelines provided to our Ambassadors – the so-called ‘the Mission

¹ Ambassador, Professor and Al-Haj, Former Director, Centre for Foreign Relations, and Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the State of Kuwait and the State of Qatar.

² Some national interest is non-negotiable, like sovereignty, independence, integrity, etc.

of the Missions.’ In Tanzania, that ‘Green Book’ is a just a guide. It does not provide answers to every question the Ambassador may have, and sometimes the ‘Capital’ may be irresponsible to Ambassadors’ queries. The ‘lone ranger’ must apply other methods to have her/his query solved. Meanwhile, the Ambassador is judged by the so called ‘deliverables,’ which may or may not tally with the national interests.

Tacit and Skills

The ambiguity of the national interests and more so the absence of clear guidelines, and sometimes the irresponsiveness of the ‘Capital’ would necessitate the Ambassador to use extra tacit and skills in the handling of some of the diplomatic issues. A few may be acquired through experience and training. However, most are generated by some personal integrity. It is awkward for an accredited Ambassador to use the weapon of last resort – “Let me consult my Capital” – to every case s/he encounters. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the receiving state may purposely leak out the ‘weapon’ to the diplomatic community, and may become an Ambassador’s new nick-name. The hosts may become ‘tired’ to the monotonous answer ‘let me consult my Capital.’ To our Ambassadors, some of the ambiguous questions, which are asked by unscrupulous host countries include, *inter alia*; “Is Zanzibar a state?” “Why do you kill albinos?” “Why does your government deny citizens a right to demonstrate against it?” “Why does the government refuse to have a new constitution and an independent Electoral Commission?” “Why do you abuse rights of gays and lesbians?”

Such and other questions do not need an Ambassador to consult the Capital. Some examples (below) will substantiate this fact. A good part about such questions, and the diplomatic behaviour is that the hosts may not force an Ambassador to provide an answer: to remain quiet is an answer too. This is so, especially when the Ambassador fears the spectre of being ‘grossly’ misquoted. Basically, the Ambassador is supposed to quickly understand the question, and more so, to be able to read ‘between the lines.’ The Ambassador has to know the intention and direction of the question, sometimes based on the type of bilateral relations that exist between the two countries. The Republic of Mozambique, for example, is not expected to ask questions about the independent Electoral Commission, Zanzibar being a state, etc. Western countries are expected not

only to ask such questions, but also about gay rights, why the ruling party keeps winning, etc.

To avoid being misquoted, Ambassadors are requested to read prepared speeches verbatim, if questions by the media, for example, are sent beforehand. Whenever possible, Ambassadors should avoid impromptu speeches, if situations need some speeches.

Culture and Cultural Aspects

A successful Ambassador sets to go to a receiving state with an open mind about the culture. It is important to learn a bit about the main cultural pillars of the receiving state. Some of the things some people take offence are trivial to us but count so much in other cultures.³ An Ambassador should learn quickly about what makes other societies tick, and what they stand for. An Ambassador's first lesson is how the people greet each other, and the place of, and how people associate and interact with women.

Failure to understanding the people's culture may hamper an Ambassador in accomplishing one of the basic functions of the diplomatic representation as enshrined in the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations (1961). This is the "...ascertaining by all lawful means conditions and developments in the receiving state and report thereon to the sending state." This entails collection of information by legal means, information which serves as the basic raw material for foreign policy decision making and execution. Information acquisition is heavily governed by culture; hence the difference between 'closed' and 'open' societies/countries. It is extremely difficult to operate in 'closed' societies.

Respect for other people's culture is an important principle, as it becomes a requirement for other people to respect your culture as well. In most parts of the Middle East, for example, it is unbecoming to enquire about, and even greet women and wives (if you happen to see them). To an Ambassador, it is not only unbecoming, but 'undiplomatic' as well. This is also applicable even when you have been invited to dinner in somebody's home – as most of the time women and men are physically separated.

³ For example, handing over a visiting card using one hand is an insult in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. One has to use both hands in doing so.

Ambassadors worldwide are either held in high or low esteem, basically from the way they react to the culture which is not their own. Here, culture involves all the diplomatic practices, from courtesy to etiquette, symbolisms to dressing, and greetings to table manners. In most host countries, the diplomatic community single out a few Ambassadors and consider them 'crude.' 'Crudeness' may symbolize the behaviour of a particular Ambassador – the language s/he uses, mannerisms, being critical to almost everything in the host country, etc. Once labelled as such an Ambassador may find it difficult to operate in such a host country. The grapevine by the diplomatic community has an impact on both the receiving state and the Ambassador.

Steadfastness

The Ambassador should always be in defence of national interests. In this, Ambassadors should show resoluteness and resolve to what they believe in, especially as far as national interests are concerned. This principle is applied in all diplomatic transactions, but it is more crucial during a crisis in the sending state. A crisis at home necessitates the Ambassador to be close and in touch with the 'Capital' at all the time. Crises become the major problem for the Ambassador, as sometimes the Ambassador has to act in a manner which is against her/his conscience in regard to policy steps taken by her/his 'Capital.' It is in such a case that the operating paradigm for Ambassadors is: *My country, Wrong or Right*. This has to be so despite the awkwardness of the case in question. The individual Ambassador cannot have a personal input once the 'Capital' has decided in one way or another. To act and go contrary to what has been decided by the 'Capital' is tantamount to resignation by the Ambassador. And that may include the annulment of the title 'Ambassador' as well. In other words, what the Ambassador believes in should never contradict the national policy of the sending state – the 'Capital' cannot be wrong!

Deliverables

The Ambassador has to deliver. Deliverables can be according to Ambassadors' Handbook or any other directives from the 'Capital.' Ambassador's effectiveness on this is dependent on three other variables. The first is Ambassador's own qualities, which are personal – tacit and skills, innovativeness, hard work and a personal urge to leave a legacy.

The second variable is cooperation and good managerial skills. Even when the Ambassador has a full basket of personal qualities, delivery would be difficult if the element of cooperation is missing. The Ambassador must cultivate, nourish and cherish cooperation of her/his Embassy staff as well as those in the 'Capital.' Diplomatic work, especially its effectiveness is not a 'go it alone' affair. An Ambassador who thinks s/he 'knows it all' cannot succeed and deliver. However small our Embassies are, the involvement of all staff is essential for effective delivery.

And the third important variable is responsiveness, particularly of the Headquarters. If the 'Capital' is irresponsive, especially to queries from the Embassies, there is no way such outposts can effectively deliver. Responsiveness is a major factor if it is weighed against others. Responsiveness should go along with a streamlined and adequate C⁴I. The four Cs are Command, Control, Coordination and Communication, while I is Information, especially Intelligence. In other words, every department and section should do what is there to be done. If the four Cs disintegrate, it would look like expecting some milk from the unfed cow! For example, if correspondence from the Embassy is not dealt with and replied in the shortest possible and practical time, that particular Embassy cannot function normally.

A Case to Consider

After my arrival as an Ambassador in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, I was duty bound to make some courtesy calls as diplomatic work demands. I purposely skipped to do so to the Minister of Agriculture, despite my knowledge that the Kingdom had set aside some SAR 1.0/- billion (almost TShs. 420/- billion)⁴ in banks for Saudi investors to borrow and invest in the world. They were to invest elsewhere, where they could get land for agriculture and animal husbandry. This action aimed to overcome some Saudi (and Moslem) religious challenges.⁵ Investors were to supply local markets, and extra amounts were to be shipped to the Kingdom.

Before my going to the Kingdom, several Saudi investors had come to Tanzania.

⁴ Being in 2010, the amount was a lot of money.

⁵ The Royal Saudi government wanted to ensure that grain and fodder were grown in a *halal* way, i.e. fertilizers were to be from *halal* sources (for example, not from swine dung). Likewise, the government wanted to ensure that animals were *slaughtered* in a Moslem way, and not just *killed*.

They could not invest on land due to the fact that the land in question was not *sold* to them, and they did, therefore, not have title deeds in their names and in perpetuity for their upcoming generations.⁶ I had not wanted to get myself embroiled in such an argument.

It was about two weeks after my arrival in Riyadh that I was ‘summoned’ by the Saudi Minister of Agriculture. His Highness had about thirty or so officers with him. To my surprise, there were no ‘niceties.’ Instead, His Highness the Minister went forward to tell me why he summoned me:

Mr. Ambassador, your country says it invites investors in agriculture and animal husbandry. Instead, you repel them. All land in your country belongs to one person, the President, who is not even born in the Presidency. He is just elected. And that person does not allow land to be sold to investors. Our banks need to be presented with proof of land sale transactions before loans are issued. Now, Mr. Ambassador, after this meeting, go and advise your government to scrap your stupid land law and thereafter allow Saudi investors to purchase land for investment. OK?

Although my head was spinning, I found a way out. First, I was representing a country with a ‘stupid’ land law! Second, my President was just ‘elected’ and not born (hereditary, like kingdoms). And, third, repulsion of investors, etc. However, the first two were more painful. I had to have a cool head. My diplomatic response was as follows:

Your Highness, thank you for accommodating me this morning. Kindly, allow me to ask a simple question before I explain that most countries of the world find Tanzania attractive to invest, and investors are flocking into agriculture, particularly in value addition, energy, hospitality and tourism, infrastructure, etc. It is unfortunate if Your Highness feels that my country repels investors. But, Your Highness, suppose I have money and I am attracted to live in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, can I use my money to purchase a house to live in as mine in perpetuity, say in Riyadh, Your Highness?

As he was standing up to go, His Highness Saudi Minister of Agriculture said, “No. No. You cannot do that, because you are not a Saudi national and citizen.

⁶ This was said to be the requirement of the Saudi banks and the government, short of which an investor could not be given a loan.

You can only rent houses from Saudi nationals and citizens.” He went away the way he came in.

My Head of Chancery blamed me for what I said, threatening me of some diplomatic problems ahead. I was cool headed, because the Minister abused me. I did not abuse him. He was a bit undiplomatic.

Later on I came to learn that the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia enjoys to be regarded as a ‘big brother,’ and has a tendency to rank the countries they relate with – big, medium, or small. Unfortunately, that particular Minister had ranked my country, the United Republic of Tanzania as ‘small.’ That thinking and ranking might have provided him with a propensity to just speak without weighing what he was talking about and possibly to whom. He thought I would be cowed and beg to consult my ‘Capital.’ His Highness the Minister did not underscore the fact that Tanzania is a super power in its region.

Conclusion

I have at the end provided an example of how an Ambassador is guided by national interests, the use of tacit and skills, understanding of other people’s cultures, personal integrity and innovativeness. My question to the Minister was meant to safeguard Tanzania’s land law, whether wrong or right, is a law of my country. I could not allow someone else to dictate what land laws are good for the United Republic. The Minister was projecting his country’s strength, and he failed to predict the reaction of the Ambassador. And, the Minister’s diatribe was something not to consult the ‘Capital’ about.

Contemporary Security Milieu: Is it the Right Time for a New United Nations?

By

Mbaraka Naziad Mkeremy¹

Abstract

The UN was established to maintain international peace and security. In fulfilling this responsibility, the UN adopts a range of measures, including use of diplomacy, Peacekeeping Operations (PKOs), laws, sanctions, negotiations and others. This article examines whether or not it is ripe for the world to have a new institution other than the (UN), which will effectively deal with contemporary and future security challenges. The key argument is that the UN has been failing to effectively fulfil its obligations despite various reforms, which have been taking place. Throughout the discussion, structural functional and neo-functionalism theories have been employed. Data for preparations of the article were collected in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and Tanzania by involving respondents with sufficient experience and knowledge on role of the UN in resolving conflicts. The study employed qualitative research approach in obtaining primary and secondary sources for secondary data. Purposive sampling technique was used, whereas in-depth interviews and documentary review were employed to collect data. The study found out that the current UN and its principles have not effectively been helpful in mitigating contemporary security challenges. It is projected that the future security environment will be highly complex and therefore, the current UN setup will not be useful in exercising its duties. Accordingly, it is recommended that the current UN needs to be replaced with a new institution.

Key words: armed groups, cold war, collective security, peacekeeping mandate, peacekeeping operations, security threats.

1.0 Introduction

The international community, regional organisations as well as individual countries have been struggling to resolve conflicts amicably and sometimes, turning them into an opportunity. After World War One [WWI (1914 - 1918)], the League of Nations was formed as collective means mainly to prevent other devastating World Wars, following The League of Nations that had been formed

¹ Tanzania People's Defence Forces

in 1919. For various reasons, the League of Nations failed and hence, the UN was formed to replace it. Lessons from League of Nations' failure informed formation of the UN. The UN has been instrumental in promoting global peace and security. The organisation has been using various approaches for restoration of peace and security such as diplomacy, Peacekeeping Operations (PKOs), laws, sanctions and so forth (UN, 1945a). Among others, PKOs have been the most effective ways in forging peace and security, especially after the Cold War.

During the Cold War period (1947-1991), the world witnessed increased interstate conflicts such as Ethiopia-Somalia War from February 1964 to April 1964 (Tareke, 2000), Uganda-Tanzania war from October 1978 to June 1979 (Roberts, 2014), Iran- Iraq War from 1980 to 1988 (Takeyh, 2010) and others. Equally, in the post-cold war period, we have witnessed intrastate conflicts such as those responsible for the collapse of the state in Somalia, conflicts in Rwanda, Burundi, Ethiopia, DRC, Central African Republic, Mali, and others ensued (Malone & Malone, 2004). In both periods, the UN played a great role to mitigate conflicts but in post-Cold War period, the UN's role increased and became highly complex.

Assessments show that for 78 years of its existence, the UN has been instrumental in resolving conflicts. It has managed to prevent another destructive World War like WWII or WWI by intervention through different means as mentioned and has significantly reduced interstate wars. The UN has prevented proliferation of nuclear warfare through International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), mediated conflicts such as Angola Civil war of 1975-2002; Mozambique civil war of 1977-1992; Bosnia War of 1992-1995; and others. Besides, it helped parties in conflict to engage in peace-making, facilitated deployment of peacekeeping forces such as the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) for Suez crisis of 1956-1967; the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) for Sierra Leone Civil War of 1999-2005; the United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) for the second Sudanese civil war of 2005-2011 and others to world troubled spots.

Due to their effectiveness, PKOs have been acknowledged by some influential leaders and institutions. Autesserre (2019) commented that peacekeepers are up to now called "go-to" solution whenever a conflict erupts in the world. The then

US president, Barak Obama was convinced that UN PKOs are one of the world's most important tools to address armed conflicts (Obama, 2015). Furthermore, in 1988, the UN Peacekeeping mission was awarded the Nobel Prize for preventing armed clashes and creating conditions for peaceful negotiations worldwide (Norton & Weiss, 1991).

Despite those achievements, the UN has been facing setbacks in various aspects. Notwithstanding resolutions adopted and initiatives taken, the UN has not only failed to stop arms race (Liu, Zhang, & Ritchie, 2018), but also seems unable to effectively deal with contemporary security challenges such as dealing with terrorism. Adebajo and Landsberg (2000) note that apart from few achievements, most of PKOs have been failing, particularly to protect civilians. The perception of dilemma on UNPKOs, especially on their effectiveness, among scholars is not new: it started since 1990s (Fleitz & Fleitz Jr, 2002). It has been proven that the UN's promotion of peace and security through PKOs is largely ineffective and out-dated. It has limited capacity to deal with many intrastate and civil conflicts as manifested in African countries such as Rwanda, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Central African Republic, Mali and others.

In recognition of this setback, the UN has been convening different panels of experts to assess and come up with recommendations on possible ways to improve its performance. However, reforms undertaken so far are far from contributing to improved UN's effectiveness as atrocities continue to rise. Hardwick (2011) provides that one of the biggest sources of UN's failure is antagonism between its permanent members of UN Security Council (SC), "P5," whereby they have been using veto power for protection of their respective national interests instead of collectively managing the problem. On the other hand, there are different and conflicting interests among troop contributing countries (TCCs) to participate in PKOs with financial benefits taking precedence (Jett, 2000).

Complexity of security challenges faced by the world today require a new approach if not a new institution to manage, other than the UN in its current form. The trend shows that the future security environment will increasingly be complicated with non-state actors such as terrorists expanding their operations. Conflicts are predicted to increase as world geopolitics is evidently shifting from

the unipolar to a multipolar world (Muzaffar, Yaseen & Rahim, 2017). The question that needs to be addressed is whether or not the UN and its current setup will be able to effectively mitigate the security challenge(s) the world is about to face.

This paper strives to assess whether or not it is the right time for the world to have alternative mechanism(s) to safeguard global peace and security beyond the UN framework that we have today. This is in line with its structure, functions even futuristic security problem. The article suggests that the UN needs to be replaced with a new institution with alternative leadership and approaches. The new institution will draw lessons from current UN's structure and functions in effectively dealing with contemporary and future security challenges we are about to face. Although scholars are dissatisfied with the UN's effectiveness, they do not want to remove the international body but replace it with the new one which will deal effectively with the contemporary security threats. This, in essence, will not be the first time, as it was previously done in 1945 when the UN replaced the League of Nations. Therefore, apart from already mentioned reasons, the history suggests the same. The article is divided into five sections. The first section sets out the background. Section two provides materials and methods used, while section three dwells on theoretical review. The UN and maintenance of global peace and security are presented in section three and section four provides discussions on replacing the United Nations and finally, the article ends with concluding remarks.

2.0 Materials and Methods

This article analyses whether or not it is right time to have a new institution to replace the current UN due to different weaknesses, which the present UN has shown, especially on maintenance of peace and security. Data for the preparation of this article were collected between January 2022 and June 2023 in the DRC and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. The study involved senior and junior UN staff members including military commanders of the MONUSCO, some academicians, members of diplomatic core, and locals. The researcher used in-depth interviews by targeting key informants and documentary reviews to compile the needed data.

The study employed purposive sampling procedure, where samples were selected

based on their knowledge of PKOs, population characteristics and objective of the study. A total of 16 respondents comprising different sexes, ages, race, knowledge bases and expertise were involved. Data analysis of collected data was done using content analysis. Validity of the data collection tools was achieved through face validity where the data collection methods were crafted prior to application so as to detect whether or not they would measure what was intended to be measured.

3.0 Theoretical Review

Throughout this study, structural functionalism and neo-functionalism theories have been used. According to Chilcott (1998), structural functionalism was championed by Hebert Spencer (1820-1903) who argued that the UN is like a human body, made up of various states (parts of the human body) to keep it functioning. Similarly, Zenia Satti came with another viewpoint that the UN was formed mainly for maintenance of peace and security and must be reformed or replaced once these needs were not met (Satti, 1994). According to him, the League of Nations, which was formed as a collective security mechanism was replaced by the UN after its failure to meet its intended obligations (*ibid.*). This relates with structural functional theory whereby after League of Nations' failure, the UN was formed (Olaveson, 2001). Because of changes in security environment, gradual change of world hegemony and other factors, coupled with some failures of the UN in various areas, then it is the time for the UN to be replaced with a new institution (Satti, 1994).

Equally, neo-functionalism theory of integration is also linked to structural functional theory. According to Jensen (2013), integration of various aspects in society produces supranational institutions such as the UN, which will be given much authority and responsibility beyond the nation state level. These institutions, especially the UN play a great role in the maintenance of peace and security using different ways such as mediation. If these institutions fail to fulfil their objective(s), they can be reformed or replaced.

However, structural functional theory has been subjected to criticism. According to Holmwood (2005), the theory perceives that any form of immediate reforms or replacement is considered a deviation and is perceived as paradoxical in nature. This is not always the case, especially when reforms or changes are a result of

dysfunction of the institution like changes from League of Nations to UN. On the neo-functionalism theory of integration, Hamad (2016) commented that the theory has been criticized for simplifying possible resistance to integrations. Nonetheless, the presented criticisms do not warrant abandoning the selected theories because, for the studied problem, they are valid.

4.0 The United Nations and Maintenance of Global Peace and Security

This section discusses roles of the UN in maintenance of global peace and security. To recall, the UN was established to maintain international peace and security (UN, 1945). In fulfilling this obligation, the UN used to adopt a range of measures, including the use of diplomacy, supporting in the deployment of PKOs, laws, sanctions, and many kinds of negotiations. De Jonge Oudraat (1996) opined that the UN, through its Security Council (SC), has adopted several resolutions to support peace process, resolve conflicts as well as deployed PKOs, enforced sanctions where peace and security has been threatened and instituted other measures.

Global conflicts have been changing, depending on the period. The Cold War period (1947-1991) witnessed an increase in interstate conflicts (Jervis, 2001). During that period, relations between countries were divided in response to two ideological blocs built on mistrust and suspicion. After the Cold War, new types of security challenges emerged mainly further intensifying intrastate conflicts. Examples of countries that experienced intrastate conflicts include the DRC from 1960 to date (Mertens, 2023); Angola since her independence in 1975 until 2002 (Dulley & Sampaio, 2020); Namibia from 1966 to 1990 (Gowan & Stedman, 2018); and others. The number and intensity of emergent interstate armed conflicts, especially in parts of Africa have since declined by as much as 40 per cent and the intrastate conflicts have increased by 32.2 per cent (UCDP, n.d). The UN has deployed 72 PKOs from 1948 to 2019. But from 2000 to 2019 only, there were 20 UN PKOs (UN, 2019a).

The UN played a crucial role in supporting peace initiatives since its inception. The organisation has been involved in almost all major wars such as Korean War of 1950-1953 and other wars (Sandler, 2014). Because of the UN's involvement, the UN and other actors managed to stop the Cuban Missile crisis of 1962, one of the most dangerous conflicts in the twentieth century (Allison, 1969).

Sometimes the UN uses mediation and has mediated several conflicts. For example, the UN managed to mediate the warring parties in Libya that resulted to deployment of the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) in 2020 (UN, 2020). The UN may sometimes consolidate peace using the UN Peace Building Commission (PBC), which brings together different actors to the peace process (UN, 2015a).

The UN also uses its organs to forge global peace and security. Fischer (1997) presents that the UN, through the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), has served as the world's nuclear inspector in ensuring that nuclear materials are used only for peaceful purposes. The agency initiated and supervised different treaties such as Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty [NPT (1968)], Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty [(START) 1991], Treaty on Prohibition of nuclear weapons (2017), Strategic Offensive Reduction Treaty [(SORT) 2002] and others. Through those treaties, the UN has promoted safe, secure and peaceful use of nuclear energy to all its 164 member states. Through disarmament, the UN has signed treaties with about 92 member states on the Chemical Weapons Convention of 1997 (Üzümcü, 2014), which aimed at eliminating all categories of weapons of mass destruction by forbidding development, productions, acquisitions, stockpiling, retention, transfer or use of chemical weapons by member states. Moreover, the UN assists countries in destroying stockpiled landmines and advocates for full international participation in treaties related to landmines.

The UN has also been using different measures to prevent genocide. In this, the UN adopted a treaty for combating genocide, the Genocide Convention Act (UN, 1948). The treaty provides for prevention and punishment for actions of genocide in war and in peacetime. The UN tribunals for Yugoslavia and Rwanda, as well as UN-supported courts in Cambodia, have put would-be genocide perpetrators on notice that such crimes would no longer be tolerated (Adams, 2018). Sanction is also used by the UNSC to restore international peace and security under Chapter VII of the UN Charter (Gowlland-Debbas, 2021). The UN has imposed sanctions on countries such as Angola, Lebanon, DRC, Rwanda, Iran, and others (UN, 2023a). The UNSC has been using sanctions to force for peaceful overnment transition as well as to dispel terrorism and protect human rights (UN, 2023c).

Moreover, the UN came up with a strategy of improving the lives of people in the world by the project known as the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). According to World Vision (2015), in the UN Millennium summit of 2000, leaders of the 189 countries agreed to come up with eight measurable targets to be fulfilled before 2015 for improving the life of people. The UN also invented a comprehensive strategy to fight the world's greatest challenges soon after completion of the MDGs in 2015. The strategy is known as Sustainable Development Goals [(SDGs) Mehta *et al.*, 2018]. About 17 goals have to be achieved for a better and sustainable future by 2030.

While this article acknowledges contributions of the UN in resolving conflicts, it is also a fact that the UN is one of organisations which are failing to achieve its objectives effectively. Its history has been dominated by failures, divisions and multifaceted scandals that have been and cannot be described in a single case (Gardiner, 2007). There are many examples of the failures of UN. The UN has not managed to fully resolve conflicts between Israel and Palestine since 1948, resulting to about 165,000 people's deaths from 1947 to 2022 (SIPRI, 2022). Besides, the Kashmir conflict in India has not been resolved, to date. The Conflict between India and Pakistan has not been resolved since 1947 (Agibalova, 2020).

On the other side, the UN was unsuccessful in preventing Cambodia Genocide from 1975 to 1979 whereby more than two million people (approximately 25 %) of the country were killed (Kiernan, 2012). According to Falk (2000), the Iraq war presents a distinct ineffectiveness of the UN. It failed to prevent war and then it futilely took no action against the United States of America (USA/US) after being proved that Iraq had no weapons of mass destruction, which was the reason for US intervention in Iraq. Additionally, the UN has failed to mitigate Russia–Ukraine conflicts, which have led into war. Moreover, the UN was invisible in dealing with Taliban regime, which took Afghanistan on 21st August 2021 after the end of US Operations in Afghanistan. More than 90 per cent of people in the country are suffering from some form of food insecurity (Yousaf, & Moheb, 2021).

The UNPKOs, which have been major instruments of forging global peace, appear to be failing. Even in areas in which PKOs may be termed as successful, actually the attained peace is always for short-term and the countries fall back to

wars as well as conflicts. From UN PKOs' failure in Rwanda and Bosnia in the 1990s, the history of PKOs is covered by failures in many areas. The UN forces in DRC have been among the largest and most expensive peacekeeping forces in the world (Spooner, 2010). The DRC has long been a testing ground for evolving UN PKOs. It was in DRC that PKOs received one of the first Chapter VII mandates and it is the first mission, which has been approved to use unmanned aerial vehicles for surveillance purposes (Gberie, 2013). Despite those initiatives, violence still goes on with murder, rape, torture, and other inhuman actions that are on an increase. The report from the UN Joint Human Rights Office (UNJHRO) noted that more than 1,300 people were killed from January to June 2020 by armed groups (AGs) in the DRC, three times more than in the same period in 2019 (UNJHRO, 2020).

In Sudan (Darfur), the conflict took lives of more than 30,000 civilians, more than one million internally displaced and there are over 20,000 refugees in camps across the neighbouring Chad (Allen, 2010). The UN deployed the joint United Nations-African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) in 2007 (Lugman, 2012). Though the UNAMID operations were closed on 31st December 2020, guns have not completely been silenced in Darfur (UN, 2021). The HRW (2021) alluded that two weeks after closure of UNAMID (16th January 2021), 150 people were killed, more than 190 injured and about 50,000 were displaced.

In Central African Republic, security situation is worsened than expected. Such status is happening despite the presence of United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA), which was deployed on 10th April 2014 (UN, 2023b). According to HRW (2023), in 2023, 3.4 million people need humanitarian assistance and protections, an increase of 10 per cent compared to 2022. World Peace Foundation (2022) provides that in Mali, the security situation is worsening as the conflicts feature military coups, a separatist insurgency and extremist insurgency involving terrorism. The UN deployed its United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) in 2013 (UN, 2013). Though the mission is there, still human rights violations are on an increase. For example, World Peace Foundation (2022) provides that there were 617 human rights abuses including 165 killings by AGs in Mali from January to June 2021, an increase of 37 percent compared to 2020. As the days go on, the situation is

worsening.

The PKOs' principles (consent, impartiality, and minimum use of force) have been proved to be ineffective to fight terror group such as ADF in Beni (DRC) compared to normal AGs such as M23. One cannot seek consent or be impartial with terror groups. How can one negotiate peace with terror group(s)? Thus, the UN needs to recheck its principles – shift this to a discussion about emerging security threats.

There are different comments from various people condemning the failure of the UN in PKOs. For example, Russell (2006) presented that in interviews with London Daily Telegraph newspaper, the then US Ambassador to UN, Mr. John Bolton called the UN a hopeless organisation as it was failing to bring peace. Again, in 2006, a poll conducted by Gallup in the US showed that 64 percent of respondents said the UN was doing a poor job (Jones, 2006). Stearns (2016) noted that opinion polls conducted between May and September 2016 by the Bureau d'Etudes de Recherches et Consulting International (BERCI) in 2016 on PKOs in the DRC, showed that among 7,545 people who were interviewed where such peacekeepers were deployed, 56.7 per cent in North Kivu, 50.2 per cent in South Kivu and 45.2 per cent in Ituri wanted the UN to leave. Even the government has not been in good rapport of UN PKOs. Ilunga (2019) asserts that the Congolese government has been repeatedly asking for withdrawal of the MONUSCO. But even people of the Central African Republic want MINUSCA to leave. According to Afrique Media (2022), the Central African people mobilized numerous anti-MINUSCA demonstrations, which show that they no longer want presence of UN mission as it is failing to protect them.

From the presented cases, one can deduce that the UN has taken different initiatives to bring about peace with limited success. Violence still goes on with murder, rape, torture, and increasing other inhuman actions. In expression of dissatisfaction with the PKOs, populations, in some of the countries such as DRC – particularly the eastern part - have been waging violent demonstrations against UN forces. The same is happening in Central African Republic. Such sub-optimal performance, especially interventions by UN PKOs have brought about a lot of questions on the UN academically and in practice (Thakur *et al.*, 2001). Many reforms have been done with minimal or no effect on the effectiveness of

the UN. Therefore, it is the right time for the World to think of a new international institution to replace the UN.

5.0 Replacing the United Nations

The UN has done some commendable jobs in bringing global peace. In fact, without the UN, definitely the situation could have been worse. But it seems that its capacity coupled with SC politics has been limiting its capability and as such, there is no hope of doing more than what it is currently doing. The situation might be further bleak in prospect because the future world is predicted to be highly complicated and volatile.

Various tools for resolving conflicts seem to have shortcomings as we will see from the subsequent part of this article. The IAEA with responsibility in ensuring that nuclear materials are used only for peaceful purposes has many limitations that result to its ineffectiveness. According to Scheinman (2016), the IAEA's budget depends on contributions from member states and therefore, sometimes IAEA operations are affected by funding. The IAEA has no enforcement power, and it has limited powers of inspection. "Though the UN initiated the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1970, up to now, nuclear stockpiles remain high, and many nations continue to develop these distressing weapons. There is an increase in mistrust between superpowers, which result in the arms race" (Interviews, former MONUSCO staff, 12 March 2022).

Likewise, the PKOs, which have been mentioned to be used frequently, have their own challenges. Their effectiveness is questionable as many UN missions have been considered failed. Adebajo and Landsberg (2000) contended that some UN missions, especially in Africa have failed in protection of civilians. Weinstein (2005) pointed out that 75 per cent of civil wars where UNPKOs intervened resumed within ten years after stopping. After analysis of 11 UN PKOs, Paris (2018) asserted that only two PKOs were able to produce sustainable peace. Willmot and colleagues (2016) argue that demonstrations against MONUSCO in DRC depict a symptomatic failure of PKOs. Moreover, deployment of regional forces in DRC such as East African Regional Forces in 2022, deployment of other forces under bilateral arrangements such as Uganda and Burundi in 2021, and others is testimony of PKOs' failure in DRC.

The UN's capability to face up contemporary security challenges is very low. For example, the UN ended up only condemning the act of kidnapping of 276 Secondary School girls in Chibok, Nigeria, which was carried out by Boko Haram terrorist group on 14th April 2014 (Temitope, 2016). There were no serious measures taken by the UN apart from individual countries that showed some concern compared to the UN. Likewise, the UN has not given enough attention on Ansar Sunna Wall Jamaa in Mozambique. It is SADC regional initiatives, which try to face such challenges.

There have been different reasons for UN's failure. According to Hardwick (2011), one of the biggest sources of failure of the UN stemmed from its organisation whereby the permanent members of UNSC (P5) were set to safeguard their respective national interests using veto power. Claros (2022) presents that for most of time when there is an important decision to be made that involves P5, the UN has always been paralysed.

"If this trend will not be eliminated, the UN will soon be useless. How can a single state prevent majority of the SC from taking decision? It is upset: the UN principles have been applied unequally. When Israel invades Palestine, there is no sovereignty integrity, but when Russia invades Ukraine, the UN points out the issue of sovereignty integrity, why?" (Interview with a member of Diplomatic Corps, Dar es Salaam, 12th January 2023).

Disagreement is among challenges facing the UN. Nadin (2017) outlines that because of geopolitics, national interests and ideological factors, there have been many disagreements between P5, resulting in impeding robust actions on important situations. For example, the US has been lonely casting veto on resolutions that criticise Israel on what the Israelis have been doing to Palestinians (Stephens, 2007). Besides, experience shows that even vetoes have not managed to stop nations from proceeding with their endeavours, which was the case with the US invasion of Iraq in 2003 (Morris & Wheeler, 2007: 221). This shows that National Interest is more powerful than the SC.

Imbalance of composition of P-5 also is a challenge. Essentially, the P5 has three members from European countries, while Asia and America have one each. There is no member from Africa or Latin America. Even the veto itself is seen as weakening democratic legitimacy of the UN. Non-permanent members of the SC are limited by two-thirds majority vote during decision, while the P5 has veto

power. Claros (2022) remarks that the P5 turned the UN into an imperialist organisation, whereby the P5 members are, *de facto*, running the world. Chiefly, the organisation is unable to effectively deal with any problems related to superpowers. President Ruto once said, “Do you know that only five countries of this world hold a meaningful power in the UN Security Council, none of them is African.” More than half of the world’s population is not represented in the UN Security Council - it is neither democratic nor representative, nor transparent and nor accountable. As a result, it is unable to effectively respond to the pressing peace and security needs of parts of the world most affected by conflict and insecurity in our global south. Its attitude to conflicts is geographically determined and intervention is likewise biased. In 2023, it should not be possible for the foremost institution of global governance to remain so egregiously exclusive and non-representative and claim to stand for any meaningful human norm” (Kiongozi, 2023).

It is unfortunate that the founders of the UN were the winners of WWII as they are the ones who determined the structure of the UN Security Council which actually is the source of most of the weakness of the UN. Therefore, national interest has dominated this institution since its foundation, but we are much concerned now because the trends show that the current and future conflicts will be between superpowers as such this institution will definitely fail to resolve them. “This is the major challenge in future as most of the security challenges are likely to involve superpowers” (Interviews with a Goma Resident, Goma, 23 September 2022). Basically, national interests were the basis for setup of the SC we see today. Its organisation was based on protection of superpowers’ interest(s) who won the second WWII.

The PKOs, which have been the major tool for resolving conflicts, have been covered by limiting factors. Conflicting interests among troops contributing countries (TCCs) to participate in PKOs with financial benefits taking precedence is one of them. Carnahan, Durch and Gilmore (2006) argue that national interest, which TCCs are fulfilling by using PKOs are monetary gains from reimbursement, provision of stability in close neighbours’ country/countries, provision of experience of their troops, and gaining international support. On the other hand, Jett (2000) alluded that UN members pursue their national interest using the UN. They use PKOs as “pork barrel of

patronage job” and not contributing to the common goal of the organisation.

This study observed that peacekeeping is a multi-billion business, connecting chains of beneficiaries from manufacturers, suppliers, whole sellers, retail sellers, and peacekeepers and it is a major source of employment. Peacekeeping has become a multi-billion-dollar business with networks of food, medical as well as equipment manufacturers, and suppliers (Baregu, 2011). Jett (2000) pointed out that apart from resolving conflicts as envisaged by the UN, member states and other actors have been using UN through PKOs to pursue their interests. “There are people/countries/organisations, which see conflicts in DRC and Darfur as an opportunity for their survival” (Interview, Peacekeeper, 23 October 2022, Dar es Salaam).

On the other side, mandate has been failing PKOs. Mostly, there has been a mismatch between the mandate given and the real situation on the ground (Gibbs, 1997). To be effective, the mandate must be feasible, clear without any ambiguity and reflect the situation on the ground, including operating in line with available resources (Punga, 2011). The PKOs are failing sometimes because of the UN bureaucracy. The UN peacekeeping is dominated by heavy top-down organisation with complex procedures, which require approval of one or more levels (Agada, 2008).

There is an argument that big countries use their lion’s share of contribution to UN PKOs to dominate the PKOs’ decisions or to decide whatever to do without being challenged by the UN. It should be recalled that P5 finances more than 55 percent of the budget of PKOs with US contributing 27.89 percent, China 15.21 percent, Japan 9.68 percent, Germany 6.09 percent and United Kingdom 5.79 percent (Joshi, 2020). “The UN was just an irrelevant witness as the US, Britain and other allied forces stormed Afghanistan, the presumed safe haven of Al-Qaida. Indeed, he who pays the piper calls for the tune” (Interview, Member of Diplomatic Corps, 17th January 2023, Dodoma).

Compatibility and commitment sometimes fail PKOs as peacekeepers come from different TCCs with different military backgrounds, languages, experience, culture and traditions. Novosselof (2019) points out that there is lack of commitment for some TCCs to take risks in PKOs, especially when the TCCs are

deployed thousands of kilometers from their home countries. Involvement of peacekeepers with corruption and Sexual Exploitation and Abuse (SEA) scandals shows that the organ (UN) lacks professionalism as well as discipline and thus, needs to be replaced. For example, Pyman (2013) presents that the Procurement Tasks Force, which was set in 2006 to investigate corruption in the Oil for Food scandal in Iraq found that a former UN procurement officer received about United States of America dollars (US\$) 1 million bribes as “kickbacks” from contractors who worked on the Oil for Food Programme. Involvement of Benon Sevan (the UN head for Oil for Food Programme) and Koffi Annan’s son, Kojo in sloppy UN procurement practice ruined the image of the UN (Raphael, 2004).

In the same vein, some TCCs use PKOs to exploit wealth from host nations. International Alert (2010) provides that companies owned by businessmen from Pakistan and India from around Great Lakes Region such as Farrel Trade and Machanga Limited have been accused to collaborate with Pakistani peacekeepers in DRC to smuggle minerals. Similarly, HRW (2007) asserts that Pakistani peacekeepers in DRC had been involved in smuggling of Gold from Ituri, while the Guardian (2008) discovered that peacekeepers in DRC engaged in illegal trading with AGs by exchanging weapons confiscated during Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) program with gold. The dilemma of effectiveness of PKOs among scholars is very high. Studies titled ‘Why Peacekeeping fails’ (Jett, 2000); ‘Peacekeeping Fiascos’ (Fleitz & Fleitz Jr, 2002); ‘Peacekeeping in the Abyss’ (Cassidy, Cassidy & Press, 2004); and popular journal article ‘Give War a Chance’ (Luttwak, 1999) exemplify PKOs’ failures.

On the area of sanctions, some sanctions have not been effective due to failure of other countries to respect them (Fischhendler, Herman, & Maoz, 2017). But some sanctions have been based on national interests (Brzoska, 2015). Strydom (2022) presents that there are few sanctions that have been authorized by the UN; the majority are presided by non-UN sanctions, especially sanctions by the US or European Union. This has caused debate that sanctions are sometimes used by powerful states as a unilateral coercive measure to other states. Even on MDGs, there have been different opinions on its success. The UN (2015b) concluded that even though substantial attainments have been made on many of the MDGs’ targets, progress has been uneven. Assefa and colleagues (2017) opined that even those successes which are said have not been experienced

equally across the globe. For example, even though one of the goals was to eradicate poverty by 2015, UNDP (2023) shows that up to 2015, about 736 million people were still living in poverty [(living by less than USD 1, 90 a day) *ibid.*].

There is new threat from superpowers on use of ocean floor and its subsoil for military purposes. Though the threat is obvious, there are minimal efforts done by the UN to control. The UN has left the responsibility to the intergovernmental body “International Seabed Authority (ISA)” to control it. However, this body just controls development of mineral related operations in the international seabed and also protect the ecosystem of the seabed (Copley, 2020).

Equally, there are growing threats of space race aimed at showing national prestige by projection of geopolitical and military power, which has military, scientific and commercial importance (Broad, 2021). With an increased number of big powers such as China, France, Germany, India, Russia, United Kingdom, Japan and others, which sent artificial satellites, robots, animals and others into space, the race has been so high thereby threatening world security (Gabbat, 2021). When all of these races are happening, there are complains that the UN Office of Outer Space Affairs (UNOOSA), which governs space activities has minimally shown any concern (UN, 1958).

Because of UN’s failure, we have seen now there are different initiatives of resolving conflicts without involving UN. For example, Campbell (2023) presents that China has brokered peace between Pakistan and Saudi Arabia whereby the two countries have reestablished diplomatic relations after seven years of bitter/rancor conflicts. Currently, there is a tendency of states to depend on Private Military Contractors/Companies (PMCs) to support their efforts when they are faced by security challenges. Presence of PMCs in various states in Africa where even UN has deployed its PKOs is testimony of the UN’s failure. For example, Wagner private military company from Russia has been deployed in Central African Republic, Mali, and Burkina Faso where the UN has troops (Borshchevskaya, 2020).

All failures have been rooted in the weakness of the UN system emanating from its current organizational setup, national interests, changes of security

environment and others. Efforts to reform the UNPKOs as suggested through structural functional and neo-functionalism theories have been on-going since the mid-1990s, and different proposals have been formulated as well as implemented. The UN we are seeing today is full of amendments and reforms (Interviews with former FIB Commander, Dar es Salaam, 23rd May 2022). There has been the “Agenda for Peace” concept of 1992 (UN, 1995), establishment of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKOs) in 1992 and its separation into DPKO and Department of Field Support (DFS) in 2007.

In the same vein, there were the Panel of UN Peace Operations in 2000 commonly called Brahimi Report (Brahimi, 2000), endorsement of the “Responsibility to Protect (R2P)” concept in 2005 (Bellamy, 2009), and establishment of Counter Terrorism Office in 2017 (UN, 2017). Again in 2014, a High-Level Panel on UN Peace Operations (HIPPO) was convened to assess the state of UN Peace Operations. Besides, in 2017, the UN convened a Panel of experts under the leadership of Lieutenant General (Retired) dos Santos Cruz that aimed at identifying reasons for an increase in casualties to peacekeepers by that time (Dos Santos Cruz, Phillips, & Cusimano, 2017). All recommendations from the panel have not improved PKOs’ effectiveness.

The situation seems to be worse in the near future. Gray (2008) presents that the trend shows that the future security environment will increasingly be complicated with non-state actors such as terrorists increasing their operations and thus, there will be proliferation of weapons as well as organised crimes. Intrastate conflicts as a result of internal politics will be exacerbated and coups will also increase as currently witnessed in Western African States. Conflicts are predicted to increase as world geopolitics is shifting from the unipolar world to multipolar world. Muzaffar, Yaseen and Rahim (2017) opined that the world geopolitics is shifting from unipolar world to multipolar world whereby many states are emerging superpowers competing with US.

While other theories claim that multipolar world order is more stable than bipolar or unipolar systems, but the reality is that each power will have further freedom to decide about war and peace based on their respective national interests (Jackson & Towle, 2006). There will be an increase in deployments of PKOs where there is no peace to keep or where there is weak or no cease fire

agreement. In such circumstances, the world requires to have a very strong organisation other than the UN that will effectively deal with contemporary security challenges. The current situation predicts that there will be highly complex conflicts that will require intricate responses from strong organ(s) (Bellamy & Hunt, 2015: 1277). “Let’s be honest. The UN set up today has no capacity to effectively deal with terrorism, tyranny, and genocide” (Interview, former FIB Commander, Dar es Salaam, 23rd May 2022).

Although scholars are dissatisfied with the UN’s effectiveness, they do not want to remove the international body but replace it with a new one. Müller (2021) presents that there are opinions ranging from those who want to eliminate the UN entirely and replace it with other institution(s) and others who want reforms. Those who want the replacement of the UN believe that reforms and panels convened by the UN to enhance its effectiveness have been done since then with little or no improvements. “The electric light did not come from continuous improvement of candles. Currently, the UN is full of patches and thus, we need a new organisation” (interviews with member of diplomatic Corps, Dodoma, 12th March, 2023). For them, they want a new institution, which will come with answers to challenges we are facing today and what we will face tomorrow. The new body will use the lesson from the UN operations and come up with a new approach to fighting contemporary challenges.

This corresponds with structural functional and neo-functionalism theories, using which Satti (1994) presented that the UN was formed for the purpose of meeting certain needs and must be reformed or replaced once these needs are met or failed. Their argument corresponds with different views obtained during interviews; “The way it goes, the UN is taking direction of its predecessor, the League of Nations; it will soon sink in the abyss of history as an irrelevant absolute failure” (interview, a politician, Dodoma, 14th May 2022). Maintenance of peace and security using the UN has so far been impossible (Interviews with Goma resident, Goma 23 January 2023). “The UN has overstayed and nothing new will come out of it” (Interviews with former MONUSCO staff, Goma, 12 March 2023). It is through these comments and the presented discussion this article proposes that the current UN needs to be replaced with a new institution.

6.0 Conclusion

It is real that since its formation, the UN has seemingly managed to safeguard global peace and security. However, it is also real that the UN has been ineffective in dealing with other security issues, especially the contemporary ones. There have been different reforms such as “Agenda for Peace” concept, establishment of the DPKOs, endorsement of the R2P, establishment of Counter Terrorism Office and others. Also, there have been different UN Panels established to recommend different reforms to enhance effectiveness of the UN. All these reforms did not improve the UN’s effectiveness. It is through this background that the UN requires to be replaced with a new institution and new leadership. This is in line with structural functional and neo-functionalism theories, which advocates for replacement. The new institution will address issues of balance of permanent members of the SC, clarity of PKOs’ mandate, enhance preventive diplomacy, enhance partnership with regional organizations, enhance coordination and integration between components of PKOs, and undertake other aspects. This will not be the first time as the League of Nations was replaced by the UN after its failure.

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Towards Effective Use of Digital Diplomacy in Executing Foreign Policy in Tanzania

By

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Abstract

This article evaluates the use by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and East African Cooperation of Digital Diplomacy for the execution of Tanzania foreign policy. The study used qualitative research approach in gathering data. Interviews and documentary reviews were used to collect data which was analysed through content analysis. The findings disclose that the necessary political will for employing digital diplomacy in the execution of foreign policy is there. The study found that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and East African Cooperation is already actively using different digital platforms in its communication. Nevertheless, the government is yet to formulate a specific policy on the use of digital diplomacy, particularly social media, to pursue foreign policy goals. Even the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and East African Cooperation does not as yet have a proper desk handling digital diplomacy. This paper recommends that the government devise Digital Diplomacy Policy in order to reinforce implementation of foreign policy. In order to reach its objectives, the government should also establish a unit responsible for the management of digital aspects of foreign policy.

Keywords: diplomacy, digital diplomacy, foreign policy

1.0 Introduction

Digital diplomacy has become a major topic in modern foreign policy implementation Madu et al. (2017). Digital diplomacy brings in changes in a unique manner which, in due course, affects the very character of diplomacy both domestically and internationally. Stanzel (2018) explain that, "Diplomacy, like so many areas of public administration, is affected by the radical changes of the 21st century". In other words, contemporary issues around the world have been widely discussed in terms of a new, faster and louder mode of diplomatic

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conversation as opposed to the traditional approach of diplomacy which is seen as slow-paced archaic and unsuccessful (Seib, 2016). In line with this, countries are struggling to go hand in hand with this kind of advancement in technology in order to achieve their national interest goals against other states. For example, since 2014, Germany has undertaken intensive steps to improve and modernize the exchange of information between its ministry of foreign affairs, embassies located in Germany and foreign ministries of European Union (EU) member States. Similarly, China has executed a number of reforms in dealing with the question of modern diplomacy. The advancement in technology, the increase in interconnectedness of global aspects plus the need for states to pursue their foreign objectives necessitate governments to undertake reforms that accommodate application of digital diplomacy.

In December 2011, the United States of America (USA) inaugurated Virtual Embassy in Tehran (Iran) to enable the country intermingle with Iranian citizens online despite severance of diplomatic relations between the two countries since 1979 (Manor, 2015; Madu, 2018). Such innovation has created impetus for other entities having embassies in Iran to exchange information with USA regardless the absence of physical representation of United States in the so called hostile state. On the other hand, the revolution in Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs) and its associated force resulting from social media has not only been a major issue in Europe and America but also in Africa. The general community is increasingly becoming aware of foreign policy matters and at the same time seeks to engage diplomacy through social media and other platforms therefore altering the traditional way of conducting diplomacy (Stanzel, 2018).

African countries like Egypt, and Tunisia were brought into intriguing moments at different times when the social media became a stage to disseminate unrestricted public information amongst users in the wave of the Arab Spring (Kassim, 2012). Embassies, their citizens and others in host countries have been connected through social media and other internet-based tools. Countries have managed to promote their foreign policies and provide information to people on various issues while engaging with their followers using platforms like Facebook, Twitter, Instagram and YouTube (Stanzel, 2018; Summa, 2020). Jiang (2017) noted that “social media is an effective way for embassies to communicate to target groups, more so than conventional (offline or traditional) public

diplomacy.” The use of digital diplomacy facilitates governments to curtail disinformation and misinformation and at the same time broaden the scope of appropriate information towards the public both domestic and international.

Diplomats are now using social media to circulate countries’ positions and update the community based on their national interests during multilateral conferences. Similarly, Heads of States and Governments exchange messages of congratulations, indictments and sometimes threats on Twitter thus responding to journalists and the public in general when people demand instant answers and reactions (Golan et. al, 2019). In this respect, it is obvious that digital diplomacy is becoming an even more crucial aspect of diplomacy as Madu (2018) asserted in saying “digital diplomacy has played a significant role for today’s foreign policy, including the role and influence of the internet and new technologies on the objectives, tools and structures of diplomacy.”

However, according to Adesina (2017) “one major factor that has affected diplomacy in this modern age is the revolution in ICTs. ICTs have revolutionized the way people communicate and exchange information, changing political, social and economic landscapes across the globe.” In this case digital diplomacy is expected to be an essential tool for states’ prosperity in various areas of interest and seems to be among the important factors which define the power of a state in penetrating and influencing cotemporary international relations.

Tanzania, as part of the global system, has experienced drastic changes in the implementation of foreign policy due to evolution of technology. The adoption and exploitation of digital diplomacy in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and East African Cooperation (MFAEAC) and embassies abroad is inevitable since execution of foreign policy conforms with changes in the international system. This fact brings the need for a comprehensive investigation on how digital diplomacy can be employed in the MFAEAC and more particularly in the implementation or execution of foreign policy.

2.0 Research Problem

Several studies have found that digital diplomacy plays vital role in influencing, facilitating, accelerating and safeguarding foreign policy objectives of various

countries globally (Madu, 2018; Digital Diplomacy, 2021). Stanzel (2018) noted that, “changes in the structure of the international community have made continual adaptations in diplomacy tactics necessary” while Verrekia (2017) unveiled that, “during her time as Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton made social media an integral part of many of the programs run by the Department of State (DOS), seeking to utilize this popular new trend as a tool for statecraft.” Nonetheless, the role of digital diplomacy in influencing, preventing and promoting foreign policy goals of Tanzania is understudied despite being a critical contemporary foreign policy implementation issue.

For instance, Mujwahuzi & Kajerero, (2020) and Kajerero & Mujwahuzi, (2021), examined the nexus between digital diplomacy and the manner in which diplomacy is applied in Tanzania by considering digital economy only. At the same time Ndimbwa and Emanuel (2013) scrutinized the role of ICT in the delivery of diplomatic services. Their studies focused more on the link between offline diplomacy and modern technology while giving little attention to foreign policy accomplishment. Against this fact, this study therefore, assessed the extent of the employment of digital diplomacy in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and East African Cooperation (MFAEAC) particularly for Tanzania foreign policy execution.

3.0 Literature Review

Diplomacy as a method by which states manage their relationships with one another and try to achieve their national interests, operates in an environment which is highly influenced by technological development (Amacker, 2011). The ever changing hi-tech atmosphere has resulted in the evolvement of digital diplomacy as a means of solving foreign policy problems using the internet (Adesina, 2017). Hanson (2012) defines digital diplomacy as the use of the internet and new ICTs to help carry out diplomatic objectives, including its related goals. It is modern way of pursuing foreign policy which was defined by Frankel (1968) as “consisting of decisions and actions, which involve to some applicable extent relations between one state and others. In the contemporary international relations, digital diplomacy is seen as an important tool in furthering a nation’s foreign policy as it enables direct interaction and engagement with foreign publics.

The use of new methods and forms of carrying out diplomacy cast impact on the

current diplomatic performance and international relations at large, putting the internet and ICT at the centre of achieving foreign policy objectives. Application of websites by governments, foreign ministries, embassies and international organisations is now a standard practice. Adesina (2017) points out to social media as diplomacy's significant and powerful tool providing ultra-fast communication thus enabling actors to interact swiftly. However, the author argues that, social media offers both opportunities and challenges to states and international organisations as they search for connections with latest policy gaps mounting within the scope of internet. Through digital diplomacy, governments can engage with foreign and domestic publics anywhere instantaneously, thereby fast tracking achievement of intended foreign policy goals.

The study by Madu (2018) indicates that, the US geopolitical interests have been largely shaped by building public opinion on foreign policy matters through the internet. Further, the use of internet has increasingly democratised diplomacy by expanding entry to it by both state and non-state actors therefore manipulating the manner in which diplomacy is carried out among countries. On the other hand, Bjola and Holmes (2015) found that the United Kingdom (UK) established an official Office of Digital Diplomacy within its government in order to accelerate realization of its foreign policy ambitions globally. Again, Sweden, France, and Poland incorporated digital tools into their statecraft for similar reasons, while at the same time, Africa has not yet shown much progress in employing digital diplomacy. Evidences from US, UK, Sweden, France and Poland portray specific attention given by the governments to digital diplomacy as a significant apparatus in pursuing foreign policy targets (ibid).

Further, the study by Andrew et al. (2008) pointed towards globalisation, regionalisation and localization being major drivers of digital diplomacy. According to the study, such aspects together, created a structure that involves greater social connectivity in performing different activities to attain foreign policy goals. In the same line, Metzl (2001) maintained that, at the same time the aforementioned features challenge the traditional supremacy of the country in diplomacy, they amplify interdependence at various levels of foreign policy execution as well, and consequently increase the complexity of foreign policy issues. As such, interdependence connects both state and non-state actors, and in that way produces novel relationships among them making collective action easy

in dealing with global challenges. In that regard, execution of foreign policy is shaped by developments in technology (Bjola & Holmes, 2015).

Another study by Hocking et.al (2012), disclosed that contemporary Ministries of Foreign Affairs (MFAs) are no longer made up of elite diplomatic actors but rather a networked multi-stakeholder diplomacy is applied. As a result, the use of digital diplomacy to achieve foreign policy aims is paramount. On the other hand, the role of non-state actors in influencing states' decision making has shaped foreign policy-formulation process (Kelley, 2010), therefore turning them into essential participants in digital diplomacy. Nonetheless, digital diplomacy is allegedly limited during bilateral engagements as most of the countries resort to traditional diplomacy (Schmidt, 2014). Despite such drawbacks, digital diplomacy remains imperative in realizing foreign policy ends (Madu et.al, 2017). This study borrows a leaf from these arguments.

In connection to this view, Kerry (2013) argues that, digital technologies broadly, and social media in particular, facilitate advancement of states' foreign policy aspirations, while linking and fitting into one place diverse people from around the world. The author concludes that digital diplomacy meets the similar fundamental diplomatic purpose of generating discourse among the broadest potential audience. In that regard, notwithstanding a number of factors that have created impetus for digital diplomacy, giving it additional networked, interdependent and multifaceted characteristic, still states continue to be the main actors in international relations (Schmidt, 2014) and so their roles in formulating, promoting and safeguarding foreign policy objectives remains paramount. This study explores the use of digital diplomacy in an environment where the state still dominates international relations.

Christodoulides (2005) had the same opinion about the impact of digital diplomacy, but the scholar examined such significance in relation to the presence of internet for pursuing foreign policy goals. According to this author, the governments of the world may regard internet as an exceptional diplomatic tool they can use to establish their positions on a range of issues and promote their thoughts internationally. In the same vein, Adesina (2017) believes that, appropriate use of digital diplomacy enables the diplomatic mission and state it represents to build a positive image in the receiving state, and eventually permits

achievement of a sending state's foreign policy aims. This body of literature provides the basis for this paper.

4.0 Theoretical Framework

The study adopts the soft power theoretical framework as expounded by Nye (1990) who defined soft power to mean "the ability to set the agenda in world politics through persuasion, enticing and attracting others through the force of one's beliefs, values and ideas, and not through military or economic coercion." In his assumption, Nye distinguishes hard from soft power while showing the relevance of the later. Again, according to Nye (2011), hard power is "the ability to get others to act in ways that are contrary to their initial preferences and strategies." The concept of hard power connotes hard the ability to coerce, through threats and inducements ("sticks" and "carrots"). Unlike hard power, Nye (2004) defines soft power as the ability to get "others to want the outcomes that you want."

Kelley (2010) stresses that, soft power reflects "the ability to achieve goals through attraction rather than coercion. In the end, Nye (2005) brings in the concept of smart power as the "balance of hard and soft power" and finds soft power akin to hard power in international relations. He also believes that soft power surpasses hard power in achieving foreign policy goals in the international arena. Basing on that premise, the MFAEAC can benefit enough by bring into play the digital diplomacy which acts as soft power to convince and create a center of attention towards other actors in international relations, as compared to hard power which is more sophisticated in terms of financial resources, technology and personnel. According to Nye, governments should aspire to positively interact with the citizens of foreign nations in order to advance their interests by means of the attractiveness of their countries' culture, values, institutions and foreign policy, rather than coercion or payment – the traditional tools of *hard* power. This study correlates digital diplomacy to soft power in examining its impact in carrying out Tanzania foreign policy.

5.0 Methodology

The population of the study involved government officials from Tanzania Mainland and Zanzibar, members of Parliament of the United Republic of Tanzania as well as members of the House of Representatives of Zanzibar. The

sample of the research was obtained from the study population by non-probability sampling technique. Purposive sampling was applied in deciding respondents for incorporation into the sample. Case study design was used to advance the information-gathering process with facts being gathered using primary data through two methods namely, a survey using a semi-structured questionnaire, and an interview using key informant interview guide. The data gathered were analysed using content analysis. The questionnaire and interview results were presented in narrative quotations and complemented using thematic analysis. The study was conducted in Dar es Salaam, Dodoma and Zanzibar.

6.0 Findings and Discussion

The study found that the Ministry of Information, Communications and Information Technology (MICIT) formulated National ICT Policy in 2016 which mainly supported the government ministries including MFAEAC to achieve success in service delivery to the public as well as execution of foreign policy. The data collected from the interviews and questionnaires revealed that the government was yet to formulate a definite policy on the use social media to pursue foreign policy objectives. Also, the researchers observed that the New Foreign Policy of 2001 did not cite digital diplomacy mechanisms, although there were mentions of technological advancement being causative of policy change from traditional foreign policy to the new one. Further, the study found that the MFAEAC was in the process of reviewing the 2001 foreign policy, nonetheless, there was no any mention of the focus on digital diplomacy in the reviewed policy.

The research findings substantiate the study made by Bjola and Holmes (2015) who also found that Africa, including Tanzania has not yet shown much improvement in using digital diplomacy as compared to US, UK, Sweden, France and Poland. The abovementioned countries have given special attention to digital diplomacy as important paraphernalia in pursuing foreign policy goals and thereby benefiting from it.

From the data collected, it was found that, despite having no exact policy on digital diplomacy, there were electronic devices used by MFAEAC for video conference meetings between the government and other entities all over the world – particularly during the peak of Covid-19 pandemic. The devices were

also used for communication between the Minister and country representatives abroad to date. Furthermore, e-Government Authority (eGA) had developed a system for e-meetings for all government ministries including MFAEAC. The E-meetings system required users to login using their cheque numbers in order to enhance security and deter misuse of digital devices.

The study validates the general thinking that the usage of websites by foreign ministries, embassies and international organisations has become a normal practice. Similarly, Bjola and Holmes (2015) argued that, digital diplomacy has currently become an extremely regular tool for embassies and consulates which have interactive online websites. Basing on the study, digital diplomacy, through the use of social media has become diplomacy's momentous device that affords a stage for unrestricted communication with the foreign and domestic citizens, and has become a communicator's most influential instrument, therefore facilitating attainment of foreign policy purposes. The same was reported in (Adesina, 2017). Moreover, the study revealed that, the available devices were used for negotiation and communication between MFAEAC and the governments of other East African countries during East African Community (EAC) summits.

The Heads of State were involved in the signing of the final negotiated documents digitally. In order to mitigate the ever looming risk of cyber-attacks the devices and systems were to be checked on a daily basis. The analysis confirms findings of the study done by Verrekia (2017) who discovered that, lately, diplomats and political leaders have begun to understand the means in which they can capitalize on the reputation of technology in this digital age, to improve their engagements in international relations, and ultimately further the foreign policy ends of their countries. However, MFAEAC was yet to submit a bill on digital diplomacy to the Parliament of the United Republic of Tanzania which is the pillar responsible for making laws that affect the implementation of policies. Besides, the study discovered that there was no department or unit responsible for digital diplomacy at MFAEAC as much of the activities were done by the ICT Department in the Ministry. This could be regarded as failure to take advantage of ICT and the internet as explained by Bjola and Holmes, (2015).

However, the study found that, the MFAEAC had its official website, Twitter,

Facebook accounts and a blog which were used to disseminate information in a steady manner, on time and without delays. Despite the fact that digital platforms eased the engagement between the Ministry and foreign and domestic publics on time, the Ministry was yet to develop mechanisms to determine the effectiveness of such platforms and therefore the Ministry was not able to give details on the extent of efficiency the platforms had in connection to the execution of foreign policy. The study by Friedman (2005) unveiled that, the use of internet enables an ever more efficient international division of labour to take details of the comparative advantage of different markets. Thus MFAEAC can effectively pursue economic diplomacy and achieve its foreign policy objectives through the use of digital diplomacy.

Also, the study found that, the MFAEAC used other traditional mechanisms such as Dubai Expo to pursue foreign policy objectives as well. Nevertheless, the mechanisms were allegedly less efficient as compared to digital platforms that would enable the Ministry to reach a huge number of people worldwide within a short time. Expressly, the research verified the studies done by Hocking & Melissen (2015), Madu et.al (2017), and Lovez and Murray (2013), who divulged that, digital diplomacy is a supplement to traditional diplomacy which can help a state to promote its foreign policy goals, expand international reach, and influence people in any other side of the world by using internet or other digital mechanisms to conduct relations between states or other international entities. Therefore, digital diplomacy may be applied to complement traditional diplomacy and foster attainment of foreign policy aims.

In addition, the study discovered that, eGA as the authority mandated to assist government institutions to access shared ICT, facilitates and supports implementation of all sector specific ICT systems and services by preparing standards and guidelines that enhance efficiency of the mentioned platforms following requests from particular ministries. Nonetheless, the MFAEAC was yet to request for such support from eGA. Additionally, MFAEAC was engaging in the use of video conferences as alternative to traditional meetings. By considering the role of eGA and activities of MFAEAC, the circumstance calls for reforms to coordinate the activities of the two institutions to attain the same goal as the case of Germany testifies. It has been reported that, Germany was struggling to go hand in hand with advancement in technology in order to

achieve its foreign policy goals against other states. Stanzel (2018) noted that, the country undertook intensive reforms to influence the exchange of information between its ministry of foreign affairs, embassies located in Germany and foreign ministries of EU member States. Further, the study was informed that, the Committee for Foreign Affairs, Defence and Security (PCFADS) of the Parliament of the United Republic of Tanzania took into account the situation and was determined to direct the MFAEAC to start developing a specific policy on digital diplomacy. As shown earlier, China has also executed a number of reforms in dealing with the question of digital diplomacy. Therefore the need for reforms in the MFAEAC is critical.

The broad picture portrayed from the findings reveals the significance of applying digital platforms to achieve institutional and national goals. Several other studies found that digital diplomacy plays vital role in influencing, facilitating, accelerating and safeguarding foreign policy objectives of various countries globally. For example, Madu (2018) established that, “digital diplomacy allows countries to project their soft power beyond their borders.” Nonetheless, on the practical level, the study informs that there is no specific policy on digital diplomacy that would help to accelerate the accomplishment of foreign policy goals. This statement by Madu is a clear justification of the role of digital diplomacy in influencing attainment of foreign policy aims of any country in the world, including Tanzania.

The study sample from MFAEAC, MICIT, the Parliament, the House of Representatives, eGA and Tanzania Communications Regulatory Authority (TCRA) was used to investigate if there was a specific policy established by the government directing the MFAEAC to use social media to disseminate information, protect and promote foreign policy goals in its relation with other entities, the extent by which foreign policy objectives were reached through the use of digital diplomacy and the measures that could be taken by MFAEAC to ensure that digital diplomacy is fully utilized to win the public and promote foreign policy goals against other entities. Through a combination of answers, the study identified that the country has neither specific policy nor department responsible for digital diplomacy. This means that the country faces some challenges in the execution of foreign policy aspirations given the present-day situation which requires countries to engage more in the use of digital platforms

to interact with various stakeholders both domestic and foreign.

Furthermore, the challenges associated with application of digital devices at MFAEAC indicated that lack of a specific desk, unit or department for digital diplomacy was impeding the achievement of targets planned by the Ministry. As such, its absence was further infringing the activities in the Ministry especially in pursuing economic diplomacy. Studies by Manor (2015) and Madu (2018) maintained that the use of digital apparatus facilitates countries to achieve their foreign policy goals. Further, the study by Bjola and Holmes (2015) denotes that the United Kingdom managed to advance its foreign policy ends by setting up Office of Digital Diplomacy within its government. Besides, the efforts undertaken by Sweden, France, and Poland to include digital tools into their statecraft, is evidence that indicates potentiality of digital diplomacy for achieving foreign policy targets. Therefore, this study is of the view that, the presence of digital diplomacy policy would boost the performance of economic diplomacy policy⁴ at MFAEAC.

Additionally, the study identified challenges in cooperation between the MFAEAC and eGA that to some point obstruct the execution of the Ministry duties effectively, more particularly on the issues related to support on the use of ICT. This problem further infringes the establishment of the department accountable for digital diplomacy and consequently impacting achievement of the mission and vision of the Ministry and the government as well. To put it clear, in one scenario the respondent from MFAEAC asserted that the devices for video conferencing were much secure while the respondents from MICIT, eGA and TCRA warned on the risk of cyber security attack. These contradicting statements imply that there is absence of cooperation in terms of sharing information regarding the devices or systems.

Other researchers found that even world leaders and diplomats now use social media, and Twitter in particular; to speak and engage directly to the audience they seek to influence on particular issues. Also, Internet tools ease diplomatic activities nowadays as they assist diplomats to offer their standpoints or positions regarding policy issues. Christodoulides (2005) noted that “the Internet can be considered by governments as a unique diplomatic instrument; through its

⁴ Tanzania's new foreign policy puts emphasis on economic diplomacy

proper use they can “advertise” not only their positions on different issues, but also promote their ideas worldwide. Such a function, if used in the right way, helps the embassy, and as a result the state that it represents, to create a positive image in the host state” Conversely, this has not been the case in Tanzania where the Tweets posted by leaders are not directly referred to as the position of the government on certain concerns because of absence of the mentioned policy.

On the other hand, the research could not authenticate that the study conforms to soft power theory. Soft power as defined by Nye means the ability to set the agenda in world politics through persuasion, enticing and attracting others through the force of one’s beliefs, values and ideas, and not through military or economic coercion. But, lack of capacity to scan the number of impressions and engagements on social media platforms facing the ICT department entailed difficulties for the study to determine the degree of influence the MFAEAC has on foreign policy issues. The study is of the opinion that, if MFAEAC would be using digital diplomacy it could cater for angles of influence that would enable the country to pursue its goals effectively vis a vis other states in the international arena. Further, digital diplomacy would add to country’s competitive and comparative advantages against other entities in promoting and safeguarding national interests underlined in the New Foreign Policy.

7.0 Conclusion

Revolution in ICTs and its combined force coming out from social media has influenced the way States conduct their relations with one another in Europe, America and Africa. The community is increasingly becoming aware of foreign policy subjects and at the same time seeks to press diplomacy through social media such as Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, Clubhouse, YouTube and other platforms.

Scholars show that digital diplomacy is not only effective in safeguarding, promoting, protecting and execution of foreign policy objects but also noteworthy enough in projecting the position of Tanzania internationally. Furthermore, digital diplomacy acts as a form of soft power in directing the influence of the country on specific issues or range of issues in the international system.

However, governments have to be careful over cyber-attacks. Information

systems at national level are normally prone to attack if such systems are not secure enough and being checked frequently. People have much confidence in digital diplomacy which means that more research and development (R&D) needs to be done. Since the ICT department is incapacitated to inspect the number of impressions and engagements on social media platforms, this confirms the information rendered by Bjola and Holmes (2015) that MFAEAC lags behind in exploiting the benefits of digital diplomacy. This impacts negatively on the achievement of foreign policy goals. MFAEAC has no explicit policy on digital diplomacy despite the fact that it is phenomenon in achieving foreign policy goals and projecting the position of the country over diverse aspects in the global community. The nonexistence of such policy limits the Ministry and the country in general in finding an angle of influence through digital diplomacy which is unquestionably a soft power too. Looking for areas of influence is one of the strategies stipulated in the foreign policy of Tanzania.

Also, absence of a desk, department or unit responsible for digital diplomacy at MFAEAC puts a burden on the shoulders of the ICT department which means some of the objectives might be challenged by lack of personnel to support ICT issues while at the same time supporting the other departments. This comes out from the fact that countries like United Kingdom have gone some steps ahead by establishing Office of Digital Diplomacy which has been very effective since its inception.

8.0 Recommendations

The fact that modern diplomats such as Heads of States, Heads of Governments and Ambassadors use social media to communicate countries' positions and update the public based on their national interests makes digital diplomacy incontrovertibly central in achieving a country's foreign policy targets. This aspect becomes even more imperative to the MFAEAC which is the Ministry in charge of foreign policy purposes in the Tanzania. To that end, the study recommends that the Ministry make reforms and formulate Digital Diplomacy Policy in order to reinforce implementation of the New Foreign Policy of 2001. Further, the Ministry should consider establishing a unit to be designated for ensuring that ambitions of the government are reached through the use of social media to influence country's decisions and position in the world. This may also be done by restructuring the ICT unit of the MFAEAC. The government should

extend cooperation to closely working with the eGA to make sure that its ICT devices are properly secured. One of the steps should be to fast track presentation of a bill on Digital Diplomacy at the Parliament of the United of Republic of Tanzania in order to propel the operation of Digital Diplomacy Policy as part of the New Foreign Policy of the country.

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Disruption of Terrorist Financing in Tanzania: An Analysis of the Legal and Human Rights Framework

By

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Abstract

The terrorist incidents that occurred in the late 1990s and early 2000s in different parts of the world brought a wakeup call to the law enforcement agencies, the intelligence community and the citizens at large on the threats that are apparent to the global peace and security. The major terrorist attacks have been perpetrated by terrorist groups like the Al Qaida and Al Shabab. Terrorism poses threats and imminent danger to the mankind globally and terrorist acts violate human rights. Some people suffer consequences through spill over effects of the attacks. In Tanzania, the August 7, 1998 terrorist attack where two massive bombs exploded simultaneously outside of the U.S. embassies in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, and Nairobi, Kenya, killing 224 people and injuring 5,000, proved that the country was not free from terrorism. It is in this understanding that Tanzania, in a bid to heed an international call to all states to have counterterrorism measures has, in 2002, enacted the Prevention of Terrorism Act. The Act contains provisions on disruption of terrorist financing. It is on this note that this paper analyses the legal and human rights framework on prevention of terrorism generally and disruption of terrorist financing in Tanzania in particular. The research whose methodology was secondary method of data collection, has found that those provisions are effective and human rights compliant.

Keywords: human rights, terrorism, terrorist financing, security challenges.

1. Introduction

Much as terrorism is as old as the history of mankind itself, the terrorist incidents that occurred in the late 1990s and early 2000s opened eyes of the law enforcement agencies, the intelligence community and the citizens at large to the

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threats that are apparent to global peace and security.²

Among the notable terrorist attacks that drew world attention include the August 7, 1998 incident where two massive bombs exploded simultaneously outside of the U.S. embassies in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, and Nairobi, Kenya, killing 224 people and injuring 5,000.³ This incident raised an alarm that terrorist threats and attacks are real. Equally true, the world witnessed that on 11 September 2001, commonly referred to as 9/11; the United States was hit by a set of unprecedented terrorist attacks, calculated to inflict massive civilian casualties and damage. Four hijacked commercial jets crashed, two into the World Trade Center towers in Manhattan, which collapsed shortly thereafter, one on the Pentagon in Washington DC, and the last one in Pennsylvania. Over 3000 people were killed, including hundreds of rescue personnel.⁴ The 9/11 attack was considered the most egregious act of international terrorism. As such, it moved the world to come together and consolidate the available resources to try to defeat terrorism.

In Tanzania, the August 7, 1998 bombing of the United States Embassy in Dar es Salaam marked the first experience for the country to grapple with a terrorist attack. The attack was planned and executed by a terrorist group known as Al-Qaeda under the leadership of Osama Bin Laden. From there onwards, there have been some incidents in the country identified as terrorist attacks. They included acid attacks in Zanzibar and arson attacks on churches. Another incident was a violent attack that took place in October 19, 2020, at Kitaya village, in Mtwara, close to the border with Mozambique. The Islamic State (IS) fighters in Mozambique staged their first claimed attack on this southern part of Tanzania, killing at least 20 people.⁵ The fighters also burned down houses, destroyed an

² The United Republic of Tanzania, Ministry of Finance and Planning, (2022) *A Report on Assessment of Terrorist Financing Risk in Non-Profit Organisations in the United Republic of Tanzania*, p.14.

³ Federica, B. (2000) "Killing a Fly with a Cannon: The American Response to the Embassy Attacks," (See also Aronson, S.L. (2011) "United States Aid to Kenya: A Study on Regional Security and Counterterrorism Assistance Before and After 9/11")

⁴ OECD, (2002) "Economic Consequences of Terrorism," *OECD Economic Outlook*, 71, pp.117-140, p.117.

⁵ Ouassif, A.E. and Kitenge, S.Y. (2021) *Terrorist Insurgency in Northern Mozambique: Context, Analysis, and Spillover Effects on Tanzania*, Policy Centre for the New South, Policy Paper, November, p.12.

armored vehicle, and stole money and military equipment.⁶ Furthermore, there is the incident that took place on 25 August, 2021 where a Tanzanian by the name of Hamza Mohamed aged 33 gunned down three Police officers and a security guard near the French Embassy in Dar es Salaam, before he was gunned down by the Police.⁷

There are some factors which facilitate terrorism to find its ways through different parts of the world. Among them is terrorist financing which in the United Republic of Tanzania emanates from foreign jurisdictions.⁸ Financing is extremely important resource for terrorist groups to survive and carry out their activities. As such disrupting terrorist financing is found to be one of terrorist counter-measures. It is on this basis that this paper critically analyses the legal and human rights framework related to terrorist financing in Tanzania. The main objective is to inquire into the effectiveness of the provisions of the Prevention of Terrorism Act⁹ generally and on disruption of terrorist financing in particular. But the paper starts with an investigation into the stake of terrorist activities on Tanzanian territory and also investigates whether the provisions of the Act are human rights compliant.

2. Methodology

This study used secondary data. The study was conducted through library research and literature survey. The research involved a review and assessment of various sources. Those sources included peer-reviewed journal articles and other literature reviews as found in cited footnotes in the main body of the paper and references part. Other sources in the form of theses, official reports and documents, text books and statutes were referred to.

3. Legal Framework, Meaning and the Effects of Terrorism

The effects of terrorism are far reaching. Terrorist attacks affect country's human capital, which is the most vital component in the national development. Furthermore, the attacks put a burden on the economy and society in terms of lost economic opportunities. The burden also goes to the increase in security expenditure. Sometimes funds are inevitably diverted to security matters. This is

⁶ *Ibid.*

⁷ The United Republic of Tanzania, Ministry of Finance and Planning, (2022), *op cit*, p.16.

⁸ The United Republic of Tanzania, Ministry of Finance and Planning, (2022), *op cit*, p.13.

⁹ Cap.19 [R.E. 2002].

because the occurrence of the terrorist attacks might have not been anticipated during the budget sessions.

3.1 Concept of Terrorism

Defining the term “terrorism” is somewhat difficult and complex. So far there is no consensus on what should be the definition of terrorism common to all people worldwide. The High Court of Tanzania, which has original jurisdiction to try terrorist offences,¹⁰ is aware of the difficulty that arises in defining the term “terrorism” where Mlyambina, J. stated in the case of *Republic v. Seif Abdallah Chombo @ Baba Fatima and Five Others*¹¹ that:

“Despite the fact that terrorism has been troubling humanity for many years, it has defied any attempt to define it in very clear terms. Lucid efforts at global, regional and national levels to define this subject have not been successful. Even courts within one nation have come up with different interpretation of what constitutes terrorism.”

It is easy to recognize terrorism but difficult to define it. This is due to the fact that terrorist activities take different dimensions aimed at achieving or furthering some ideological, religious or political objectives. Terrorism is therefore used as a strategy or means of expressing political, religious or social grievances by aggrieved individuals or groups.¹² Moreover, the changing nature of tactics that are used to effect terrorist attacks in the contemporary world complicates the matter. Terrorists are fast in adapting to new developments in communication. They use apps, social media sites and other online content-sharing services to communicate and coordinate their actions across the globe and to disseminate terrorist content.

Edwin Bakker and Beatrice de Graaf attempt to define terrorism by arguing that:

¹⁰ Terrorist offences are tried in ordinary courts in Tanzania. There is no special court established for hearing these cases only. Under the Prevention of Terrorism Act, Cap.19 [R.E. 2002], section 34, it is the High Court, which has original jurisdiction to try these offences. All rights and obligations pertaining to any accused person of any other criminal offences are also available to the accused persons of terrorist offences. Those laws include mainly the Criminal Procedure Act, Cap.20 [R.E. 2022], sections 5, 11, 13, 14 and 23 and the Evidence Act, Cap. 6 [R.E. 2022].

¹¹ The High Court of the United Republic of Tanzania, The Corruption and Economic Crime Division at Songea Sub Registry, Economic Case No. 4 of 2022 (Unreported).

¹² See Kunaka, K. (2021) “An Analysis of the Transnational Diffusion of Terrorism in Africa: The Case of Ansar Al-Sunna Armed Group in Northern Mozambique *African Journal on Terrorism*, Vol.11 No.1, December, pp.91-106, p.91.

“What is terrorism and what is the essence of this phenomenon? Even after more than fifty years of research into terrorism, there is no generally accepted answer to this question. Nonetheless, many scholars, as well as practitioners, would probably agree that terrorism is an instrument that – by way of threats and attacks – aims to create fear and anxiety and wants to intimidate people in order to achieve certain political goals. Most definitions of terrorism include direct and indirect goals that relate to the spread of fear.”¹³

According to Ferdinand Temba and Ignas Punge, terrorism has been described as unlawful threatening of the use of violence against individuals or property to coerce and intimidate governments or societies for political, religious or ideological objectives.¹⁴ Komakeeh on the other hand defines terrorism as the unlawful use of violence and intimidation, especially against civilians in the pursuit of political aims.¹⁵

Terrorism has been defined in one report on terrorism and transnational organized crime in West Africa in the following words:

“In this report, terrorism is defined as the premeditated use or threat of use of violence by an individual or group to cause fear, destruction or death, especially against unarmed targets, property or infrastructure in a state, intended to compel those in authority to respond to the demands and expectations of the individual or group behind such violent acts. Their demands or expectations may be for a change in status quo in terms of the political, economic, ideological, religious or social order within the affected state, or for a change in the (in)actions or policies of the affected state in relation to its interaction with (an)other group(s) or states.”¹⁶

Lack of common definition of the term “terrorism” is even seen within

¹³ Bakker, E. & de Graaf, B. (2014) *Towards a Theory of Fear Management in the Counterterrorism Domain: A Stocktaking Approach*, ICCT Research Paper, International Centre for Counter-Terrorism, The Hague, January, p.2.

¹⁴ Temba, F.M. & Punge, I.S. (2014) “The Fight against Terrorism and the Protection of Human Rights in Tanzania: A Critical Analysis of the Prevention of Terrorism Act, 2002,” *The Tanzania Lawyer: Journal of the Tanganyika Law Society*, Vol. 1 No.2, pp. 1-41, p. 7.

¹⁵ Komateeh, M.T. (2020) “Terrorism in East Africa,” *The Defender Magazine*, Senior Command and Staff College, Senior Command and Staff College, Kimaka, Jinja, Vol.15 No.15, June, p.146.

¹⁶ Onuoha, F.C. & Ezirin, G.E. (2013) “*Terrorism and Transnational Organised Crime in West Africa*, Report, Al Jazeera Center for Studies, 24 June, pp.2-3.

government quarters. It is for instance noted that there are various definitions of terrorism offered by the different governmental departments in the USA. The United States House of Representatives Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence defines terrorism as the illegitimate, premeditated violence or threat of violence by subnational groups against persons or property with the intent to coerce a government by installing fear amongst the populace.¹⁷ On the other hand, State Department refers to “terrorism” as premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience.¹⁸ According to FBI, “terrorism” is defined as the unlawful use, or threatened use, of force or violence by a group or individual... committed against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives.¹⁹ Enders and Sandler define terrorism as:

“...the premeditated use or threat of use of extra-normal violence or brutality by sub-national groups to obtain a political, religious or ideological objective through intimidation of a huge audience, usually not directly involved with the policy making that the terrorists seek to influence.”²⁰

The Indian Supreme Court has once attempted to define the term “terrorism” in the case of *Hitendra Vishnu Thakur v. State of Maharashtra*²¹, where Dr. Anand, J. has perceptively given a detailed description thereof by stating that:

‘Terrorism’ is one of the manifestations of increased lawlessness and cult of violence. Violence and crime constitute a threat to an established order and are a revolt against a civilized society. ‘Terrorism’ has not been defined under TADA²² nor is it possible to give a precise definition of ‘terrorism’ or lay down what constitutes ‘terrorism’...A ‘terrorist’ activity does not merely arise by causing disturbance of law and order or of public order...Experience has shown us that ‘terrorism’ is generally an attempt to acquire or maintain power or control by intimidation and causing fear and

¹⁷ Schmid, A. (2014) “Terrorism -The Definitional Problem,” *Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law*, Vol.56, Issue 2, 375-419, 377.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁹ *Ibid.*

²⁰ Enders, W. & Sandler, T. (2002) “Patterns of Transnational Terrorism, 1970-1999: Alternative Time-Series Estimates,” *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol.46, pp.145-165, p.146.

²¹ 1994 AIR 2623; 1994 SCC (4) 602.

²² TADA is an abbreviation of the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987.

helplessness in the minds of the people at large or any section thereof and is a totally abnormal phenomenon. What distinguishes 'terrorism' from other forms of violence, therefore, appears to be the deliberate and systematic use of coercive intimidation.”

In Tanzania the Prevention of Terrorism Act²³ does not define the term “terrorism”. However, the Act merely lists acts which constitute terrorism, that is to say it defines terrorist acts.²⁴ Under section 4 of the Act, an act constitutes terrorism if it seriously damages a country or an international organization and is intended to seriously intimidate a population, unduly compel a government to perform or abstain from performing any act, or seriously destabilize or destroy the fundamental political, constitutional, economic or social structure of the country or international organization.²⁵ The Act also provides that an act also constitutes terrorism within the scope of legal framework if it is an act or threat of action which involves serious bodily harm to a person; involves serious damage to property; endangers a person's life; creates a serious risk to the health or safety of the public or a section of the public; involves the use of firearms or explosives; involves releasing into the environment or any part of it or distributing or exposing the public or any part of it to any dangerous, hazardous, radioactive or harmful substance; any toxic chemical; any microbial or other biological agent or toxin.²⁶

Looking closely at these and other different definitions of terrorism by various authors, there are, some elements frequently used by them when defining the term. According to Schmid *et al* who conducted a thorough analysis of several definitions on terrorism, the following are some main elements used in the definitions of terrorism: (a) violence, force, (b) political, (c) fear, terror emphasized, (d) threat, (e) psychological effects and (anticipated) reactions, (f) victim-target differentiation, and (g) purposive, planned, systematic, organized action.²⁷

²³Cap.19 [R.E. 2002].

²⁴ *Ibid.*, s.4.

²⁵*Ibid.*, s.4(2)

²⁶ *Ibid.*, s. 4(3).

²⁷ Schmid, C. *et al.* (1988) *Political Terrorism: A New Guide to Actors, Authors, Concepts, Data Bases, Theories, and Literature*, Transaction Books, North Holland, Amsterdam, p.27.

Gathering from what has been stated above, terrorism may be defined as the unlawful use of threat and violence against targeted individuals or groups of people in a society in order to achieve political, religious or ideological goals. The use of threat and violence by terrorists serves as a means of sending a message through instilling or causing fear, destruction of property or infrastructure or death thereby coercing or intimidating governments or societies so that their objectives are achieved. In this understanding, terrorism aims to create fear of insecurity and belief in the targeted section of the society that it is no longer protected by leaders in power and their socio-economic and political rights are not taken care of.

3.2 Terrorism and Violation of Human Rights

According to the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, human rights are universal values and legal guarantees that protect individuals and groups against actions and omissions that interfere with fundamental freedoms, entitlements and human dignity.²⁸ The full spectrum of human rights involves respect for, and protection and fulfillment of, civil, cultural, economic, political and social rights, as well as the right to development. Human rights are universal—in other words, they belong inherently to all human beings—and are interdependent and indivisible.²⁹ Terrorism constitutes a serious violation of human rights and poses threats to peace, security, development and democracy in the world. It is one of the major threats to humanity and it continues to be a danger to world peace. As a result, it denies the targeted communities or peoples their fundamental right to be protected from such acts and to live freely without any fear or threats. The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, states that:

“Terrorism clearly has a very real and direct impact on human rights, with devastating consequences for the enjoyment of the right to life, liberty and physical integrity of victims. In addition to these individual costs, terrorism can destabilize Governments, undermine civil society, jeopardize peace and security, and threaten social and economic development. All of these also have a real impact on the enjoyment of human rights.”³⁰

²⁸Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Human Rights, Terrorism and Counter-terrorism, Fact Sheet No. 32, p.3.

²⁹ *Ibid.*

³⁰ *Ibid.*, p.1.

It has also been stated that:

“It is widely accepted that terrorism constitutes a violation of human rights, especially the rights to physical integrity, life, freedom and security and also impedes socio-economic rights. All acts of terror —whether by a state or groups of individuals - seriously impair the enjoyment of human rights by persons in the places targeted. Thousands of people all over the world have lost their lives as a consequence of terrorist acts.”³¹

From what has been stated above, it is apparent that terrorism denies people of the enjoyment of all human rights and fundamental freedoms, ranging from economic, social to cultural rights. This is because terrorism touches all aspects of human rights as stipulated under all declarations, covenants and conventions.³² The Universal Declaration of Human Rights³³ provides for the right to equality, freedom from discrimination,³⁴ the right to life, liberty,³⁵ and personal security,³⁶ freedom from slavery,³⁷ and freedom from torture and degrading treatment.³⁸ Terrorist activities violate almost every sphere of human life, be it economic, political or social.³⁹ It also violates people’s enjoyment of cultural rights. Cultural Rights are rights related to art and culture. They are human rights that aim at assuring the enjoyment of culture and its components in condition of equality, human dignity and non-discrimination.⁴⁰

Terrorist attacks affect everyone in the targeted areas and beyond either directly or indirectly. In fact, they pose a serious violation of human rights and a threat to

³¹ Lumira, C. (2007) “Counter-terrorism legislation and the protection of human rights: A survey of selected international practice,” *African Human Rights Law Journal*, Vol. 7, pp.35 -65, pp. 59-60.

³² Omar, M. (2018) *Draft Report on Negative Effects of Terrorism on the Enjoyment of Human Rights*, Human Rights Council Advisory Committee, Twenty-first session, 6-10 July, A/HRC/AC/21/CRP.2, 23 July, p.4.

³³ The Universal Declaration of Human Rights was proclaimed by the United Nations General Assembly in Paris on 10 December 1948 (General Assembly resolution 217 A) as a common standard of achievements for all peoples and all nations. It sets for the first time, fundamental human rights to be universally protected.

³⁴ Arts. 1 and 2

³⁵ Art. 3.

³⁶ Art. 3.

³⁷ Art. 4.

³⁸ Art. 5.

³⁹ Omar, M., *op cit.*

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*

peace, security, development and democracy.⁴¹ They also endanger the social fabric and economic development. Nations grapple with effects of terrorism, which range from claiming several lives of innocent human beings to destabilizing state governments, sovereignties and socio-economic stabilities. Effects of terrorism are felt not only by the targeted individuals or groups but also the world at large. What varies is the magnitude and frequency of the terrorist attacks.

Worth mentioning is the Mumbai Attack on 26th November, 2008, which shook not only entire Indian nation but also its tremors were felt across the world.⁴² The attack was among the deadliest acts of terrorism ever to occur in India. According to official figures, the 60-hour-long multiple strikes that started on the night of 26 November 2008 and lasted until 29 November 2008, across the India's financial capital, left at least 164 civilians and security personnel dead (including 26 foreign nationals) and 304 people injured.⁴³ On 11th July, 2010 the near simultaneous twin terrorist attacks took place in the Ugandan capital city of Kampala at the Ethiopian Village restaurant in Kabalabala and Kyadondo Rugby Club, where hundreds of football fans were watching the World Cup finals. In these incidents, 76 people were killed and at least 85 others were injured.⁴⁴ On April 2, 2015, gunmen affiliated with Somali's Al-Shabab jihadist – terror group, entered Garissa University College, Kenya, killing 148 and wounding dozens.⁴⁵

3.3 Some Economic Effects of Terrorism

Terrorism has direct impact on the society's economic wellbeing. It has direct and indirect economic costs. The direct economic costs include the destruction of

⁴¹ See preamble to the Protocol to the OAU Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism.

⁴² Chowdhary, G.K.N. (2010) "Editorial", *The Indian Police Journal*, Vol. LVII, No.3, July-September, pp. 2-3, p. 2.

⁴³ Vaidya, A. (2017) "The 26/11 Mumbai Terror Attack: A Comparative Analysis of Indian and Pakistan Print Media," *World Affairs: The Journal of International Issues*, Vol.21, No.4 Winter (October-December), pp. 98-109, p.98.

⁴⁴ James, K. (2022) *State Capacity and Counter-terrorism Measures in Uganda*, Dissertation Submitted to the Directorate of Research and Graduate Training in partial Fulfilment of the Requirements for the Award of Master of Arts in International Relations and Diplomatic Studies, Makerere University, March, p.18. See also *The New York Times*, July12, 2010.

⁴⁵ Odhiambo, E.O. S. *et al.* (2015) "Learning Institutions' Vulnerability to Terrorism: An Overview of Issue Coverage in Nowadays' Media and Specialised Literature & A Case Study of Garissa University College, Kenya," *Defense Resources Management*, Vol.6, Issue 2 (11), pp.21-29, at p.26. See also Shihundu, F. *et al.* (2021) "Experience of Terrorism in Kenya: What are the Vulnerabilities and Strengths?", *African Journal on Terrorism*, Vol.11, No.1, December, pp.127-144, at pp.129-130.

life and property, whereas indirect costs, whereas indirect costs cover such aspects as undermining consumer and investor confidence within the affected country.⁴⁶ Terrorism has effects to the victims globally ranging from losses from deaths, injuries and property destruction. It is on record that the global economic impact of terrorism reached US\$52 billion in 2017, increasing by two thirds in the ten years from 2008.⁴⁷ The terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001 in New York and Washington D.C. had large economic impacts, with the losses from deaths, injuries and property destruction amounting to US\$73 billion.⁴⁸ This excludes the indirect costs to the US economy in general, which has been estimated at between 0.7 and one per cent of US GDP, or up to US\$190 billion. The total economic cost of terrorism in Africa from 2007 to 2016 is at a minimum US\$119 billion.⁴⁹

As a result, economic undertakings become vulnerable whenever there is a terrorist attack, thereby reducing the number of jobs and total earnings among other things. Brodeur, who carried out a survey on economic consequences of the successful and failed terror attacks, found that successful attacks, in comparison to failed attacks, reduce the number of jobs and total earnings in targeted areas in a post-attacks period.⁵⁰ It needs to be understood that terrorist attacks render an economic environment in the affected country unstable for investment. Terrorism causes economic disruption. It has been argued that:

“The immediate economic costs of terrorism can be measured in terms of the value of lives lost, the disability that results from the injuries, and the destruction of private and public property.”⁵¹

It is further noted that:

⁴⁶ Johnston, R.B. & Nedelescu, O.M. (2005) *The Impact of Terrorism on Financial Markets*, IFM Working Paper, WP/05/60, March, pp. 3-4.

⁴⁷ UNDP, (2019) *Measuring the Economic Impact of Violent Extremism Leading to Terrorism in Africa*, The research undertaken under the UNDP regional project entitled Preventing and Responding to Violent Extremism (PVE) in Africa: A Development Approach, with the support of the Government and people of Japan, The Report, p. 1.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*

⁵⁰ Brodeur, A. (2018) "The Effect of Terrorism on Employment and Consumer Sentiment: Evidence from Successful and Failed Terror Attacks." *American Economic Journal: Applied Economics*, 10 (4), pp. 246-282. p. 246.

⁵¹ Bardwell, H. & Iqbal, M. (2021) "The Economic Impact of Terrorism from 2000-2018", *Peace Economics, Peace Science and Public Policy Journal*, 27(2); 227-261, 227.

“Depending on the scale and frequency of the terrorist events within a country, the economic impact of terrorism on growth, investment, consumption and tourism is a serious threat to the economic development and growth of a country. Terrorism alters economic behaviour, primarily by changing investment and consumption patterns.”⁵²

In case of tourism industry, this is one of the economic undertakings where terrorism destroys capital and reduces the economic capacity of affected countries worldwide. Tourism industry is an important sector in most countries around the world. In fact, tourism is just not an industry; but it has multidimensional influence on the economy and the living standards of people.⁵³ Globally, tourism contributes significantly to the national economies in terms of employment creation and revenue generation.⁵⁴ It is playing a great role in world's economy.⁵⁵ Tourism is one of the major contributors in economic development, such as creating revenues, jobs, supporting culture and entertainment. There are many industries that show positive relations with the growth of tourism industry. Examples are hotel and lodging industry, food and beverage industry, transport industry, tour operations and industries which are dealing with real estate, finance and insurance.⁵⁶

Africa, just like the other regions in the globe, is affected by international terrorism both in terms of massive loss of lives and property as well as economic development.⁵⁷ It needs to be understood that tourism is one of the largest and fastest growing economic sectors globally. However, while tourism generates lots of money in addition to promoting international cohesion, it is not immune to terrorism and terror attacks. The impact of terrorism on the travel and

⁵² *Ibid.*

⁵³ Khan, Y.H. (2018) “The Impact of Terrorism on Tourism Destination Image and Development,” *Asian Administration and Management Review*, Vol. 1 No. 2, July-December, pp. 71-87, p.71.

⁵⁴ Zhou, Z. (2022) “Critical Shifts in the Global Tourism Industry: Perspectives from Africa,” *GeoJournal* 87: 1245–1264, 1246. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s10708-020-10297-y>, 0123456789(), - volV() 0123458697(),.1

⁵⁵ Aunga, D.A.O. and Mselemo, F. (2021) “Terrorism: A Threat to Tourism Industry in Arusha Region,” *International Journal of Advanced Research*, 6(6), 431-445, 431.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*

⁵⁷ Anangwe, A. (2004) “International Terrorism and East African sub-regionalism: Developing a Sub-regional Tourism Industry in the Face of War.” *African Journal of International Affairs*, Vol. 7, Nos. 1&2, pp. 81–97, p.82.

tourism industry can be enormous.⁵⁸ It can lead to unemployment, homelessness, deflation, depression and many other social and economic ills. The contribution of tourism for many countries is so great that any downturn in the industry is a cause of major concern for many governments.⁵⁹

Terrorism is an enigmatic and compelling phenomenon, and its relationship with tourism is complex and multifaceted.⁶⁰ To say the least, terrorism is the biggest factor, which pushes tourism industry down. Terrorism brings fear to tourists, which demotes tourism.⁶¹ In East Africa, there has been a slump in the tourism industry because the region has shared infrastructure like railway lines, road networks, harbours and airports.⁶² As such spill-over effects of terrorist threats and attacks are felt either directly or indirectly throughout the region.

In recent years, Kenya and its people have witnessed a surge in terrorist attacks, violent extremism.⁶³ In 2002, two terror attacks were carried out in the Coastal City of Mombasa. In one attack, an all-terrain vehicle crashed through a barrier outside the Paradise Hotel in Kikambala and blew up, killing 13 people and injuring 80.⁶⁴ In another attack, terrorists fired two off-target surface-to-air missiles at an Israeli charter plane that was leaving the Moi International Airport. Following the 2002 attacks, Kenya maintained a relative time of calm for slightly over a decade.⁶⁵ However, this peace has been violently disrupted over the last three years with the Country witnessing several attacks that have resulted in the loss of lives and property. The most notable attacks have been the Westgate Attack (2013), the Mpeketoni Attack (2014) and the Garissa University Attack (2015).⁶⁶ Kenya has further borne the brunt of terrorism by

⁵⁸ Diriye, H.G. (2015) *The Effect of Terrorism on Tourism in Africa in the 21st Century: A Case Study of Kenya*, A Research Project Submitted in Partial Fulfilment of The Requirements for the Award of Master of Arts Degree in International Studies, University of Nairobi, p. xii.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*

⁶¹ Ranabhat, K., (2015) *Effects of Terrorism in Tourism Industry: A Case Study of 9/11 Terrorist Attacks in World Trade Center*, Bachelor's Thesis, Central University of Applied Sciences Degree Program in Tourism, p. ii.

⁶² Anangwe, A. (2004), *op cit.*, p.91.

⁶³ UNDP, (2017) *Articulating the Pathways of the Impact of Terrorism and Violent Extremism on the Kenyan Economy*, Policy Brief, Issue No: 1/2017, pp.1 -5, p.1.

⁶⁴ UNODC, *Kenya Training Manual on Human Rights and Criminal Justice Responses to Terrorism*, p. vii.

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*

sending its soldiers to the war-torn neighbouring Somalia under the aegis of AMISOM where several casualties and deaths have been reported despite the good progress made by the troops in neutralizing the threats of terrorism.⁶⁷

Tourism is one of the key sectors in the Kenyan economy and a major source of foreign exchange earnings. The Kenyan tourism industry, which was most affected following Al Shabab frequent terrorist attacks, bears testimony. The country has witnessed a decline in visitor arrivals from peak of 1.8 million visitors in 2011 to about 1.5 million in 2013.⁶⁸ Terrorist threats and attacks were identified as the major reasons for the decline

According to Aunga and Mselemo who conducted a research on terrorism as a threat to tourism industry in Arusha Region, Tanzania, in 2018, there was a drop of income in tour operating companies. This implies that terrorist activities cause a drop on income in tour operating companies, which is a result of the decrease on the number of tourists visiting Arusha tourist destinations. Hotel occupancy levels plunged from an average of 75% to 14%.⁶⁹

In view of what has been stated above, there is a need to understand and appreciate the economic impact of terrorism so that there is equitable re-allocation of financial resources in the post-terrorist attacks period. It has been noted that:

“Understanding the economic impact of terrorism provides a substantial evidence base for evaluating the allocation of financial resources to counterterrorism programs and activities. The estimate of the economic impact of terrorism is useful to inform policymakers as an evidence base for evaluations such as a cost-benefit analysis of terrorism prevention programs.”⁷⁰

3.4 Terrorism and Politics

Terrorist activities have effects on politics. In the most affected areas, terrorism destabilizes political arrangements, makes the political system vulnerable. It

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*

⁶⁸ Bugut, S. (2018) Effect of Terrorism on Demand for Tourism in Kenya,” *Tourism and Hospitality Research: a Comparative Analysis*, Vol.18, No.1, pp. 28-37, p.28.

⁶⁹ Aunga, D.A.O. and Mselemo, F. (2021), *op cit.*, p.439.

⁷⁰ Bardwell, H. & Iqbal, M. (2021), *op cit.*

challenges the existing political institutions so that the country becomes ungovernable. Frequent terrorist attacks may bring political instability – sometimes turning citizens against their governments and causing insecurity. All these impacts have effect on national development as noted by one Kenyan researcher that:

“Terrorism directly affects development of a country. Its direct cost on human life and injuries implies that people who have been victims cannot engage in productive activities or may not reach the productivity levels they had before the attack and more resources allocated in the securing the country would compromise national development agenda. The death of 147 Garissa University College students denied the country potential young and productive citizens who would, otherwise, have been absorbed into productive sectors of the economy.”⁷¹

At individual level, the surviving victims have to feel insecure due to wide spread of fear and also grapple with psychological trauma resulting from what they underwent during the attacks. Frequent attacks have rendered institutions and premises such as places of worship, schools, shops, restaurants and other public utilities unsafe. As a result, tight security measures have to be taken in order to have access to such places. Not only so but also deaths or fatal injuries to breadwinners result into loss of family incomes. More so, looking after victims who sustained permanent disabilities becomes a burden on close relatives whose income generating activities might be at times paralyzed.

4. Disruption of Terrorist Financing

The legal framework on prevention of terrorism generally and disrupting terrorist financing in particular in Tanzania is effective and complies with human rights provisions. Those human rights provisions are enshrined in the Constitution of the United Republic of Tanzania of 1977.⁷² It has been noted that perpetrators of terrorism are financially facilitated by various individuals, organizations and agents so that they are able to carry out their activities. Terrorists need money for running their camps, feed their members and plan and carry out attacks on their targets. Terrorist organizations will not survive for

⁷¹ Kanyange, M.M. (2016) *International Terrorism and its Psycho-social Impacts in Africa: A Case Study of Kenya, 1998-2015*, A Research Project Submitted in Partial Fulfilment for the Requirements of Degree of Master of arts in International Studies, University of Nairobi, October, pp.54-55.

⁷² Cap.2 [R.E. 2002], Arts. 12-32.

long without constant supply of money for their sustenance.⁷³

The Prevention of Terrorism Act⁷⁴ applies throughout the United Republic of Tanzania (both in Tanzania mainland and Zanzibar).⁷⁵ This legal position is clarified by the case of the *Republic v. Shaaban Morris Gama and Three Others*⁷⁶ where the Court of Appeal of Tanzania decided on the application of the Act by holding that it is applicable throughout the United Republic of Tanzania. So far there is no common definition of the term “terrorism” across the world. Different attempts are in place to define the term. Even the Prevention of Terrorism Act⁷⁷ is silent on defining the term. It only defines the “terrorist act” under section 4.

Given Tanzania’s proximity to countries where Al-Qaida, Al-Shabab and other terrorist organizations are based, presents a serious spill over risk for radicalization and recruitment in Tanzania. Indeed, Tanzanians have been reported to have been among the foreigners fighting for Al-Shabab in Kenya and Somalia. In 2015 a Tanzanian was involved in the Al-Shabab attack in Garissa University College in Kenya killing 150 people, mostly students. This is an indication that there are possible secret terrorist networks connected to Al-Qaida, Al-Shabab and other terrorist organizations operating in the country. Table 1 bellow, shows the status of acts of violence perpetuated by various non-state actors such as terrorist groups, clan militants, community militants and unidentified armed groups:

Table 1: Violent incidences in the four EAC Countries

	2016	2017	2018	2019	Total
Kenya	54	225	145	42	466
Somalia	854	1,007	1,224	1,062	4,137
Tanzania	13	25	9	10	57
Uganda	36	40	59	36	171

Source: Global Terrorism Database⁷⁸

⁷³ *Ibid.*

⁷⁴ Cap.19 [R.E. 2002].

⁷⁵ See the Prevention of Terrorism Act, Cap.19 [R.E. 2002], s.2.

⁷⁶ Court of Appeal of Tanzania, Criminal Appeal Case No. 269 of 2010 (Unreported).

⁷⁷ Cap.19 [R.E. 2002].

⁷⁸ We acknowledge to have retrieved the table from the United Republic of Tanzania, Financial Intelligence Unit, (2022) *Terrorist Financing and Hawala Risk Assessment Report*, 2022, May, p.2.

The figures in the Table 1 above indicate that Tanzania experienced significantly fewer cases when compared to other neighbouring countries. It should, however, be underscored that the ISIS-Mozambique situation is worth taking note of and currently it poses the greatest threat to Tanzania, having conducted at least two attacks inside Tanzania between 2019 and 2020.⁷⁹ It is apparent that the threat posed by terrorism today is complex. The complexity comes from the fact that it is sometimes connected to a number of other international threats thereby posing threats to tranquility and global stability.

Matters get worse as perpetrators of terrorism are financially facilitated by various individuals, organizations and agents so that they are able to carry out this most heinous crime. It has been noted that the growth and continued spread of terrorism world-wide has been accentuated by the important role played by finance.⁸⁰ Terrorists need money for running their recruitment of new members, camps, feed their members and plan and carry out attacks on their targets. Terrorist organizations will not survive for long without constant supply of money for their sustenance.⁸¹

4.1 Concept of Terrorist Financing

Terrorist financing may be understood in the following context: The UN Convention for the Suppression of Financing Terrorism provides the definition of terrorist financing under article 2(1).⁸² It does so in the course of criminalizing terrorist financing by stating that:

“Any person commits an offence within the meaning of this Convention if that person by any means, directly or indirectly, unlawfully and willfully, provides or collects funds...in order to carry out: (a) an act which constitutes an offence within the scope of and as defined in one of the treaties listed in the annex; or (b) any other act intended to cause death or serious bodily injury to a civilian, or to any other person not taking an active part in the hostilities in a situation of armed conflict, when the purpose of

⁷⁹ The United Republic of Tanzania, Financial Intelligence Unit, *Ibid*, p.3.

⁸⁰ Attah, C.E. (2016) “Financing Terrorism in Nigeria: Cutting off the Oxygen,” *Africa Development*, Volume XLIV, No. 2, pp.5-25, p.5.

⁸¹ *Ibid*.

⁸² The objective of the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism is to enhance international cooperation among States in devising and adopting effective measures for the prevention of the financing of terrorism, as well as for its suppression through the prosecution and punishment of its perpetrators.

such act, by its nature or context, is to intimidate a population, or to compel a government or an international organization to do or to abstain from doing any act”⁸³

In short, the Convention provides that terrorist financing is the provision or collection of funds to commit terrorist acts. The World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) also define terrorist financing as “the financial support, in any form, of terrorism or of those who encourage, plan or engage in it”⁸⁴ It should be understood that terrorists need funds in order to carry out their day to day activities and operations. Thus, terrorist countermeasures, including suppressing terrorist funding at global, regional and national levels are necessary.

According to the Financial Intelligence Unit in Tanzania, the definition of funds for the purpose of terrorist financing means assets of every kind, whether corporeal or incorporeal, tangible or intangible, movable or immovable, however acquired, and legal document or instruments in any form, including electronic or digital, evidencing title to, or interest in, such asset and will include instrumentalities provided and used for the purpose of terrorist activity.⁸⁵ Terrorism financing typically involves four stages - the first being raising of funds through donations, self-funding (micro-loans or wages), or criminal activity; the second stage involves transferring funds to a terrorist, terror network, organization, or cell and third stage storage and fourth stage is using the funds, for instance, to purchase weapons to make payments to terrorists or insurgents, or to fund expenses of terror networks.⁸⁶

Gathering from what has been stated above, terrorist financing can be referred to as an act of providing funds or property that has monetary value to individual terrorists or terrorist groups or persons and groups engaged in terrorist activities or engaging in financial transactions with terrorist groups with an intention to enable them carry out terrorist acts and activities. It is resourcing

⁸³ The International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, Art. 2.

⁸⁴ World Bank & International Monetary Fund (2003) *Reference Guide to Anti-Money Laundering and Combating the Financing of Terrorism*, World Bank and IMF, Washington DC, United States.

⁸⁵ The United Republic of Tanzania, Financial Intelligence Unit, (2022) *Terrorist Financing Risk Assessment Report, 2022* (Revised in June, 2023), p.1.

⁸⁶ *Ibid.*

terrorists so that they are assured of their sustainability and carrying out their activities. This money can come from both legal and illegal sources. That is legal and illegal money-making activities are involved to raise funds for that purpose.

Legal activities may include profits from businesses, gifts and donations from sympathetic groups, charities and foundations. Illegal activities include criminal acts such as kidnapping for ransom, extortion, large-scale smuggling of end-use goods, narcotics trafficking, robbery, theft,⁸⁷ human trafficking, money laundering, illegal trafficking in small arms and light weapons (SALWs), trading or dealing in counterfeit products,⁸⁸ marine and wildlife criminal activities,⁸⁹ or direct provision of equipment to cells and the like. Regarding narcotics trafficking, which could support terrorist activities, the Financial Intelligence Unit in Tanzania provides that:

“Tanzania is located along major heroin trafficking routes from Southwest Asia. Tanzania’s location, porous borders and corruption present challenges to drug interdictions. Between June 2019 to December 2021, Tanzania experienced a surge on drug trafficking, and illegal trafficking of precursor chemicals and UNODC and other international partners have been at the forefront working with Tanzania to combat the surge. A total of 1100kg of heroin and 452 kg of Methamphetamine were seized by DCEA through the illicit drug trafficking of Southern Route from South East Asia.”⁹⁰

Tanzania has been used as a transit route for drugs from Asia and the Middle East en route to the southern part of the continent and finally to the United States and Europe.⁹¹ In the process, some of the drugs remain in the country and

⁸⁷ Financial Action Task Force (FATF) (2002) *Report on Money Laundering Typologies 2001-2002*, Feb, pp.2-7.

⁸⁸ For detailed discussion on counterfeit products and their effects, see Kaniki, A.O.J. (2014) “Proliferation of Counterfeit Products in Tanzania: A Threat to Human Security,” *The Tanzania Lawyer: Journal of the Tanganyika Law Society*, Vol. 1 No.2, pp. 42-73.

⁸⁹ Kideghesho, J.R. (2016) “Reversing the Trend of Wildlife Crime in Tanzania: Challenges and Opportunities,” *Biodiversity and Conservation*, March, Vol. 25(3), pp.427-449, p.427.

⁹⁰ The United Republic of Tanzania, Financial Intelligence Unit, (2022) *Terrorist Financing Risk Assessment Report, 2022*, (Revised in June, 2023), p.11.

⁹¹ According to Gastrow, P. (2013) *Transnational Organised Crime: The Stepchild of Crime-combating Priorities*, Institute for Security Studies Policy Brief 46, ISS Pretoria, October, pp.1-4, at p. 3, the UN estimates that the number of global illicit drug users is set to rise by 25 per cent by 2050 and that the bulk of the increase is likely to come from the rapidly rising urban populations of developing countries. This means that developing countries should expect turnover from drug trafficking to increase by billions of dollars.

find a market. At times some Tanzanians have turned into drug dealers through this process.

Terrorists use financial infrastructure to mobilize and channel their funds to various destinations throughout the world. According to Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering (FATF), terrorists use the same money laundering methods as other criminal groups, including cash smuggling, structured deposits and withdrawals from bank accounts, purchases of various types of monetary instruments, use of credit cards, and informal remittance networks.⁹² Moreover, they are adaptive to new methods and making extensive use of the new information technologies in order to facilitate financing and avoid detection. It has been revealed that:

“International concern with the problem of the financing of terrorism was heightened after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. While there had always been some suspicion that secret and fictitious bank accounts were being used to fund terrorist activities, investigations conducted after the attacks, primarily in the United States, Europe, the Middle East and Asia, revealed the existence of an extensive network of underground banking and other financing channels that have been used to finance terrorist activities.”⁹³

Thus, countries throughout the world have been urged by the international community to criminalize terrorism in their respective jurisdictions as a matter of urgency. A series of measures at the national, regional and international level have been introduced and enforced in an effort to deprive terrorists of the means to inflict serious damage.⁹⁴ It is thus no wonder that the United Nations has come up with the International Convention for the Suppression of Financing of

⁹² Source: Johnston, R.B. & Nedelescu, O.M. (2005) *The Impact of Terrorism on Financial Markets, IFM Working Paper, WP/05/60, March, p. 13, quoting Financial Action Task Force (FATF) (2002) Report on Money Laundering Typologies 2001-2002, Feb, pp.2-7.*

⁹³ Morais, H. V. (2005) “Fighting International Crime and Its Financing: The Importance of following a Coherent Global Strategy Based on the Rule of Law,” *Villanova law Review*, Vol. 50, Iss.3, pp.583-644, p.610.

⁹⁴ Hübschle, A. “Flogging a Dead Horse: The Incongruity of Measures Against Terrorist Financing in Southern Africa,” in Goredema, C. (Ed.) (2006) *Money Laundering Experiences, A Survey*, ISS Monograph Series, No.124, June, Institute for Security Studies, pp.91-120, at p.93.

Terrorism of 1999,⁹⁵ which urges states parties to cooperate in fighting terrorism. As its title indicates, the Convention is designed to criminalize acts of financing terrorism.⁹⁶

The Convention requires parties to take steps to prevent and counteract the direct and indirect financing of terrorists. It also commits states to hold those who finance terrorism criminally, civilly or administratively liable for such acts. In addition, immediately after the 9/11 attacks, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) adopted Resolution 1373, which imposed unprecedented legal obligations on UN member states to comply with measures designed to counter terrorist financing, travel, recruitment and supply.

According to article 12 of the Convention, request for legal assistance may not be refused on the grounds of bank secrecy. That is to say bank secrecy is no longer adequate justification for refusing to cooperate. The reason behind is that:

“Criminals increasingly abuse bank secrecy, by which is meant all aspects of the confidentiality of customers’ accounts, not just secret or numbered bank accounts. More and more exceptions are being made for those cases, such as drug trafficking and money laundering, where the serious nature of the crimes outweighs the otherwise legitimate interest of an individual in keeping his financial affairs private.”⁹⁷

In order to ensure the greatest degree of cooperation among the states parties with respect to the offences set out in the Convention, the Convention contains detailed provisions on mutual legal assistance and extradition. Regarding mutual legal assistance, the Convention envisages that states parties undertake to give each other the greatest measure of assistance in connection with criminal

⁹⁵ The Convention was adopted by the UN General Assembly on 9 December, 1999. The Convention has been signed by 132 states, and, as of April 30, 2003, it was in force among 80 states.

⁹⁶ It is a Convention that is aimed at cutting off funding for terrorist activities.

⁹⁷ Aust, A., “Counter-Terrorism-A New Approach,” in Frowen, J.A. & Wolfrum, R. (Eds.) (2001) *Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law*, Volume 5, Kluwer Law International, The Netherlands, pp.285-306, p.304. For some detailed discussion on more and more exception that have been made in Tanzania for making sure that criminals do not shield themselves behind the bank secrecy principle, see Longopa, E. (2014) “Cracking Down Criminality and Erosion of Banker’s Confidentiality Obligation in Tanzania,” *Eastern Africa Law Review*, Issue No. 2, Vol.41, December, pp.1-31. See also Mandopi, K. (2011) “Anti-Terrorists’ Financing: Does it Undermine Privacy of the Customer of a Bank?” *The Law Reformer Journal*, Vol.3, No. 1 April, pp.47-59.

investigations or criminal or extradition proceedings in respect of the offences set out under the Convention.⁹⁸

Regarding freezing, seizing, and forfeiting terrorist assets, the Convention requires each state party to take appropriate measures for the identification, detection and freezing or seizure of any funds used or allocated for the purposes of committing the offences set out in the Convention and for the forfeiture of funds used or allocated for the purposes of committing such offences and the proceeds derived from such offences.⁹⁹ Where it is established in the course of implementing those appropriate measures that assets were derived from or have been transferred to a third party who acted innocently or in good faith, rights of such third party shall be protected.¹⁰⁰ That is to say such assets shall not be forfeited.

4.2 Prevention of Terrorism Act and Disruption of Terrorist Financing

Tanzania, as is the case with other countries in the world, has in 2002 enacted the Prevention of Terrorism Act.¹⁰¹ This is an Act, which provides for comprehensive measures of dealing with terrorism, to prevent and to co-operate with other states in the suppression of terrorism.¹⁰² It has provisions for exchange of information and extradition of offenders between Tanzania and other countries.¹⁰³ Such information relates to terrorist groups, terrorist acts and movements of weapons and materials by the terrorist groups and their use of communication technology.

Part IV of the Act, which covers sections 13 up to 27, provides for offences amounting to terrorism, including financing of terrorism. They include provision or collection of funds to commit terrorist acts;¹⁰⁴ collection of property or provision of property and services, for commission of terrorist act;¹⁰⁵ use of

⁹⁸ The UN International Convention for the Suppression of Financing of Terrorism of 1999, Art.11.

⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, Art.8.

¹⁰⁰ *Ibid.*

¹⁰¹ Cap.19 [R.E. 2002].

¹⁰² See its long title.

¹⁰³ See sections 37-39 of the Act.

¹⁰⁴ Cap.19 [R.E. 2002], s.13.

¹⁰⁵ *Ibid.*, s.14.

property for commission of terrorist acts;¹⁰⁶ arrangements for retention or control of terrorist property;¹⁰⁷ dealing with property owned or controlled by terrorist groups;¹⁰⁸ soliciting and giving support to terrorist groups for the commission of terrorist acts;¹⁰⁹ harboring of persons committing terrorist acts;¹¹⁰ provision of weapons to terrorist groups;¹¹¹ recruitment of persons to be members of terrorist groups or to participate in terrorist acts;¹¹² promotion or facilitation of the commission of terrorist acts in foreign states;¹¹³ promotion of offences;¹¹⁴ conspiracy to commit offences under this Act;¹¹⁵ membership of terrorist groups;¹¹⁶ arrangement of meetings in support of terrorist groups¹¹⁷ and participation in the commission of offence under this Act.¹¹⁸

The following discussion goes into detail on the provisions of the Act relating to disruption of financing of terrorism in Tanzania. The main concern is to look at the extent to which the law in Tanzania addresses this aspect, which plays a double role in the fight against terrorism, namely preventing and combating on the one hand and pre-emptive measures on the other. It would be noted that by terrorist financing, the Act encompasses the provision or collection of funds to commit terrorist acts. Terrorist financing is covered under sections 13 and 14 of the Act by making it a crime. As a matter of noting, the Prevention of Terrorism Act¹¹⁹ is applicable in Tanzania mainland and Zanzibar.¹²⁰ The Act provides under section 13 that:

“Every person who provides, or collects by any means, directly or indirectly, any funds, intending, knowing or having reasonable grounds to believe that

¹⁰⁶ *Ibid.*, s.15.

¹⁰⁷ *Ibid.*, s.16.

¹⁰⁸ *Ibid.*, s.17.

¹⁰⁹ *Ibid.*, s.18.

¹¹⁰ *Ibid.*, s.19.

¹¹¹ *Ibid.*, s.20.

¹¹² *Ibid.*, s.21.

¹¹³ *Ibid.*, s.22.

¹¹⁴ *Ibid.*, s.23.

¹¹⁵ *Ibid.*, s.24.

¹¹⁶ *Ibid.*, s.25.

¹¹⁷ *Ibid.*, s.26.

¹¹⁸ *Ibid.*, s.27.

¹¹⁹ Cap.19 [R.E. 2002].

¹²⁰ See s.2 of the Act. See also the United Republic of Tanzania, Ministry of Finance and Planning, (2022) *A Report on Assessment of Terrorist Financing Risk in Non-Profit Organisations in the United Republic of Tanzania*, June, p.18.

the funds will be used in full or in part to carry out a terrorist act commits an offence and shall on conviction be liable to imprisonment for a term not less than fifteen years and not more than twenty years.”

The Act further states under section 14 that:

“14. Every person who, directly, collects property or provides, invites a person to provide, or makes available, property or financial or other related services -

(a) intending that they be used, in whole or in part, for the purpose of committing or facilitating the commission of, a terrorist act or for the purpose of benefiting any person who is committing or facilitating the commission of, a terrorist act; or

(b) knowing that in whole or part, they will be used by, or will benefit, a terrorist group,

commits an offence and shall on conviction, be liable to imprisonment for a term not less than twenty years and not more than twenty-five years.”

The Act also has provisions for forfeiture of any property used for, or connected with; or received as payments for the commission of terrorist acts. Orders for forfeiture of proceeds and instrumentalities of crime are made upon conviction for offences under the Act.¹²¹ Property forfeited to the United Republic of Tanzania is vested in the Government.

The above provisions of the Act, which criminalize the provision of financial assistance to terrorists or terrorist groups, are in compliance with the International Convention for the Suppression of Financing of Terrorism of 1999. The Convention requires states to create an offence when a “person by any means, directly or indirectly, unlawfully and willfully, provides or collects funds with the intention that they should be used” to commit an act that constitutes a terrorist offence.¹²² In addition, the Act complies with the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) adopted Resolution 1373, which imposed unprecedented legal obligations on UN member states to comply with measures designed to, among other things, counter terrorist financing.¹²³

¹²¹ *Ibid.*, s.36(1) read together with ss. 42 and 43.

¹²² See Art. 2(1) of the Convention.

¹²³ See sections 13 and 14 of the Prevention of Terrorism Act, Cap.19 [R.E. 2002].

5. Is the Prevention of Terrorism Act Human Rights Compliant?

One of the measures of countering terrorism is enacting anti-terrorism laws. In so doing, states are urged to enact anti-terrorism laws that strike a balance between protecting national security and basic human rights.¹²⁴ Tanzania is not an exception. The country is obliged to observe fundamental rights and freedoms. With the entrenchment of the Bill of Rights in the Constitution of the United Republic of Tanzania of 1977¹²⁵ in 1984 as per the Fifth Constitutional Amendment,¹²⁶ Tanzania is duty bound to create avenues through which citizens are able to realise human rights. This can be achieved through, among other things, enacting national laws that are human rights compliant.

Terrorists and other criminals should not be denied their enjoyment of human rights, which are enshrined in the country's constitution. In the administration of criminal justice system, terrorism has equal status as any other offence punishable by penal law in Tanzania. As such, law enforcement agencies are required to observe human rights provisions when dealing with terrorist suspects. Among the basic rights to be observed include the right to freedom from arbitrary detention and arrest, the right not to be subject to torture, the right to privacy, the right to non-discrimination, and the right to an effective remedy for a breach of human rights.

All these can be observed if the anti-terrorism actions of the state are within the framework of the criminal justice systems and the scope of the rule of law. The fundamental question is: Does the Prevention of Terrorism Act¹²⁷ comply with human rights provisions? The following discussion, which centers on one aspect, namely the investigation of terrorist offences, attempts to respond to this question. The main focus is on looking, albeit briefly, at the legal framework involved in relation to human rights provisions.

Regarding investigation of terrorist offences, the starting point is arrest. The Prevention of Terrorism Act provides under section 28 powers of arrest. The section empowers a police officer to carry out the arrest. For purposes of the

¹²⁴ This means that the International Convention for the Suppression of Financing of Terrorism of 1999 should be read together with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

¹²⁵ Cap.2 [R.E. 2002].

¹²⁶ See the Fifth Constitutional Amendment Act No.15 of 1984.

¹²⁷ Cap.19 [R.E. 2002].

section, police officer also includes an immigration officer or a member of Tanzania Intelligence Security Service. According to this section, any police officer of the rank of or above Assistant Superintendent may arrest without warrant any person suspected to have committed a terrorist offence. Provided that such police officer acts on reasonable ground, the arrest shall be deemed lawful.

However, much as the police officer arrests without warrant, he is duty bound to comply with the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Act,¹²⁸ which provides for modality of effecting arrests. The modality that is provided for under the Criminal Procedure Act reflects on what is provided for under the Bill of Rights in the country's Constitution. Among the conditions that an arresting officer should observe include the following. The arresting officer must have reasonable grounds to believe that the arrested person has committed an offence;¹²⁹ an arrested person should be informed of grounds of arrest,¹³⁰ no unnecessary restraint¹³¹ and no use of unnecessary force. The law only allows use of reasonable force in the circumstances.¹³² It should be noted that when a person is arrested in suspicion of committing any of criminal offences with or without warrant, he is deprived of his liberty. That being the case, an arresting officer must comply with modalities of carrying out the arrest. In other words, an arrest should be carried out in a proper manner and for a proper purpose.

Concerns have been raised by several commentators challenging provisions of the Prevention of Terrorism Act on empowering police officers to arrest terrorist suspects without warrant. However, given the imminent danger and threats posed by terrorist attacks to the targeted audience, the Legislature in its wisdom saw the urgent need to enable law enforcement machinery to be ready at any time to take action immediately, especially under state of emergency. It has been reminded that:

“The police play a crucial role in ensuring the security and safety of citizens. For this purpose they are vested with coercive power and with authority to impose limitations on an individual's rights when this is necessary for the

¹²⁸ The Prevention of Terrorism Act Cap. 20 [R.E. 2022], sections 5, 11, 13, 14 and 23.

¹²⁹ *Ibid.*, s. 5(1) and (2).

¹³⁰ *Ibid.*, s.23.

¹³¹ *Ibid.*, s.12

¹³² *Ibid.*, s.21

protection of others or for the promotion of the general welfare.”¹³³

The fact that crime and violence activities such as terrorist acts cause social, material and bodily ill-being to a point of creating fear in the minds of the people that may result in impairing their very existence, citizens need to be assured by the government of their security and safety. If citizens are fearful of crime, they retreat in doors to safety and concede victory to criminals. Hence, they lose confidence in the Police Force and the Government as a whole. Thus, people see maintenance of law and order as government’s responsibility. As such breakdown in peace or tranquility is seen as a governance failure rather than a social issue.¹³⁴ Thus, the legal framework should enable the police officers to take actions whenever terrorist acts are about to be perpetrated.

Police officers are also empowered under the Act to carry out investigation of terrorist cases as a matter of urgency.¹³⁵ As such, they can in a case of urgency enter and search without warrant any premises or place, if they have reason to suspect that within those premises or at that place a terrorist offence is being committed or likely to be committed, and there is evidence on commission of such offence, search, seize anything in connection therewith. They can as well arrest and detain any person whom they reasonably suspect to have committed the terrorist offence in that premises or place.¹³⁶

As the Act criminalizes acts of terrorism and financing terrorism, it has provisions for forfeiture of any property used for, or connected with; or received as payments for the commission of terrorist acts.¹³⁷ Orders for forfeiture of proceeds and instrumentalities of crime are made upon conviction for offences under the Act. In order to realize all these, thorough financial investigation should be carried out by investigators from the very early stages of dealing with cases involving terrorism acts. In this endeavor, the provisions of the Act should operate alongside the Proceeds of Crime Act, which is the main forfeiture law in

¹³³ Ntanda Nsereko, D.D. (1993) “The Police, Human Rights and the Constitution: An African Perspective,” *Human Rights Quarterly*, 15, pp.465-484, at p.482.

¹³⁴ See Report by Research and Analysis Working Group (2004) *Vulnerability and Resilience to Poverty in Tanzania: Causes, Consequences and Policy Implications*, Mkuki na Nyota Publishers Limited, Dar es Salaam, p.75.

¹³⁵ The Prevention of Terrorism Act, Cap.19 [R.E. 2002], s.29.

¹³⁶ *Ibid.*

¹³⁷ *Ibid.*, s.36(1).

Tanzania.¹³⁸ Terrorism is among the predicate offences covered in this Act namely, the Proceeds of Crime Act.¹³⁹

There is therefore a need to carry out financial investigation that involves bank accounts of individuals, groups or organizations that are suspected to finance terrorist activities. It should be noted that part of proceeds of crime usually ends up as deposits in domestic or foreign banks or is concealed by acquiring other assets.¹⁴⁰ Moreover, when assets flow through the financial system, the transfer of funds in and out of the accounts usually leaves an audit trail, which can be tracked and detected.¹⁴¹ Therefore investigators need to have access to bank accounts and bank records of persons who are alleged to have assets that were acquired through criminal activities and which are funding terrorist activities. Access to a bank account by an investigator, *inter alia*, enables the investigator not only to have real-time financial surveillance of the ongoing suspicious transactions but also to establish trend and pattern of activities and identify new accounts, which are connected with the one under investigation. Investigation of a bank account may also reveal other persons who might be connected with facilitating concealment of criminally acquired assets. In case of large cash withdrawals, it may also present opportunities for cash seizure as the locations will be revealed.¹⁴²

The Proceeds of Crime Act empowers investigators to have access to bank account of any person who has been involved in the commission of a serious offence, a predicate offence or money laundering and where there is likelihood of finding evidence on the commission of such offence in a bank account kept by that person, spouse or child or of any person reasonably believed to be a trustee

¹³⁸ Cap. 256 [R.E. 2022].

¹³⁹ For elaboration, see Tenga, R.W. (2017) "Money Laundering Prosecutions in Tanzania: A Tentative Assessment," *Eastern Africa Law Review*, Issue No.2, Vol. 44, December, pp.50-94 and Kaniki, A.O.J. (2020) *An Examination of the Law and Practice Relating to Asset Recovery in Tanzania*, PhD (Law) Thesis, University of Dar es Salaam.

¹⁴⁰ As noted in the foregoing parts of the discussion, some sources of finances that fund terrorist activities are illegal activities, hence are proceeds of crime.

¹⁴¹ Monteith, C. & Dornbierer, A. (2013) *Tracking and Tracing Stolen Assets in Foreign Jurisdictions*, International Centre for Asset Recovery, Basel Institute on Governance, Basel, Switzerland, Working Paper Series No.15, p.13. Source: <http://www.fatf-gafi.org/pages/faq/Moneylaundering>, accessed on 10th November, 2022.

¹⁴² Brun, J-P. *et al.* (2011) *Asset Recovery Handbook: A Guide for Practitioners*, StAR Initiative, Washington DC, p.53.

or agent of such person.¹⁴³ In such a situation, the Inspector General of Police (IGP) or the Director of Criminal Investigation is empowered to authorize and direct a police officer of or above the rank of Assistant Superintendent of Police to investigate the bank account.¹⁴⁴ Such authorization is sufficient to warrant the production of the bank account for scrutiny by that police officer.¹⁴⁵

The authorization also warrants the police officer to freeze a bank account and seize any document from that bank or financial institution for fourteen days during which leave of the court for continued seizure and freezing shall be obtained.¹⁴⁶

Police officers are also empowered by the law to seize any property reasonably believed to have been used in the commission of a terrorist offence.¹⁴⁷ The police officers are required by law upon seizure of any of such property to as soon as possible to apply in court for a detention order. The court does not issue the order unless it gives every person appearing to have an interest in the property, a reasonable opportunity of being heard; and has reasonable grounds to believe that the property has been used in the commission of an offence under the Act.¹⁴⁸ The following part covers assets that are secured for freezing and seizure generally and funds used for financing terrorist activities in particular. This is because such funds may be transformed into physical assets such as landed property, motor vehicles, and the like. All these, whether in monetary terms or physical assets, make up funds that, at the end, finance terrorist activities.

Investigators should, however, note that freezing has to be approached carefully. Proper timing should be observed on when to effect asset freezing. Otherwise investigators can lose some more important evidence. Thus, before freezing takes place, an analysis of evidence that has already been collected should be undertaken. Then a conclusion should be made whether or not freezing at that time will affect gathering the other evidence which has not yet been retrieved. Atkinson sums it up in the following words:

¹⁴³The Proceeds of Crime Act, Cap. 256 [R.E. 2022], s. 63A.

¹⁴⁴The Proceeds of Crime Act, Cap. 256 [R.E. 2022], s. 31A as amended by section 95 of the Written Laws (Miscellaneous Amendments) (No.2) Act, 2018, Act No.7 of 2018.

¹⁴⁵*Ibid.*

¹⁴⁶*Ibid.* s.31A.

¹⁴⁷The Prevention of Terrorism Act, Cap.19 [R.E. 2002], s.33.

¹⁴⁸*Ibid.*

“Freezing is a measure that must be approached carefully to ensure that it is taken at the appropriate moment during the process. Once assets are frozen, the investigator or prosecutor runs the risk of alerting the target of the investigation, which could hinder the tracing of other assets. On the other hand, the transfer of money has become extremely easy. It can be done online, over the telephone, etc. This means, that while criminals can move their monies around very quickly and conceal them very effectively, law enforcement takes much longer to trace them, as investigators are bound by the law.”¹⁴⁹

The seized assets remain the property of the person(s) or entity (ies) that held an interest in them at the time of the seizure, although the competent authority will often take over possession, administration or management of the seized assets.¹⁵⁰ One of the most important aspects of forfeiture procedure is the ability, before trial, to secure the availability of assets for forfeiture.¹⁵¹ It is for these reasons that emphasis is put that once assets have been seized, the investigation must be carried out to validate the measure and collect the elements of proof for possible further forfeiture.¹⁵² Thus, assets that could be seized include those objects that can be considered as evidence of crime; instruments of the crime; proceeds of crime and other assets with illicit origin that cannot be proven but that may be useful for forfeiture of equivalent value.¹⁵³

It is argued finally that the Prevention of Terrorism Act¹⁵⁴ is compliant with human rights provisions, especially when it is viewed as there to ensure protection and enjoyment of human rights for the public good. All rights and obligations pertaining to any accused person of any other criminal offences are also available, without exception, to the accused persons of terrorist offences.

¹⁴⁹ Atkinson, P. (2010) “Effective Investigation of Assets, Practical Application of Mutual Legal Assistance and Asset Recovery,” in OECD Anti-Corruption Network for Eastern Europe and Central Asia, *Proceedings of the Seminar “Effective Means of Investigation and Prosecution,”* held in Bucharest, Romania, 20-22 October, pp.87-105, p.89.

¹⁵⁰ *Ibid.*

¹⁵¹ Gaumer, C. (2007) “Criminal Forfeiture,” *United States Attorneys’ Bulletin*, November, Volume 55, Number 6, pp.21-29, p.25.

¹⁵² Schmid, J-B. (2008) “Seizure,” in Pieth, M. (Ed.), *Recovering Stolen Assets*, Peter Lang, Bern, pp.231-242, p.237.

¹⁵³ European Union, (2009) *White Paper on Best Practices in Asset Recovery*, CEART [Centres of Excellence in Asset recovery and Training] Project, Published by Ministerio Del Interior, Madrid, pp.38-39. Source: www.projectceart.org, accessed on 24th October, 2022.

¹⁵⁴ Cap.19 [R.E. 2002],

Laws such as the Criminal Procedure Act¹⁵⁵ and the Evidence Act,¹⁵⁶ which provide for rules and procedures in court, equally apply to all accused persons, including those who are accused to have committed terrorist offences. Such laws are against any discrimination.

7.0 Conclusion

In conclusion, it is argued that the major terrorist incidents that have been perpetrated by different terrorist groups such as Al Qaida and Al Shabab throughout the world are testimonies that the global peace and security are at jeopardy. The discussion has underscored that terrorism has over time been increasingly posing threats to the world peace, security and stability. It also endangers the social fabric and economic development of the nations. It is one of the challenges that the world is facing since no part of the world is immune from this scourge. Effects of terrorism are felt at all levels.

In order to address terrorism, states the world-over are taking steps at international and national levels that are necessary to prevent the commission of terrorist acts. Among the steps is strengthening their legal frameworks. It is in this understanding that Tanzania, as is the case with other countries in the world, has in 2002 enacted the Prevention of Terrorism Act to provide comprehensive measures of dealing with terrorism in the country, to prevent and to co-operate with other states in the suppression of terrorism.

It needs to be underscored that terrorists need funds and other logistical arrangements in order to run their day to day activities and operations. The work has also looked at whether the Prevention of Terrorism Act is compliant to human rights provisions as enshrined under the Constitution of the United Republic of Tanzania of 1977¹⁵⁷. It has been revealed that the Act is human rights compliant. This stems out of the fact that all rights and obligations pertaining to any accused person of any other criminal offences are also available to the accused persons of terrorist offences as envisaged under the Act. The Act should be operated alongside the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Act.¹⁵⁸

¹⁵⁵ Cap. 20 [R.E. 2022], sections 5, 11, 13, 14 and 23.

¹⁵⁶ Cap. 6 [R.E. 2022].

¹⁵⁷ Cap. 2 [R.E. 2002].

¹⁵⁸ Cap. 20 [R.E. 2022].

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Why Foreign Aid Fails to Deliver Development in African Rural Settings: The Case of Korean Aid in Tanzania

By

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Abstract

In 2011 KOICA sponsored a model village project in Morogoro region in Tanzania. The aim was to create a prosperous village that would be a model of modern villagization to be emulated by other villages in Morogoro and finally in Tanzania in general. The project drew its philosophy from Saemaul Undong rural development strategy that had been very successful in South Korea. Agricultural equipment was supplied and strategic infrastructure was put in place. Using interviews with village leaders and reviewing village project reports, this paper reports on the performance of foreign aid in this project. Results from content analysis of the collected data shows that, once again, modernization development models like the Harrod-Domar and Nurkse's Vicious Circle of Poverty have failed to deliver development, contrary to the belief that what poor rural settings need is capital from outside. This is partly because some important socioeconomic and cultural factors were overlooked or underestimated when conceiving and implementing the project. The efficiency of the injected capital was seriously affected by lack of ownership, poor feasibility assessment, lack of accountability as well as wrong timing of the project. It is suggested that small business models would work better than village communal projects.

Key words: aid, rural development, Saemaul Undong, Ujamaa

1.0 Introduction

There is widespread evidence of ineffectiveness of foreign aid in Africa's development. Notwithstanding this evidence reported again and again from different parts of Africa, the so-called development aid keeps coming in through different ways. Mostly, donors have relied on macroeconomic Western development models which they use to convince African leaders to experiment. These models have been experimented in Tanzania since its independence in

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1961 but the expected positive effects have not been forthcoming (Rugumamu, 1997). The emphasis in macroeconomic growth models has not only informed donor agenda but also most of literature on aid effectiveness. Many have put the blame on corruption and lack of good governance in general but factors that lead to aid ineffectiveness are far more than macroeconomic. The focus on macroeconomic factors fails to appreciate the role of social and cultural factors that equally render aid ineffective in poor African rural settings (Andrews, 2009).

This paper explores the reasons for the failure of Korean development aid to Tanzania aimed at creation of a model village through the application of *Saemaul Undong* approach. The village was to be created in Pangawe in Morogoro region. It was expected that the village would be emulated by other villages in Tanzania but the project proved failure. The next section briefly discusses aid effectiveness in general. Then the paper highlights on the concept of rural development, after which rural development under Ujamaa in Tanzania is also highlighted upon. Section five discusses rural development after the Ujamaa period. Section six engages Korean aid and its strategy for rural development. Section seven describes the Pangawe village project and section eight presents the theoretical framework followed by methodology in section nine. Sections ten and eleven handle the performance of the projects supported by Korean aid in Pangawe village. Discussion of the findings of this study is presented in section twelve followed by a conclusion in section thirteen.

2.0 Aid and Aid Effectiveness – an Overview

International development aid has a long history. It has also been a subject of much academic debate. Several authors have traced its history and effectiveness. Moyo (2009), for example, traces it back to the reconstruction of European nations following the devastations of World War II. Carlsson et al (1997) argue that, although development aid is a post war phenomenon initially thought to be just a complement to the development functions of national resources and efforts, evaluation of its role after forty years of its existence, shows that aid has become something permanent. Foreign aid has also become a subject of heated debates causing growing disillusionment with its performance. The authors argue that fighting poverty by supporting economic growth and development in the least-developed countries has continued to be a major objective of development aid.

Notwithstanding this seemingly good will, in many countries it has been difficult to identify any positive connection between development aid and development. In the words of these authors, 'Africa is a particularly sad case in this respect,' (p. 7). Rugumamu (1997) argues that foreign aid has generally failed to mitigate critical problems of underdevelopment and has helped to debilitate rather than stimulate potential productive energies in Africa. According to him the results of aid in Africa have been unprecedented economic stagnation and waste, crippling debt crisis, human rights abuse and foreign intervention in national economic policy management. Because of its negative rather than positive effect to development in Tanzania, Rugumamu (ibid.) calls foreign aid 'lethal aid'. Moyo (2009) shares the same conviction. She posits that aid to Africa has been historically used a tool for both mind and political control – leading to dire effects of disabling African economies. She calls it 'dead aid' which she explains as the story of the failure of post-war development policy. In the same vein, Easterly (2006) has argued that Western aid to the rest of the world has done so much ill and so little good. He calls it 'white man's burden'.

Whereas most of earlier studies on aid effectiveness focused on its impact on development and growth, the study by Carlsson et al (1997) focused on determinants of aid effectiveness. In their study, aid effectiveness was defined as ability of the aid project to achieve its objectives and the degree of sustainability of these achievements. Sustainability is the ability of the positive results of the aid project to continue long after the aid resources have ceased. In analysing the determinants for aid effectiveness these researchers found that there were three important issues that had not received enough attention. These are management capacity of the recipients, relationship between donors and the receiving governments, and sustainability of the aid. The study covered a total of eight countries, Tanzania being one of them. Actually, among the countries included in the study, Tanzania and Zambia were pointed out as being two countries where debt servicing was meaningless. This was because, for these two countries, the burden of debts had become too huge when measured against the value of their exports.

All the countries have had experience of the international donor community, some more than others. Tanzania and Zambia have been high on the list of most donors. Heavy inflows of aid, combined with economic misfortunes, have resulted in impressive aid dependence. Aid flows accounted for 40 per cent of Tanzanian GNP and 24 per cent of the Zambian GNP. This is about

twice the average for the other countries in our sample³ (p. 15).

The fact that, in spite of increased aid to Africa and Tanzania in particular, the economy is still not performing well arouses skepticism about the effectiveness, not only of the aid itself but also of the proposed economic models. Among the most popular growth models of the 1950s are Nurkses' Vicious Circle of Poverty and the Harrod – Domar growth model. Both models are about capital accumulation. The results from Africa (and elsewhere) and Tanzania in particular defy the basic hypothesis of these models which holds that economic development in any developing country could be enhanced by the introduction of foreign capital. The failure of this hypothesis led to the introduction of a new paradigm focusing on the relationship between donors and recipients of foreign aid. This new paradigm is simply referred to as the 'donor-recipient aid relations' model of aid evaluation (Bagachwa, 1997).

This new paradigm involves all the activities and responsibilities that cut across the whole aid process. It involves an analysis of levels of participation for both donors and aid recipients in the management of the aid from the time of conceiving the project to the termination of the project. It is important to focus on these relations because it is on these that depends the success or failure of donor funded projects. Project management capacities differ between donors and recipients. Their socioeconomic contexts are also normally not the same.

Furthermore, and even more important, sociocultural issues that inform the intricacies of donor-recipient relations can be very complex. There are small but important issues that have normally been overlooked in earlier approaches to aid effectiveness which focused on generalizations of specific project performance. These issues are mostly contextual and cultural. They concern behaviour, social relations, beliefs, attitudes, trust, work ethics etc. Based on this fact, the current study aims at testing both the capital accumulation and donor-recipient models in relation to Korean aid in Pangawe village.

³The average for the sample was 10 per cent.

3.0 Rural development

Specifically, rural development has been defined as any strategy designed to improve the economic and social life of the rural poor. Urban dwellers are normally more advantaged than those in the rural areas in terms of economic and social services. Therefore, rural development involves effort to extend the benefits of social and economic development to the most disadvantaged of those who live in the rural areas. This group of the poorest seekers of livelihoods in rural areas is mostly composed of small – scale rural farmers (World Bank, 1975). Rural development strategy was adopted by the World Bank in 1975. It was this adoption by the major financial institution that contributed largely to influencing donor support for agriculture and rural development and particularly for agricultural projects in the rural areas. The result was that both governments and donors saw rural development as the way to improve social and economic lives of rural dwellers. Actually, the positive relationship between improving agriculture and poverty alleviation has been, empirically, shown to be very strong (Siddiq and Ismail, 2013). A development program is therefore expected to involve a mixture of projects and activities aimed at improving agriculture, health, education, employment, communication and housing (Baah-Dwomoh, 2016).

Although the meaning of rural area may differ from one country to another, the notion of rural development has been understood as denoting the totality of development efforts, policies, initiatives and activities by any development partners for the aim of improving the standard of living of people in the non-urban places. The development partners include governments, donors, NGOs, as well as urban and rural communities. Rural development, normally, involves improvement in the primary sector which is concerned with the production of food and raw materials. In Tanzania rural development is directly related to the improvement in the livelihoods and production activities of the people living in villages as contrasted to people living and working in small towns, towns and cities which are termed ‘urban areas’ (Losch and Michaud, 2016).

One of the reasons that have been given for the failure of foreign-aided development projects is lack of aid policy guidelines for planners and negotiators resulting in inconsistencies between national goals and aided project objectives, as well as mismanagement of aid funds (Rugumamu, 1997). Another is failure to

manage local participation in such projects (Suphian and Jani, 2020). Technological incompatibility has also been highlighted as one of the causes of failure in aided industrial projects (Nyirenda, 2019). Bilateral aid comes, normally, through the government. It therefore leads, in many cases, to a top-down development project determination. In such cases the culture of the people becomes crucial. The basic argument, as it will be shown, is that project management, people participation and technology transfer in development projects in Tanzania are highly affected by recipient culture and other related contextual issues.

4.0 Ujamaa, Self-reliance and Rural Development in Tanzania

Six years after its independence in 1961, Tanzania took a turn to socialism. This major policy decision was announced through the Arusha Declaration under the leadership of the supreme party TANU. The Arusha Declaration of 1967 had four tenets. These were socialism, self-reliance, rural development, and economic growth. Among the four, self-reliance meant reduction of dependence on external assistance and indigenous control of national resources. The focus of rural development was in improving conditions in the rural areas that provided the livelihood to over 80 per cent of the population (Bagachwa, 1997).

Under Ujamaa, the bulk of both the land and people were found in rural areas. Since self-reliance implied full mobilization of these factors of production, rural development became an essential aspect of self-reliance (Nnoli, 1978). Consequently, the development paradigm of the 1970s was driven by the need to focus on problems of employment, inadequacy in the provision of basic needs as well as the challenge of income distribution. In this paradigm the role of foreign aid was to be perceived as being that of raising the standard of living of the poor, most of whom lived in rural areas, largely through increased employment (Wangwe, 2006).

Nyerere, the leader of TANU and president of Tanzania at that time, had faith in the village commune as the best way to organize the Tanzanian rural communities. In his efforts to build a prosperous egalitarian society, Nyerere clearly criticised rural modes of production in which a few individuals had the opportunity of accumulating personal wealth and therefore grow richer than the rest of the members of the village commune. The typical village commune was to

be built on the foundations of the African traditional society which, according to Nyerere, was both prosperous and egalitarian. In this society people worked for the benefit of the community or extended family. Competition and accumulation were not part of the philosophy that governed the traditional society. However, in 1967, Nyerere was worried by the fact that, although rural communities in Tanzania exhibited an attractive degree of equality, there were still unacceptably high levels of poverty. Nyerere thought that the poverty was not inherited from the traditional society but that it was caused by ignorance and lack of adequate technology. To defeat poverty, the traditional village communes had to learn from the technologically developed societies outside Africa (Maghimbi, 2012). It is this kind of thinking that triggered emulative foreign aided projects like that of Pangawe village.

Nnoli (1978) elaborates succinctly that although self-reliance emphasized the use of domestic resources for national development, the use of external resources was not excluded. Given the underdeveloped state of Tanzania's productive forces, external wealth was 'essential to facilitate take-off into sustained economic growth' (p.203). Yet, external resources were not to be received and accepted uncritically. Any foreign aid was to be evaluated in terms of compatibility with national objectives and values. The author proposes five criteria for gauging the acquisition of any form of external resources. These are the integration of resource into the overall national framework of goals, resources, traditions, and procedures; proper coordination in order to build Tanzanian capability to phase out their use; ranking the choice of the resources according to national priorities, harmonization of the interests of both donors and recipients; and the unfettered will to reject unsuitable foreign aid. This kind of scrutiny is crucially important for emulative projects as well.

The development of the rural areas in general and agricultural sector in particular in Tanzania has historically required deliberate state efforts. This is mainly due, first, to the fact that agriculture inherited from colonialism was not structured in ways that would meaningfully contribute to the development of the colonized country. It was structured to produce raw materials for industries in the metropolitan economies of the colonizing European countries (Rodney, 1973; Rweyemamu, 1973).

Secondly, the newly independent society in Tanzania witnessed disturbing levels of inequality between urban areas and the predominantly agricultural rural areas Van de Laar (1972). Urban areas have historically been favoured in the provision of social services, as compared to rural areas. Van de Walle (2009), for example, argues that one reason postcolonial governments failed to alter older patterns of inequality relates to the policies they have pursued. The author continues to show that studies of social policies in Africa have, moreover, argued that education and health expenditures have not always served the needs of the poor as capital cities receive the lion's share of social services, while hinterland areas far from the capital systematically receive a lower standard of service. Also, health services favoured curative, hospital services that tend to cater to the rich, rather than preventative healthcare, which would be more likely to help the poor in both urban and rural areas (Magadi et al., 2003). It is also shown that, the per-student expenditures of education policies have overwhelmingly favoured secondary and tertiary education – which are mainly found in urban areas – over primary education (van de Walle 2009). In the same vein, Nyerere (1968) reiterated that:

One important result of development...has been the growth of urban centres (where) only about 4% of our people live...Unfortunately, the life of these tiny minorities has become a matter of great envy for the majority. Life in the towns has come to represent opportunities for advancement, a chance of excitement, and the provision of social services, none of which is easily available in the rural areas (p. 111).

Thirdly, Tanzania did not have the industrial base strong and dependable enough on which to build its economy. This was made clear in the Arusha declaration. In a small booklet titled the *President Explains the Arusha Declaration* (1967) Nyerere argues that whereas it was possible to find investment capital (from own resources) for great increases in agricultural output, it was not possible to envisage establishing industries in the near future. He continued to argue as follows:

To be realistic, therefore, we must stop dreaming of developing Tanzania through the establishment of large modern industries. For such things we have neither the money nor the skilled manpower...Our future lies in the development of our agriculture, and in the development of our rural areas (p. 5).

In Tanzania today, despite its significance to the economy, the agricultural sector suffers from lack of access to credit and training opportunities for farmers (Nyoni, 2007). Nevertheless, the sector has not received the greatest attention from development aid donors. Official development assistance has been focusing more on poverty reduction and achievement of the more socially-oriented Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). The focus of development aid in recent years has been on health, education and good governance (Rotarou and Ueta, 2009). This was not the case in the 1960s up to 1990s when the legacy of Ujamaa put emphasis on rural development.

From the 1970s to early 1990 therefore, Tanzania's policy on development, deliberately focused first and foremost on rural advancement. This does not mean that urban areas were not to be developed but that priority would be given to rural areas. Policies that emanated from the Arusha Declaration attested to this commitment by the government and its leaders. Capital was sought from both within and outside the country for the development of agriculture, forestry and fishing. According to Rugumamu (1997) for example, sectors that received the largest portion of international aid included the agricultural sector as shown in the table below.

Table 1: Sectoral distribution of aid to Tanzania 1989 to 1991 (in UDS '000)

Sector	1989	%	1990	%	1991	%
Economic Management	17,782	2.0	58,843	6.2	86,680	8.5
Administration	112,331	12.4	55,227	5.8	115,293	11.3
Agriculture/forestry/fish	72,792	8.0	116,228	12.2	172,254	16.9
Industry	224,020	24.8	163,260	17.1	171,591	16.8
Transport	111,510	12.3	141,471	15.0	145,010	14.3

Source: Extracted from Rugumamu (1997, p. 177)

As it can be seen from table 1 above, agriculture (including fishing and forestry) received the largest portion of aid, overall.

5.0 Aid and Rural Development after Ujamaa

Development of the rural areas has for a long time continued to be a major concern of social and economic development policy in Tanzania. Poverty has remained widespread and deep in the rural areas where most of Tanzanians live. Available data shows that in the rural areas, the proportion of the food poor has

increased from 18.5% (1991/92) to 25.4% in 2000. Thus, poverty in Tanzania remains overwhelmingly a rural phenomenon. In addition, the rural areas are central to Tanzania's overall development. They account for more than half of the country's income generation; more than 60% of foreign exchange earnings; and support the livelihood of more than 80% of the population (URT 2001).

Given this economic significance, a robust rural economy is still necessary, even after Ujamaa, to support the country and realize the Vision 2025 goal of becoming a middle-income nation by year 2025. Informed by this reality, the Government of Tanzania has formulated a draft framework, known as Tanzania Assistance Strategy (TAS), for guiding development co-operation with the international community. The centrepiece of TAS is improving the effectiveness of aid through the promotion of local ownership, donor co-ordination, and other elements of best practice partnership (URT *ibid.*). Notably, the government of Tanzania has continued to solicit aid for rural development. What remains to be sorted out is how to make development aid effective.

6.0 Korean Aid and Rural Development Strategy

The Korean Development Assistance Policy is based on the Economic Development and Cooperation Fund (EDCF) founded in 1987, and the Korea International Cooperation Agency (KOICA) founded in 1991. The grants policy is set by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs but implemented by KOICA. Korean official development assistance (ODA) has increased significantly since the beginning of the 2000s, when the country sought to assert itself on the international stage as a middle power. It multiplied tenfold over the course of roughly 15 years, going from \$212.07 million in 2004 to \$2.4 billion in 2017. About 70% of Korean ODA is bilateral in nature of which a major share is dedicated to grants (about 64% in 2017). Korean ODA flows to Africa have been increasing since 2006, as part of the country's commitment to support the international community's efforts to achieve the Millennium Development Goals.

Emphasis is specifically placed on poverty reduction and capacity building. KOICA is present on the continent through offices located in 15 African countries, including Tanzania. 70% of Korean ODA in Africa is focused on its seven priority partners. These include Ghana, Rwanda, Mozambique, Senegal, Ethiopia, Uganda and Tanzania. Ethiopia, Ghana and Tanzania were also among

the top ten recipients of Korean ODA in 2017. For sub-Saharan Africa, aid was focused on public health, water supply, education and rural development, while for North Africa, the priority sectors were information and communication technology (ICT), administrative systems and industrial energy (Nicolas, 2020). *Saemaul Undong* was a Korean government initiative of the 1970s which created a nationwide rural development movement aimed at modernizing rural regions (Suphian and Jani, 2020).

The movement aimed at instilling in rural dwellers a spirit of diligence and cooperation in production aimed in turn at improving rural livelihood (Lee et al., 2018). Like the Tanzanian Ujamaa, the underlying policy of *Saemaul Undong* targeted effective use and mobilization of available local resources for the modernization process (Whang, 1981; So, 2018). The modernization process was expected to expand rural capacity for value addition and reduce the economic development gap between rural and urban areas leading to national inclusive growth through equitable sharing of benefits (So, 2018). As Yoo (1987) argues, the model of *Saemaul Undong* received strong support in Korea and also internationally.

7.0 The Pangawe Village Integrated Rural Development Programme

Sponsored by KOICA in 2011, a model village project was introduced in Pangawe village, Mkambarani ward in Morogoro district in central Tanzania. The project was named *Pangawe Integrated Community Development Project*. It aimed at improving the economy of the village through irrigation agriculture, modernized animal keeping and better roads, education and health services. A total of USD 4.5 million was intended to be used for the success of the project from 2011 to 2013. The project was the result of the then President Jakaya Kikwete's visit to Korea in September 2006. Because the *Saemaul Undong* philosophy was very similar to Ujamaa in Tanzania, the former president saw it as an opportunity to emulate an already tested modern villagization model after the failure of Ujamaa villagization of the 1970s.

As Nyerere (1974) put it, 'nothing succeeds like success. If we can get a few of these village communities working in every area, their success will lead to others also being started' (p. 7). *Saemaul Undong* became considered as a successful and imitable model for community development agricultural modernization.

Therefore, Koreans started to export the model to other countries, in confidence that it had been tested and proven. One of the places that the model was exported to was Tanzania, particularly Morogoro region. The model had many resemblances with a traditional Tanzania village. This was one reason for the hopes that the model would work well in Tanzania too. In addition, Nyerere had made it very clear that the type of agricultural organization propagated under TANU's rural development policy was to be socialist. People had to cooperate in production and share the proceeds of their agricultural labour.

Five hundred acres of land, parcelled out from sisal farm number 362 owned by Highland Estates Limited were earmarked for the project. In exchange the company was to be compensated with 405 hectares of farm number 101 in Sangasanga area in Morogoro region. The occupancy of the land for the project was transferred to the village but Morogoro District Council retained the right of ownership. KOICA managed the early phase of the development of the project including the construction of strategic infrastructure and purchase of necessary equipment. The project was handed over to the village in 2016. Under this umbrella project were smaller projects to be managed by the villagers. KOICA connected the village with Jyeong sang Bukdo province of Korea who introduced the SAEMAUL approach to the village.

As noted above, the whole Pangawe project drew its rationale from the *Saemaul Undong* model of Korea's rural development movement in the 1970s whose spirit was to use a community-driven development approach aiming at transforming top-down planners into client-oriented service providers and to empower poor rural communities, to play a role in designing and implementing programmes that affect their livelihoods. Nevertheless, admittedly, the differences between Korea in the 1970s and modern Tanzania (in the 2000s) were notable and substantial. This reality could affect the impact of the programme (OECD, 2011).

7.0 Theoretical Underpinnings of the Project

According to Thong and Thi Hao (2019), the Harrod – Domar economic growth model basically argues that it is saving and investing which create increase in productive capital which in turn is the determinant of economic growth. Entrepreneurs are expected to save and invest in the same economy in order to create capital. Capital increases due to investment activities of these

entrepreneurs. So, under this model economic growth depends on three main factors which are capital (K), labour (L), and resources (R). This could be expressed in an equation as follows:

$$Y = f(K, L, R)$$

In this equation factors R and L are the resources necessary for the creation of an increase in productive capital (K). The capital produced and re invested in the same economy by entrepreneurs leads to production of goods and services while more saving leads to expanded capital and further economic growth.

On the other hand, the underlying argument of the Vicious Circle of Poverty Theory is that a poor society will never be able to develop the required capital to get itself out of poverty unless it receives help from outside. The reason for poverty, according to this theory is poverty itself. The poor are caught in a situation where their poverty engenders more poverty as they fail to mobilize the necessary productive capital to generate growth through investment. The suggested solution to the trap of poverty for every poor society is to accept and receive financial push from outside. The main argument of the theory is that in any poor country the failure to accumulate necessary capital for economic take off follows the repeating trend of low income, low savings, low investment, and low productivity. In the final analysis, both of the models are macroeconomic and they suggest that poor societies would inevitably need capital from outside for their initial economic take off.

The logic of introducing foreign aid to a village setting like that of Pangawe, is the thinking that the villagers were failing to save and invest to create productive capital. This is the same logic as that of Nurkse's Vicious Circle of Poverty (1953) which suggested that poor societies were remaining poor because they failed to mobilize savings due to low income. Both the Harrod-Domar model and the Vicious Circle of Poverty are modernization models that believe in the ability of injected capital to lead to economic growth in a poor setting. This study set out to determine why the capital injected through foreign aid could not deliver rural development as expected in the case of Korean aid to Pangawe village.

9.0 Methodology

The Korean aid to Pangawe village was found to have been categorized into two types of projects one was aid for the modernization of the village in general and the second was support for the establishment of smaller projects managed at neighbourhood level. The first category was labelled 'KOICA projects' while the second was labelled 'SAEMAUL projects.' This study used purposive and snowball sampling techniques to reach the intended respondents. In the first instance the chairman and secretary of Pangawe village were approached and requested to respond to an interview on the project. Then these leaders were requested to provide names of other respondents that could provide information on specific projects. These formed the group that participated in a focus group discussion. This second stage of sampling was applied for both KOICA and SAEMAUL projects. Finally, the interviewees were asked to provide names of group members from specific projects including youth, women and men. These were interrogated through semi structured interviews.

Secondary data was accessed through a detailed project report that was prepared for the office of the regional commissioner. Information from the interviews and focus group discussions was tape recorded, transcribed and then subjected to a process of content analysis. Major themes were identified and broken into smaller themes that informed the findings of this study. The project report was translated from English to Kiswahili and reviewed. This too was analysed using qualitative content analysis method.

Content Analysis is a technique used for examining the content/information contained in written documents or other media. The process included 'counting how often certain words or themes appeared. 'After we systematically record what we find, we analyse it, often using graphs or charts' (Neuman, 2014, p. 49). The analysis involved organization of the data into broad categories, deductive and inductive theme making/creation and finally coding of the sub themes. Inductive theme generation is when themes emerge directly from the data while deductive theme generation involves the development of themes, concepts and variables from theory and previous studies (Berg, 2001). The emerging themes were then matched to the objectives of the study to build the interpretive narration (Berg, 2009).

10.0 Performance of the KOICA-sponsored Village Projects

10.1 Agriculture

The plan was to establish a maize farm covering an area of 60 hectares and a model farm of one hectare. The model farm was intended to be imitated by farmers from other villages. The farming project was to be accompanied by the construction of irrigation infra-structures. After the project was handed over to the village, the performance of the farming project was inadequate. A sixty-hectare maize farm was started and handed over to a group of 130 farmers for management. The group was given one tractor, one power tiller machine, one planter and a maize processing machine. By the time of the study the farmers' group had only 106 members. The planter was not working. Irrigation infra-structure had not been constructed and the output from agriculture was found to be very minimal as the project depended on seasonal rainfall.

10.2 Animal keeping

The aim was to earmark 150 acres for this project. The area was well fenced and handed over to a 67-member animal keeping group. By the time of the study the group had only 15 members. But a big chunk of the land earmarked for animal keeping was being hired out to private farmers for crop farming. The project had also aimed at constructing cow and poultry sheds, a water-well, a water tank, dipping trough and a servant house. Three cow sheds were found and they were still in good condition. One dipping trough had been built but never used as it was said to have been constructed below standard. A poultry shed was also constructed but by the time of the study it was found to be empty. This too was reported to have been built below standard. The servants' house was also built and furnished but never inhabited. The villagers reported that the house was built too far from common residence and was therefore not safe for habitation.

The water well (bore hole) was dug, connected to a solar powered water pump and a water tank. Nevertheless, the water was found to be too salty and not fit for human or animal use. The farmers then decided to put doors and windows on the water tank and use it for the storage of crops. This group too was handed with a tractor and power tiller machine. The tractor was found to be broken down and not usable.

Another aim of the animal keeping project was to buy 100 dairy cows, 1000

chicken, and 500 dairy goats. The 50 goats were purchased but in the case of other animals only 33 dairy cows and 200 chicken were purchased. The cows and chicken were handed over to the animal keeping group to be used as capital for the production of more cows and chicken. The group decided to sell all the 33 dairy cows and buy 7 improved breed cows. A total of 8 cows were found by the time of the study. The chicken project never took off. The goats were found to have been distributed among a few villagers who were interested. Only a few of the goats were found to be still used as capital for the production of more goats. There was a report that some cows had jumped off a truck as they were being transported to their shed. Responding to one of the semi structured interview questions, an interviewee said:

People are only pretending. They want to own these farms individually and they steal things. How can cows jump form a truck and get lost in broad day light? They stole the cows!

More findings about the KOICA projects in Pangawe village show that water for irrigation to facilitate farming and animal keeping was to be tapped form a neighbouring village called Bamba. This study was informed that the infrastructure for this project was never built because Bamba villagers did not allow KOICA to tap water from their village and send it to the neighbouring village of Pangawe. This is one of the major causes of the failure of agricultural projects in Pangawe village. The second major impediment was that the Morogoro District Council engaged in a rival project of selling land plots at the area earmarked for agriculture and animal keeping.

10.3 Construction of public infrastructure

Six classrooms were constructed for Pangawe Primary School. In addition, one kindergarten class was built, a library, an administration building for the school, as well as two toilets of 14 holes each. The project supplied 300 desks, tables, chairs and book shelves. The project also constructed and furnished one teachers' house. The school was also supplied with a water-well with its tanks. The project constructed and furnished a two-hall building to serve as community centre. The building was in place and used for various activities. Another building was constructed to help in keeping the agricultural equipment. This building was found intact and in use. In addition, a 6.3-kilometre village road was built with murram. Village leaders and some few villagers got an opportunity to travel to

Korea for short term training.

11.0 Performance of SAEMAUL Neighbourhood Projects

Performance of the SAEMAUL projects was also not encouraging. The projects were designed to be run by activity groups. An activity group is a group of persons with a common interest in running a certain type of project focusing on a specific production activity. These groups were mobilized in terms of neighbourhoods. This study found that the youth of Pangawe village were given two maize milling diesel powered machines housed in a modern building. By the time of the study the two machines were non-functional. They were broken down and needed repairing. Pangawe village women were given 30 sewing machines housed in two buildings. One of the buildings was for training and the other one was meant to be a dormitory for learners. It was found during the study that the project was still running but it had been privatized. It was now run by an individual.

Chicken project was introduced also in one of the neighbourhoods. Under this project group members had agreed to contribute 2000 shillings per month in order to sustain the project. Each member would receive a fully mature hen for production of more chicken. The aim was that eventually the whole village would enjoy the benefits of the good breed of chicken. By the time of the study there was no project. The group members had decided to turn to soap making and abandoned the chicken project. A youth group in another neighbourhood was availed with 55 goats, 9 sheep and a fenced shed. By the time of the study there was no project. The youth had decided to divide the animals among themselves for each of them to continue with private keeping in their houses. It was not easy to identify any meaningful propagation of the animals as initially intended. As one of the respondents said:

People here are already used to animal keeping at home. It is difficult to organize them to work in communal groups for something they think they have always been doing at home. How do you convince them?

12.0 Discussion of the Findings

It is evident from the findings that the whole Pangawe Village Integrated Rural Development Programme was not well managed. There was a serious ownership gap between the village and the district council authorities after the

program was handed over to the village. This is seen in the fact that a village in the same district could prohibit the donor from using water for development activities. In a well-conceived and coordinated project such issues need to be sorted out and memoranda of understanding established among all the concerned project partners. Another closely related issue is that of authentic feasibility study. One wonders whether there had been any feasibility study for the projects. The village report shows that money had been invested in a deep water well where the water was too salty for human or animal consumption. A good project starts with exploration which leads to expert opinion on such technical issues. In addition, the report shows that the servant house was built in an uninhabitable place. One wonders how the decision was reached to locate the house in that area.

Most of the expensive equipment provided for the projects were found broken and requiring repair. This shows that the machines were not well handled. Accountability systems were not put in place at the beginning of the project. This is a fatal mistake for any project. Where people are not held accountable, communal projects never yield. It also shows that there was no maintenance plan. Broken machines are not repaired and therefore the projects have come to a halt. Theories that advocate for a financial push in terms of foreign aid focus only on capital availability without considering the behaviours of the human agents in development. Without accountability and management skills, the effect of foreign capital will not lead to development. Just like Rugumamu (1997) showed, aid can fall in the wrong hands and lead to waste of time and other resources.

According to the findings, it becomes difficult to understand how the types of projects were identified. How participatory was the process of choosing the types of projects to be run? A good and sustainable project ensures that the beneficiaries are the ones who choose the types of activities. In addition, here too a good feasibility study is required to ensure that productive activities are connected to viable and dependable markets. The fact that group members abandon the initial activity and decide to engage in other activities shows that there was a problem in identifying feasible project activities. The mode of running the projects had to be carefully decided too. Communal economic arrangements work only where people can be held accountable and the activities are encouragingly productive in terms of market availability. That is why some groups chose to abandon chicken farming and turned to soap making. It also

explains why the sewing project had been sustained after privatization.

Ujamaa strongly defended the importance of love, sharing and work as the bases for the African traditional society, and in turn, the basis for Ujamaa. But this culture was never truly developed and practiced in a typical Tanzanian village. The major obstacle to the assurance of love, sharing and work in a typical village is that these values are moral in nature (Silveira, 1976). In addition, dissimilarities between the contexts of Korea and Tanzania existed and were clearly notable even from the beginning of the project. *Undong* may have had striking similarities with Ujamaa but the culture of work and respect for communal property may have not been well cultivated in Tanzanian villages. Competitive tendencies, class pride, and affinity for private property never ceased even under Ujamaa (van de Laar, 1972).

Finally, the project faced the problem of wrong timing. There was already a new Tanzania that was not very supportive of subsistence agriculture. People wanted to produce things for sale. There was a conflict of two different philosophies. The Pangawe project timing was into the liberal age in Tanzania. *Undong* in Korea was built on the same philosophy as that of Ujamaa. By the time KOICA was starting its project at Pangawe, Ujamaa was already a thing of the past for many Tanzanians – notwithstanding its continued affirmation in the constitution. In practice most Tanzania villagers were already making efforts to quit village mentality. In many places of Tanzania agriculture was already being transformed from a sector for village sustenance to a sector that should bring money and modernize village life. Many people had changed their thinking from subsistence farming to farming as a business activity. Agricultural proceeds were no longer meant for sharing between villagers. They were rather meant for sale. The spirit of cooperation was fading away and the spirit of competition was coming in. People with such a mind-set can never participate effectively in village communal work. In addition, such mind-set is not supportive of the culture of love and fraternity upheld in Ujamaa. The new culture is an important fact that contributed to the failure of the Pangawe project(s). The logic was right but the context was incompatible.

The findings of this study correspond with and support the position held by Carlsson et al. (1997). All the three determinants of development aid

effectiveness mentioned by these authors i.e. project management capacity of the recipients, relationship between donors and the aid recipients and sustainability of the aid have been shown to be in the negative side of performance. This means that in Pangawe the neighbourhood, village and district authorities did not have the required levels of project management capacity. Likewise, the relationship between donors and recipients was not well cultivated (Siddig and Ismail, 2013). The Pangawe project was imposed from the top. The villagers did not have the time to develop the necessary closeness with the donors in order to create a real common and continued understanding which would be the social foundation of the project. At the end the whole project was abandoned by all. The donors gave it over to the village while the national, regional and district government authorities were not closely involved. Because of lack of reliable scientific feasibility study during the beginning of the project, lack of accountability systems and lack of equipment maintenance arrangements, the project could not be sustainable.

13.0 Conclusion

This paper set out to evaluate the effectiveness of Korean development aid to Pangawe village in Tanzania in the light of the long-held view that what poor communities need is capital from outside. The findings have shown that capital alone may be limited and its intentions curtailed by social and cultural realities of the receiving communities. Project feasibility study is one among the most important ingredients that were missing in the Pangawe village project. There was also a serious problem of project ownership among the government authorities in Morogoro. After the project was handed over to the village, both district and regional government authorities did not take the responsibility of managing the project.

Also, by the time the project was introduced the culture of Ujamaa was already dying. Private property ownership and entrepreneurship were already being promoted all over the country. Accountability for the assets belonging to the projects was another big problem. Economic activity groups in the village could decide and act wrongly with impunity. The assets were not maintained and no one was held accountable. The project in Pangawe failed because of utter mismanagement. In addition to lack of reliable feasibility studies, the project lacked ownership, accountability and maintenance plan. The failure of the

Pangawe village project proves that capital alone is not enough for successful development projects. Good management, accountability and other cultural factors should inform the efficiency of capital use.

Given these findings, we argue that, for development aid to work effectively, development support for village projects should not be given as aid but as small revolving loans with strict payback conditions. Group lending methods or the use of cooperative societies could be the best approach in such cases. The lucrativeness of each project should be made clearly known to the beneficiaries from the onset. Markets should be explored and links established. Benefits of a particular project for one or a few individuals should then inform the expansion of the project. Failures should be phased out and individuals held accountable for their decisions and actions that affect the projects.

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The Role of Social Media Platforms in Transforming Diplomatic Correspondence

By

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Abstract

The study focused on examining the role of social media in transforming diplomatic practices. The study used a qualitative research design whereby in-depth interviews (IDI) and secondary data were used in data collection. Simple random sampling was used to select the sample of five diplomatic missions and international organizations engaged in the study. Content analysis was used to analyse data gathered for this study. The study findings revealed that Facebook and Twitter were the most used social media platforms for communicating and interacting with the diplomatic community. Findings unveiled that there is a clear indication that the usage of social media platforms in executing diplomatic functions among institutions has brought some useful results. The study concludes that social media has become an important component that plays a significant role for diplomats to obtain relevant information on different aspects of economic, political and social development. The study recommends that despite its importance, there is a need for embassies, international organizations and honorary consulates to have an understanding of the influence of social media on enhancing interactions between states and non-state actors in international relations and diplomacy.

Keywords: diplomatic correspondence, public opinion, and social media,

1.0 Introduction

Evolution in Communication globally has transformed traditional communication. The use of ICTs has brought convenience in the communication process between communicating parties as well as easy accessibility of information. In diplomacy particularly, communication between diplomats and leaders has evolved from having to send eminent persons who would have to travel long distances to deliver a message, to an era where conversations can take place through e-mails or phone calls unless there is a need to send an envoy physically to deliver a message (Mellisen, 2011). The application of ICT in diplomacy has resulted in a paradigm shift in the international domain and affects both the content and context of international correspondence. This has led to an increase in the involvement of non-state actors, and domestic and foreign

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civilians in policy-making. It has also increased the potential use of soft power rather than hard power in pursuance of foreign policy objectives (Stanley, Mosud, Olumoye et al, 2013).

Equally, this evolution has brought about the usage of internet, e-mails, fax, and video calls, and others. The most important component is the introduction of social media platforms including Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, YouTube, TikTok and Badoo, and possibly many more to come (Fletcher, 2016). In the current fast-paced digital diplomacy era, this evolution allows the larger community to interact and share valuable information with other foreign correspondents through these social media platforms (Mellisen, 2011). Bjola and Holmes (2015) argue that digital technology has transformed how states conduct governance - which has resulted in changes in interstate interactions, i.e. adaptation of digital diplomacy through the use of social media for diplomatic purposes. Diplomacy has seen developments of virtual embassies such as the United States of America and the United Kingdom's virtual embassies in Iran (Fletcher, 2016).

Although in managing international affairs, writing letters or diplomatic notes such as first person note/note signée, press statements, aide memoire, demarche, circular notes, and invitation letters are the core means of diplomatic correspondence, communication through social media has been vital in many states, embassies or high commissions and International organizations. There is a good number of Presidents, Prime Ministers, and Monarchs in the world who use social media platforms to share a variety of information and connect with people (Fletcher 2016). A study by Costa (2017) established that 90% of United Nations Governments use social media as a means of communication. Diplomats take advantage of social media platforms to exchange and share important information and communicate with varied groups of people entailing representatives of states, international organizations, prominent individuals and other key stakeholders in diplomacy through Twitter, Instagram, and Facebook.

Furthermore, the usage of social media platforms in diplomatic practices led to sharing of useful information whereby it has become customary for leaders to exchange congratulatory or condolence notes through social media platforms. Thus, diplomats all over the world have made it customary to share and exchange information through social media platforms to address matters affecting them and their countries at large.

Technological advancements have brought changes in how correspondences

occur in the diplomatic sphere. Recently, states use social media platforms such as tweeter to share information, including statements that have political significance. States' use of social media platforms to make statements that have significance in international politics is a new phenomenon that has shifted how diplomatic correspondence is done. Prior to the introduction of social media, diplomatic correspondence followed the conventional channels through official letters and calls. The use of social media platforms to share information amongst the diplomatic corps and the public is unconventional in diplomacy. The use of socio media platforms exposed diplomatic correspondence to the public which scholars such as Hockings & Mellisen (2015) suggest it's detrimental to the field of diplomacy because of the involvement of people whose knowledge in diplomacy is uncertain.

The online community whose knowledge and experience in diplomacy is uncertain can impact how domestic and international policies are made. Also, there is a question of whether the rules governing correspondence in social media platforms are in line with the established principles of diplomatic correspondence. Through social media platforms diplomatic corps are operating on platforms that are governed by social media rules that are not essentially diplomatic in their orientation. Hence this study seeks to assess the role social media plays in transforming the conduct of diplomatic practices and come up with recommendations that would help the diplomatic community as they are utilizing social media platforms. Since the use of social media platforms is a new practice in diplomatic correspondence, this paper focuses on understanding the role of social media in diplomatic correspondence. Furthermore, the study sought to understand the changes that social media has brought to diplomacy. The paper intends to respond to three questions: How social media is used in executing diplomatic functions, what changes social media has brought to diplomatic correspondence, and the extent to which diplomatic correspondence by social media has affected diplomatic practices in the diplomatic community.

2.0 Theoretical underpinnings

The study used the communication models developed by Shannon and Weaver in 1948 well-known as Shannon-Weaver Model of Communication of 1948. The model consists of five subsystems which are the source, transmitter, noise source, receiver, and destination. Communication passes through all these five subsystems. As far as diplomacy is concerned, social media platforms present new channels through which diplomatic communications are carried out; these include channels/transmitters such as WhatsApp, Facebook, LinkedIn, Twitter, and YouTube. Social media platforms present new channels through which communication between diplomatic corps is carried out.

The source refers to the sender of the message. However, the introduction of social media has increased the scope of the source of information/the sender because social media allows the online community to engage in a dialogue and ultimately shape international policies. Unlike before, the sender/the source was chiefly the government or other official personnel; social media has increased the scope of the source/sender to include the online community.

The Shanon-Weaver model of communication suggests that the transmitter/channel may be prone to noise which in turn may distort the message. In this context therefore the noises involve distractions caused by people who lack the basic understanding of diplomacy, fake news, cyber-crimes, and other related matters that may hinder the successful transmission of the message as intended by the source/sender. On the other hand, the receiver implies the final receiver of the message or information. With the application of social media that welcomes the online community in the communication process, the receiver involves both primary and secondary receivers whereby, the primary receiver refers to the originally intended recipient whereas the secondary receiver refers to the online community that comes across the message because social media involves open transmission that allows everyone on the online community to access the message.

Ultimately, feedback is shared when information obtained from social media affects decision-making. Information obtained from social media may be relevant in shaping foreign policy decisions since information is vital when making foreign policy decisions. Social media platforms, therefore, bring new ways through which feedback is shared between stakeholders in diplomacy.

With respect to the above theory, states' use of socio-media platforms to make diplomatic correspondence introduces a multiplicity of actors who can affect the communication process as was presented by the communication model presented by Shannon and Weaver. Prior to the use of social media, the sender and the receiver were clear, however, through social media platforms diplomatic correspondence became a complicated process. Social media as a choice of transmission may itself act as a noise or distraction when communicating a message due to its open nature that allows different stakeholders to have their say on different issues raised on online platforms.

3.0 Materials and Methods

3.1. Sampling

Since Social media platforms are vast; the study employed Twitter, Facebook, and Instagram as its case studies to establish the role of social media in diplomatic correspondence and the manner in which diplomatic correspondence

has been influenced by these novel changes. To capture the experience of various states in the use of social media, due to limitations in resources and time, the study has narrowed its scope to diplomatic corps present in Tanzania that represent their countries and respective regional and international organizations. The study focused on the wider aspect of diplomatic representation such as representatives of states, representatives of regional and international organizations, consulate generals, and honorary consulates.

3.2. Sampling Formula

In Tanzania, there is a total of 60 diplomatic missions from 48 countries around the world (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Tanzania, 2023). Sample size was calculated by slovin formula as follows;

$$n = N / (1 + Ne^2)$$

Where n = sample size

N = Population size

e = desired margin of error

$$n = 60 / (1 + 60 * (0.10^2))$$

$$n = 37.5 \sim 38$$

Therefore, based on Slovin formula, sample size for this study was 38 diplomatic missions. Data were collected from thirty-eight (38) selected diplomatic missions operating in Tanzania. Simple random sampling was adopted in the study.

3.3. Research Approach

As for method, the study employed qualitative methods to analyse the role of social media usage in diplomatic correspondence. The study used secondary and primary data. Primary data were gathered through key-informant interviews and In-depth interviews to collect opinions and information from sampled respondents. In-depth interviews were conducted with respondents of all types whereas key-informant interview was used to gather data from key persons who are believed to have knowledge and experience concerning social media and diplomacy. Secondary data were collected through reading a series of reports, books, and journal articles relevant to this study. Researchers prepared a set of open-ended questions that were used to administer interviews with the heads of missions or their deputies. Further, the study focused on communications officers in these organizations for their insightfulness in providing information regarding the influence of social media in diplomatic correspondence. Content analysis method was used in data analysis. The method allows the researcher to interpret data based on the content and its relevance to the subject matter (Laws et al 2003).

4.0 Data presentation and analysis

4.1. Types of social media used in Diplomacy

The findings of this study show that there are different types of social media platforms that are used to manage diplomatic correspondence. This depends on the content of information shared, the type of users, and the technical capacity of the platform in delivering the intended information. Respondents identified that they prefer Facebook platform to other social media outlets because it can post longer sentences, several photos, and videos. Also, it allows them to share full information especially when informing about events or programs. One respondent said:

“We have the platforms like Instagram, Facebook, and Twitter but we also have YouTube for large and longer video segments; and we have sound cloud channel which is for audio files; and of course, we can’t forget that most Tanzanians still get most of their news from radio. So we even have radio programs that we produce”.

It was demonstrated that social media has improved diplomatic communications and had quick dissemination of information in various institutions. Concerning the usage of traditional diplomatic communication channels, respondents reported to use both channels of communication. For example, one of the respondents stated that

“I can say it has helped to facilitate more information but we still use also the old channels like writing letters or writing emails but we have added another tool which is more effective”.

This fact was also reported by Nyakweya (2013), who performed a study on the role of social media in enhancing public diplomacy. The study revealed that new media tools have substantially changed diplomacy and therefore diplomatic practitioners should be techno-savvy.

On the question of rules and principles guiding the usage of social media platforms, respondents revealed that, there are established social media policies which were developed by their respective ministries of Foreign Affairs and shared with the embassies and consulates. Therefore, there are Rules of Procedures (RoP) on how correspondences are managed on social media. On the other hand, embassies and consulates develop annual social media strategies and implement them accordingly.

On the aspect of social media as a tool used in developing relations between states, findings indicated that social media was a useful communication tool because it enhances relations. One of the respondents stated:

“Yes we use social media to communicate in various scenarios in Tanzania. I can

give you an example. We communicate to send well wishes and congratulatory greetings during national holidays such as Independence Day, Revolutionary day and on national elections events”.

In addition, study observations of tweeter on 20th March, 2021, it was observed that the Vice President of the United States of America H.E Kamala Harris had sent congratulatory greetings to H. E. Samia Suluhu Hassan on becoming the President of the United Republic of Tanzania. She also congratulated her on being the first woman to hold the office and assuring her of her commitment to working together to strengthen relations between the two states. Furthermore, on 27th April 2021, H.E Boris Johnson shared a tweet about speaking with the President of the Republic of Kenya H. E Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta regarding the UK-Kenya Global Education Summit which the two countries prepared. Furthermore, one of the respondents demonstrated as follows:

“In this era, social media is a very powerful tool and it has proven advantageous because it is the only tool which can provide information fast to the people. So it is an important tool if it is used to collect information in general ways”.

Moreover, another respondent said:

“Social media is one of the very useful tools to spread information easily especially to the civil society, that is why we use social media as a tool to spread our ideas and information”.

On the aspect of managing diplomatic correspondence and smoothen diplomatic tensions among states, the study found that social media was useful in settling misunderstandings between states. This fact is also supported by Duncombe (2017) on his study titled *Twitter and Transformative Diplomacy* where the study unveiled that the relevance of social media in the Iran-US relation was depicted in 2016 when the United States vessels and crews that entered Iranian sovereign territory were released by the Iranian authority “swiftly and peacefully”, a day after their seizure. After the vessels and crews were released foreign ministers of the United States and Iran took to Twitter to comment on the incident. John Kerry, the then State Secretary of the United States tweeted:

“Peaceful and efficient resolution of this issue is a testament to the critical role diplomacy plays in keeping our country secure and strong”.

Half an hour later, Zarif shared a tweet as well regarding the same incident, saying:

“Happy to see dialog and respect, not threats and impetuosity, swiftly resolved the sailors’ episode. Let’s learn from this latest example”.

On execution of diplomatic functions, the study found that social media platforms

have been very important for institutions involved in executing diplomacy practices in international relations. One of the respondents stated:

“Social media gives opportunity for the community to know what we do. Previously people didn’t know what our country is doing in Tanzania but since we have started using social media many people have learned about projects that we support in Tanzania”.

Another respondent said:

“Absolutely, I believe it has helped diplomacy because the information is disseminated quickly. Also, I believe that diplomats can access each other through Twitter, email or WhatsApp much easier. I believe it may enhance diplomacy because people don’t have to rush to meet someone in person after a meeting or seminar or session. You can search from Google for a Twitter account or WhatsApp number and be able to have dialogue. These are the obvious benefits of social media”.

Another respondent identified the biggest strength of social media as being the ease of reaching out to internet users. In that sense, it has become a very effective tool for sharing information rather than limiting that information to government officials. Respondents were asked to clarify the influence of social media in current diplomacy practices between states and non-state actors in international relations. It was unveiled that diplomacy engages a large community of practitioners who through social media platforms have access to give opinions on international relations and diplomacy. One of the respondents stated as follows:

“Of course, social media has opened up diplomacy. The area of diplomacy is no longer reserved for states as the only players but it is now more inclusive of communities through extension of diplomatic information. That is a good thing”.

The study by Bjola and Zaiotti, (2020) indicated that International Organizations use social media platforms to maintain internal and external communications. Furthermore, their study indicated that Social media platforms enable international organizations to share information, and conduct dialogue with the assertive public hence engaging people in formulating public policies. Also, the same has been supported by Archetti (2011) who argued that digitalization and social media usage in diplomacy was “democratization of diplomacy” whereby common people are finally given platforms to engage in diplomacy. But contrary to these findings, a study by Hockings and Mellisen (2015) suggests that on the execution of diplomatic functions, social media is detrimental to the field of diplomacy because these online platforms give people with uncertain knowledge of diplomacy power to shape public opinion, which can later be used to formulate domestic or international policy.

Concerning making decisions based on information obtained from social media

platforms it was revealed that it was rare for embassies and organizations to make fruitful decisions by just relying on the information from social media. This is because of fear of fake news which might cause diplomatic chaos. Regarding this issue one of the respondents said:

"Yes we do follow other organizations and other missions in social media platforms. This included Tanzanian government's official pages. We also share and use information from other missions but we never use the information casually. Information from social media is communicative only but not for crucial decision making".

Social media platforms provide users with access to the online community where they can have their opinions heard and ultimately formulate public opinion which essentially serves as input for the policy-making process. This is indicated in the following words of a respondent:

"Yes, I have because recently, for example, I obtained information through social media and it was not directly from our headquarters, but it came from social media. There was an award that was reported to have been given to West Africa instead of East Africa. I got that information through social media because it was posted on a website in Rwanda and because I am working as an honorary consular then I had to communicate with our Embassy in South Africa so that they can do a follow-up with the government of Rwanda".

This argument is against the findings from Bjola & Zaiotti (2020) that social media as channels used by diplomats to send and receive messages, can only negatively impact the kinds of decisions made in diplomacy.

5.0 Discussion of the Findings

The first objective of this study was to examine the usage of social media in executing diplomatic functions of international institutions. It was demonstrated that there is a clear indication that the usage of social media platforms in executing diplomatic functions among institutions has brought some useful results as it has been revealed by respondents in this study. This includes instant communication, gathering information as well as visibility in the public. The study's findings are consistent with Costa (2017) who narrated that the rise of digital diplomacy has been a useful component in executing diplomatic functions as it allowed Polish diplomacy to be communicated with other foreign audiences.

Moreover, in examining changes in diplomatic correspondence due to the evolution of social media, the results revealed that previously diplomacy was belonging to a certain group of people and so only a few people had access to it but the evolution of social media platforms led to engaging a larger community of practitioners which have access to diplomacy and can give opinions on

international relations and diplomacy and thus improving communication and increasing interactions between states. The findings support Muaka (2021) who found that proper usage of social media makes a state visible and brings good interaction with other states globally. Furthermore, social media has improved citizens' awareness hence public involvement in diplomatic practices. The author added that the COVID-19 pandemic has contributed to ushering in a paradigm shift from traditional forms of communication to the new era of digital diplomacy that allows for online interaction urging every state to promote digital communication. In the same vein, Jowett and O'Donnell (2012) assert that social media surpasses traditional diplomacy in cultivating public opinions from other countries, easing interactions between diplomats and foreign correspondents in international relations and diplomacy.

In assessing the impact of diplomatic correspondence by social media on the conduct of diplomatic practices in the diplomatic community, findings revealed that embassies and organizations were observed to use both channels of communication taking advantage of the development in technology which have led these organizations to adopt digital diplomacy. Also, it was revealed that social media had a positive influence on improving diplomacy and relationship between states as it facilitated good and timely communication hence a good way of resolving conflicts. Nevertheless, social media not only has positive impact. Some impacts are all together negative. This is supported by Maor (2016) revealing that there is a negative ideology against Romanian embassies in Europe which are communicating in the Romanian language on social media hence bringing negative feelings to other states. People from other states think that the Romanians have a hidden agenda.

6.0 Conclusion and Recommendations

Recently, social media has become an important component of diplomatic correspondence. It plays a significant role in helping diplomats obtain relevant information on different issues. The evolution from traditional communication diplomacy to digital communication diplomacy is an inescapable international relations communication tool because for now, diplomats can transact information through social media without having to meet physically. This is an important contribution to improving effective communication in diplomatic practices between and within states. Due to the significance of digital diplomacy, there are some embassies and organizations that successfully established departments responsible for managing social media platforms in communicating with other governments and accelerating information to the public at large, as well as improving communication with foreign audiences. Social media has become vital in providing instant information to the public.

This study recommends that official diplomatic practices (traditional diplomacy) are still important in making negotiations, signing trade agreements, and interacting on social and political affairs. Yet, there is a need for embassies, international organizations, and honorary consulates to have a deeper understanding of the influence of social media on enhancing interactions and diplomatic practices between states and non-state actors in international relations.

Moreover, with the spurring of technology on influencing diplomacy there is a need for diplomats and communication officers in the embassies and organizations to be well-trained concerning the usage of social media platforms on sharing information and interacting with others to avoid controversies, conflicts and improve trust.

Furthermore, to avoid conflicts arising from diplomatic correspondence through socio-media, the study recommends the establishment of rules and regulations to govern diplomatic communication through social media. Since relations between actors in the international community are governed by rules and regulations, including how they communicate, there are yet to be established rules that govern the communication between diplomatic corps when using social media platforms. Hence, the diplomatic community needs to use this opportunity before it is transformed to a challenge.

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Impact of Non-Tariff Barriers on Regional Trade: A Case of Namanga One Stop Border Post

By

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Abstract

This study highlights the impact of non-tariff barriers (NTBs) on trade in East Africa. It examines the impact of non-tariff barriers on intra-regional trade. The study focuses on the Tanzania and Kenya border, specifically the Namanga One Stop Border Post (OSBP). Regional economic theory was used as the basis of the study. The study employed both qualitative and quantitative approaches where primary and secondary data were used. Both probability and non-probability sampling techniques were used to select respondents. Simple random and purposive sampling techniques were used to select the sample which involved 60 respondents. Using content analysis, data was transcribed and the study discovered several NTBs that impede trade. These include import bans, multiple quality checks and weighbridges, police roadblocks, and standards of packaging. The study recommends the upgrade of the network system and revision of NTB laws in order to address the effects NTBs are having on trade in the EAC in general and between Tanzania and Kenya specifically.

Keywords: East Africa, Intra-regional Trade, Non-tariff Barriers,

1.0 Introduction

In contemporary business environment it is not uncommon to come across the aspect of non-tariff barriers (NTBs). Trade protection policies such as NTBs have become the sort out strategies in the international scenery. In many political and economic unions such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and North America Free Trade Area (NAFTA) the imposition of NTBs has become the norm (Oatley, 2019; EAC 2018). The same is true within the African continent. Regional blocs such as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and East African Community (EAC) impose NTBs as a practical approach to achieve economic growth. The EAC in particular views NTBs as a basic pillar in establishing cooperation in trade (EAC, 2018). Member

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states have initiated agreements that prohibit the removal of NTBs that might affect relations in trade in the bloc. Initiatives such as One Stop Border Posts serve as instrumental phases in the eventual elimination of trade protectionism policies for member states and agencies.

Although measures have been put in place to facilitate trade between Tanzania and Kenya, they have not resulted in the desired levels of above 10% GDP growth rate. Trade protectionism has persisted between the two states (EAC, 2018). Kenya for example, has placed blame on Tanzania for unnecessary verification processes that have resulted in time wastage and increased costs at the border. On the other hand, Tanzania has argued that the Kenya Revenue Authority (KRA) has put in place various check points on products from Tanzania that also lead to an increase in cost for Tanzanian business people. Both states however agree that NTBs have a severe impact on trade (Ibid).

Mkuna (2014), for example, observed that NTBs can cause dire obstructions in intra-regional trade which include inaccessibility to partner country's market; increase in prices of products for export; diminishing in job creation; and limitations for economic development. Furthermore, NTBs are known to hamper free trade among partner states to the extent that even if regional blocs have signed existing treaties, they may not result in the blossoming of free trade or the investment environment (East Africa Business Council, 2008; Hangi, 2010).

This paper accentuates the impact imposed on regional trade by NTBs at Namanga One Stop Border Post. Several studies have been conducted to explore the impact of NTBs but much focus has been put on how NTBs impact state development. The paper analyses the impact of NTBs on trade facilitation by determining the impact that NTBs pose intra-regional trade and the general disruption it is having between Tanzania and Kenya's trade relationship. Finally, the paper outlines suggestions on how to improve and smoothen intra-regional trade. The basis of the paper is regional economic theory which is the underlining theory guiding regional economic integration (REI). REI is the progressive removal of obstacles to free trade. It is the establishment of preferential trade access to markets in each other's economies. The goal of REI is the eventual creation of an economic union (Balassa, 1961; Kahnert, et al, 1969; Hosny, 2013).

2.0 Literature Review

Among the most common forms of trade protectionism are tariffs. NTBs are usually put in place by states to protect local producers. However, whenever a community embarks on an ambition to increase intra-regional trade, NTBs will always act as an obstacle to the development. This is because NTBs disrupt trade. In the SADC region for example, one of the major causes attributed to the low trade between SADC countries is NTBs (UNCTAD, 2016).

Although a legal framework for the elimination of NTBs was passed by the EAC in 2015, NTBs still persist and curbing intra-regional trade. However, a study by Okumu and Okuk (2010), discovered that trade is increasing within the EAC despite the existence of NTBs. For example, in 2018, trade within the EAC increased to \$5.98 billion from \$3.18 billion in 2010 (The East African, 2020). Okumu and Okuk (2010) argue that the reason for this could be that NTBs are not effective in affecting trade. However, this is untrue because there is a general consensus that NTBs are holding back the EACs full trade potential (EAC 2018). The other reason that can be attributed to the growth is traders finding different ways to go around the NTBs. This is more likely the reason because many informal cross borders exist within the EAC region. This leaves room for corruption and improper regulation of goods and services.

According to Odebero (2011), it was the unfavourable economic conditions that led to the implementation of NTBs. As the EAC grew, it was undoubtedly clear that Kenya was reaping the larger share of benefits compared to her counterparts. Other EAC members saw that in order to maintain the same level of growth as Kenya they had to apply the principle of irregularity. These irregularities implied imposing NTBs to ensure their economies are protected from the exports of Kenyan products. However, measures such as these can have a drastic impact on the economy. In 1997 the Japanese, for example, imposed a ban on pork exports from Taiwan for fear of the foot and mouth disease. Although the move was pushed by a health risk and not the need to protect their economy, Marie-Helene et al (2011) report that the decision led to a two-year delay in pork exports. This is because Taiwan supplied 41 per cent of the Japanese port imports. This of course is an extreme example but it does shed some light on what would happen if NTBs are severely imposed.

According to Jonyo (2018), the effects of NTBs to trade should not be underestimated. NTBs cause goods to be denied access to certain markets, raise the cost of conducting business, and disrupt trade in general. This is most notably seen in Kenya. A study conducted by Nganga (2013) reports that Kenya has the most NTBs in the region. The presence of numerous weighbridges and roadblocks, and unnecessarily long import processes presented obstacles to businesspersons. Other obstacles also included unusual working times at the border and long bureaucratic processes for acquiring work permits. In fact, a 2008 report by the East African Business Council proclaimed Kenya as the worst delinquent of NTBs. The fact of the matter is that NTBs play a much bigger role as barrier to cross border trade than any other tariff (Stahl, 2005). It is the very same obstacles that can lead to a build-up in pressure which may eventually find release in the form of riots as it happened in March 2019 at the Namanga border.

The other major impact, according to Karugia et al (2009), caused by NTBs is tax disparities. Throughout the development of the EAC there has yet to be a harmonization of their tax regimes. It is not uncommon to find the EAC members charging different tax rates, whether value added tax or excise tax, to foreign investors. This is ironic because one of the reasons attributed to the collapse of the first EAC was disparities in their economic systems (Karugia et al 2009). Nevertheless, this disharmony in tax regimes has resulted in increased cost of compliance and has affected investor decisions regarding where to invest and source finance. It has also shifted the burden to consumers who at times are facing different prices for similar products.

An equal obstacle that burdens both consumers and investors are trade costs resulting from invisible trade barriers. These may be in the form of technical or health standards that are often not harmonized (Cernat, 2001). The lack of an imposed common control system more often than not produces and fosters an environment for corruption and fraud (Ibid). In Tanzania, for example, measurements of quality and standard are done by several agencies including the Tanzania Bureau of Standards (TBS) and Tanzania Food and Drugs Authority (TFDA). Tanzania, in fact, is considered by Calabrese and Eberhard-Ruiz (2016) to impose the largest margin of safety and quality measures in the EAC since 2009. This double to triple checking of goods causes disruptions to trade and investors incur costs when goods are delayed passage.

3.0 Research Methodology

Qualitative and quantitative research approaches were used in this study to address the aim of the study. These approaches also assisted in designing the research tools, data collection and analysis. Quantitative approach was used to generate statistical data on NTBs such as import bans, police road blocks, and weighbridges while qualitative approach was used to get in-depth information from all key stakeholders. The study employed a survey-based approach. The study area was at the Namanga border between Tanzania and Kenya. Both probability and non-probability sampling techniques were employed to select respondents of this study. Simple random and purposive sampling techniques were used to select the sample. The sample size was obtained by deriving Yamane's formula from a sample size of 150 (see Prince, 2005). The triangulation of methods was used to increase reliability and validity. However, the number of respondents covered does not capture the full scope of stakeholders. This leaves room for further research.

Table 1: Respondents of the research study

S/N	Respondents	Sample Size
1	TRA Officials	6
2	Drivers	26
3	Local traders/Businesspeople	28
TOTAL		60

Source: Researchers' Field Data, 2020

Primary data was obtained from semi-structured questionnaires which contained both close ended and open-ended questions which were administered to drivers and businesspeople. The study also employed interview method to attain data from Tanzania Revenue Authority officials. Secondary data was obtained from documentary review such as Foreign direct investment reports, Tanzania development vision 2025, East Africa Vision 2050, Economic and Social Research Foundation (ESRF), to mention a few. Online books and journals related to the topic were also used. Data was successfully sorted, filtered, entered and analysed in relation to the specific objectives while Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS) version 20 was employed to determine frequencies of responses of sixty (60) respondents from different stakeholders as presented in Table 1.

4.0 Results and Discussion

4.1 Characteristics of the Population

The study intended to identify the characteristics of the population under study in order to observe their contribution to the overall theme. The characteristics observed were gender, age, level of education, and occupation of population. The findings showed that 53 (88.3%) of the respondents were male, while 7 (11.7%) respondents were female as indicated in Table 2. This signifies that, for the implementers, there are more male than female in the category of drivers and businesspeople. This, according to the researchers, may be attributed to the nature of the job.

Table 2: Gender of Respondents by Type of Stakeholders

Stakeholder	Frequency		Total Observation
	Male (%)	Female (%)	
TRA Officials	5	2	11.7%
Drivers	25	0	41.7%
Local Traders/ Businesspeople	23	5	46.6%
Total	88.3	11.7	100% of 60 respondents

Source: Researchers' Field Data, 2020

Table 3: Age of Respondents

Age (Years)	Frequency	Percent (%)
Youth (18- 38)	18	30
Middle (39 – 60)	39	65.0
Old (61 and above)	3	5.0
Total	60	100

Source: Researchers' Field Data, 2020

Table 3 depicts the age of the respondents. Majority of the respondents i.e. 57 (95%), were between the ages of 28 to 60 years of age. The basis for enquiring about respondents' age was to capture the percentage of youth and middle aged people who would be engaged in some form of economic activity that would be directly impacted by the theme of the study.

The results in Table 4 further indicate that 98.3% had formal education whereby those with secondary education were leading (36.6%) followed by the group with primary education (35.0%). This indicates that the majority of the respondents were not illiterate and were aware of the circumstances of their daily activities.

Table 4: Level of Education of Respondents

Education Level	Frequency	Percent (%)
None	1	1.7
Primary	21	35.0
Secondary	22	36.6
College	16	26.7
Total	60	100

Source: Researchers' Field Data, 2020

The majority of the respondents were businessman followed by drivers and 10% were TRA officers. All of them encountered NTBs and they posed challenges in their line of work in one form or another.

Table 5: Occupation of Respondents

Occupation	Frequency	Percent
Businesspeople	28	46.7
Driver	26	43.3
TRA Officers	6	10.0
Total	60	100

Source: Researchers' Field Data, 2020

Despite efforts to resolve the NTBs that exist in EAC through the introduction of various principles of custom union, there have been some that have not yet been resolved. The study therefore embarked on determining the current NTBs that hamper intra-regional trade between Tanzania and Kenya.

4.2 Identified NTBs at the Namanga OSBS

Respondents pointed out that there were import bans present at Namanga OSBP. In fact, 35% of the respondents agreed to the presence of these bans while 58.3% were neutral meaning that they were of the view that they existed but were not sure to what extent. Import bans are notorious impediments to trade

and quite often hampered relations between trade partners.




Figure 1: Import Bans

Source: Researchers' Field Data, 2020




Figure 2: Police Roadblocks

Source: Researchers' Field Data, 2020

Similar results were observed at Malaba OSBP between Kenya and Uganda by Jonyo (2018). This author noted that 60% of trade between Kenya and Uganda is being affected by the import bans. Although the degree of disturbance was not established at Namanga OSBP but, from the responses, it is certain that it is impeding trade.

Figure 2 shows 48.3% of respondents agreed that there were numerous road blocks that caused nuisance to trade. Road blocks lead to an increase in delays

and delivery time. They also foster a bribery environment which leads to further impediments to intra - regional trade.

As observed in Figure 3, 65% of respondents agreed that the classifications and valuation processes of goods were lengthy to the extent that it impeded trade. Due to numerous classifications goods may be delayed or businesspeople may incur extra costs which act as a deterrent to intra - regional trade.





Figure 3: Lengthy Classification and Valuation Processes


Source: Researchers' Field Data, 2020

According to Figure 4, 80% of traders reported to encounter multiple quality checks of their products. 20% may be engaged in trade that does not make them encounter quality checks or they manoeuvre around them. As indicated above, multiple quality checks always lead to delays and extra costs for businesspeople. The inconveniences that result from the multiple checks are not compensated in any manner by either government. This circumstance leads traders to manoeuvre in whatever way they can so as to avoid any additional costs to their businesses. Otherwise, the extra costs can be unloaded on the consumer which again is another unfair aspect.

**Figure 4: Multiple Quality Checks for Products**


Source: Researchers' Field Data, 2020

The existence of multiple weighbridges is another NTB that has been pointed out. Note in Figure 5, 80% of respondents indicated the existence of multiple weighbridges. Although weighbridges are a useful method of restricting trucks from overloading and escaping tariffs, the agreed EAC procedure is that they should be only at entry and exit points. The presence of multiple weighbridges encourages corruption, leads to cargo delays and increased cost of business.

**Figure 5: Multiple Weighbridges**

Source: Researchers' Field Data, 2020

It is not uncommon for countries to have their own standards regarding certain goods and services. Even at the Namanga OSBP 47 (78.3%) respondents agreed that there were standards and packaging checks. However, the standards are not universally observed as you would expect in a regional community that has signed a trade Treaty. In fact, both Tanzania and Kenya are supposed to conform to WTO guidelines, however this is not the case and this leads to more delays of cargo at the border.

**Figure 6:** Standards and Packaging**Source:** Researchers' Field Data, 2020

As stated earlier, EAC member states still employ NTBs in most of their trading activities. This is despite the fact that this goes against the treaties mentioned in the introduction. Article 13 of the EAC Customs Union, for example, advocates for the elimination of NTBs. Table 6 presents a summary of the responses which show respondent interpretations of the effects of NTBs on the following areas; cost of doing business; delaying of business; increase in organizational cost; denial of access to markets; and changes in quantity traded.

Table 6: Rating Scale

Mean range	Response	Interpretation
1.00-1.99	Agree	Very high
2.00-2.99	Neutral	Moderate
3.00-3.99	Disagree	Very low

Table 7: Descriptive Statistics

Effects of NTBs	Mean	Standard Deviation	Interpretation
Increases cost of doing business	1.28	0.824	Very high
Delays business	1.23	0.700	Very high
Increases organizational cost	1.72	0.890	Very high
Denies access to certain markets	1.65	0.781	Very high
Changes quantities of goods traded	1.65	0.847	Very high
Controls spread of diseases	2.03	0.663	Moderate

Is for Security purposes	2.75	0.644	Moderate
Ensures the growth of internal markets	1.82	0.704	Very high

Source: Researchers' Field Data, 2020

The respondents were asked to provide suggestions for solutions to the NTBs and Table 7 outlines their responses. Most respondents suggested that there needs to be an improvement in the border services since that is where the bulk of activities are. In order to reduce delays and unnecessary costs the number of weighbridges should be reduced and follow the agreed terms already signed in the EAC treaty. Respondents also insisted on the freedom of trade from political interference. Finally, the other major suggestion made by the majority of respondents was the increased frequency of stakeholder meetings to discuss problems and find solutions to the Namanga OSBP. This also means that laws guiding the NTBs should be revised from time to time and should not be stagnant.

Table 8: Solutions to the NTBs Problem at Namanga OSBP

Responses	Number of respondents	Percentage
Transparency on NTBs law	2	2.7
Stakeholders meeting to discuss about the issue	8	18.5
Political conflict should not interfere business issues (let business be free from political interference)	5	10.6
Reduce the number of road weighbridges	16	24.3
Improve border services like the network system	17	25.2
Provision of education of NTBs to businessman	1	0.7
Laws based on NTBs should be revised time to time	5	9.8
Reduce multiple checks	4	5.5
Reduce number of police blocks	2	2.7
Total	60	100

Source: Researchers' Field Data, 2020

5.0 Conclusion and Recommendations

This study has examined the effects of NTBs at the Namanga OSBP and identified several NTBs that are affecting trade. The NTBs indicated are import bans, lengthy processes for validation, multiple quality checks and weighbridges, police road blocks, and standards and packaging. The discovery is that these

NTBs cause delays to cargo, add unnecessary costs to businesspeople which in turn may be passed down to the consumer, and impede trade between Tanzania and Kenya. The study has pointed out the mild and severe consequences of NTBs. The study recommends that the network system should be upgraded; NTB laws should be taught to business people and consumers; and stakeholder meetings should be held periodically that involve all parties affected.

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Possibility of Democratic Peace in Africa: A Lesson Drawn from Botswana

By
Godwin Gonde Amani¹

Abstract

Starting with a general understanding and application of the term democracy, specifically Western Liberal Democracy, this paper uses the case of Botswana as an example of a possibility of peaceful transition of government in Africa. The paper majors on the views of Robert Dahl, particularly on what democracy is and how democratic societies and their governments should be formed and behave. The paper also sets the foundation of its arguments on what has been termed 'democratic peace'. The paper then uses this background to assess the behaviour of the state of Botswana in terms of democratic peace theory and the views of Robert Dahl to gauge out the political possibilities of peaceful transition of political power in Africa through democratic elections. The paper concludes that democracy can be a factor for peaceful transition of political power, taking lessons from Botswana's history of political stability and peaceful elections over 40 years.

Key Words: democracy, democratic peace, elections

1.0 Introduction

The demand for political inclusion has been one of the major causes of conflicts in Africa. Historically, Africa is a continent that faces almost all types of conflicts as argued by Waltz (1959). The continent has been criticized for having conflicts and wars from intrastate to interstate, most of them resulting from demands for political inclusion in general and democratic political systems in particular (Ho - Wo, 2011).

The East African Election Management Bodies have suggested that, electoral competition has become an important barometer of the health of democracy in the region. These bodies not only insist on the competition side of the elections but also such elections to be regular, free and fair as well as transparent. The bodies direct that, the transfer of power which assures the sustainability of peace

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within the states will always be guaranteed through free and fair elections contrary to what peace spoilers within the region believe that ‘bullets change the governments far sure than ballots’ (Deng, 2008).

Deng (ibid.) continues to show that in Africa, federalism is seen as one of the means of removing biases and uniting people under one federal state. Nigeria, Ethiopia and now Kenya have been some examples on how such a system can function in taking care of intra state violence. The success of this system of government is based on the argument that the rights (and responsibilities) of minor groups should be stipulated within the constitution so that every individual will see the constitution as a mirror reflecting his/her image. Also people should be able to practice democracy as a means of choosing those whom they want to represent them in decision making.

The next section of this paper gives a short background to the concept of democracy and democratic peace by reviewing major argument for liberal democracy and mainly the views of Robert Dahl – among others. Then the paper engages the case of Botswana highlighting the nature of governance that has enabled it to experience 40 years peaceful elections and transitions of government. The paper settles its argument after appreciating a few criticisms levelled against the nature of democracy in Botswana.

1.1 Methods and Materials

This paper employs a case study research approach where Botswana is selected due to its democratic record as the leading democratic state in Africa. It is primarily a qualitative study and it involves desk review. Data were collected through online materials and a review of journal articles, media resources and other scholarly works. Thematic data analysis was used and findings were ordered into descriptive categories around which the main elements are presented.

2.0 Background to the concept of democracy

2.1 From Greece to Fukuyama's Thesis

For a long time the concept of democracy has been a fundamental issue of discussion. With the challenges facing the sovereignties of states and legitimacies of governments all over the world, it seems that the definition of

democracy goes beyond what Abraham Lincoln (The 16th US president) termed as “Government of the people, for the people and by the people”. Since the ancient Greek idea of ‘democratia’ as the rule by the people back in the 5th Century, democracy has continues to emerged and re-emerge as a complex and disputable term and as an ideal with complicated implications. The people’s notion on democracy pitted against how they view their governments’ and states’ actions towards social and political order leave a number of unanswered questions about what democracy really is. Peter Stirk and David Weigall, (1995) when analysing democracy and popular representation, came up with a number of assumptions and even traced how different ancient societies considered the concept of democracy.

The same analysis was done by John Morrow, (2005) who viewed democracy in terms of the location of political authority in a ruling body and brought a debatable question of “Who Should Rule”. Francis Fukuyama in his famous book “The End of History and the Last Man” argued in favour of democracy when trying to prove it to be a fundamentally better system that could calm the political tensions of the world. Following the success of the West in exporting liberal democracy to other parts of the world in the 1980s, Fukuyama believed that all states of the world would be converted to democracies, (Fukuyama, 1992). Those who argued later in favour of Fukuyama’s notion of democracy agreed on the idea of *Democratic Peace Theory* which commented that, democracies rarely or never go to war with one another.

Actually, Fukuyama’s book was viewed as the continuation of Kojève’s (1969) work with the same title “End of History” though the two had different perceptions on the future of the world in terms of democracy and capitalism. The philosophical ideas of Fukuyama and Kojève on the notion of democracy are more influenced by the writings of Plato, Aristotle, Emmanuel Kant, George Wilhelm, Friedrich Hegel, Karl Marx and Leo Strauss.

2.2 Robert Dahl on Democracy and Democratization

In making an in-depth discussion on the democracy and democratization, this paper uses Robert A. Dahl’s three works on democracy with a greater focus on the relationship between democracy and state which we will later discuss when we link democracy to the case of Botswana. In his three works, *Dilemmas of*

Pluralistic Democracy (1982), *A Preface to Democratic Theory* (2005), and *On Political Equality* (2006), Dahl insists on how power within the state should be shared to ensure that the aspect of democracy is not affected by the distribution of power. In *A Preface to Democratic Theory*, Dahl views democracy as a process by which ordinary citizens exercise a relatively high degree of control over their leaders. For him, there is never a theory of democracy but the theories of democracy that means democracy is viewed differently by societies. He scrutinizes the element of power versus man in a democratic society and highlights the ability of power to pose as a threat to any party without power in a given society. He also points out the idea of Natural Rights as the elements of democracy within the society and insists that the state by no means should violate these rights.

On the same issue of men with power in relation to democracy, Dahl argued that, men love power and from that nature he is sure that those with power in their hands will always strive to hold it and increase it (Dahl, 2006). Democracy here has to do with equalitarianism in which case a republic government will be needed for true democracy to succeed. The republic government is the one which derives all of its powers directly from the people and is administered by persons holding their office during pleasure of the majority and for a limited period or during a period of good behaviour. Man's love for power was clearly depicted in the book *The True Law of Free Monarchies*, (1598). The idea of one man being given all power (divinely) came into domination when King James VI of England insisted on the divine rights of the kings. His ideas went further by considering that the kings are not only God's Lieutenants but also by the virtue of their authorities they are Gods. This means they possess the powers of policy makers, philosophers and Gods (Dahl, 1982).

In *The Dilemmas of Democracies*, Dahl brought the idea of autonomy versus control. On these dilemmas, he highlighted the link between Organizations and Democracy. The basic argument is that there should be organizations with autonomy and power to oversee the working of the individuals vested with power in order to avoid abuse of democracy. This is the case when a parliament, for example, has autonomy to supervise the president and his government.

In this view, democracy includes political equality in which according the role of

institutions in ensuring democracies to the people is emphasised (Dahl, 2005). Whether people participate in direct democracy as a result of small population or they are being represented in the assemblies by their representatives, his ideas remain that the peoples' will should be fully exercised. According to Dahl (2006), democracy is all about the necessary systems of fundamental rights of the people and that all adult human beings are entitled to equal treatment. He linked this concept of equality of men and their struggle for power. For him the fundamental truth about human being is that, power corrupts people and absolute power corrupts people absolutely. The voting system was therefore also a concern for Dahl when he insisted that the democratic society is the one that allows its citizens to make decisions through the votes and ensuring that each vote is counted and finally the majority prevails, (ibid).

For democracy to succeed, the legal part of the ruling institutions should be legitimate. As the major law of the land, the constitution needs to be framed in such a way that all citizens and their identities are reflected, (Francis *et al.*, 2013). The process of constitution making needs to be democratic and that all citizens need to participate fully. Democratization and Constitutionalism are mandatory in removing differences within the democratic society. Any writing of a constitution should involve all identities in a country so that all the people will have a sense of ownership of their country and their government.

2.3 Democratic Peace Theory

Democratic Peace Theory has been in the field of political science for years. It became famous during the 1960's when the Cold War period was leading the world politics. Though it was first considered as a scientific theory, this theory had its foundations from the 18th Century when scholars like Emmanuel Kant and Thomas Paine included the theory in their works. The main argument of this theory is the emphasis that liberal and republican forms of democracies are less likely to go to war with one another since they act in favour of peace. This theory argues more on the notion that, democratic states are more dovish in their interactions with other democracies, and that democratically elected leaders are more likely to resort to peaceful resolution in disputes - both when those conflicts are happening within and without the democracies. The theory insists on the need to democratize the authoritarian regimes and take all the necessary steps to ensure that the restoration of democracy is done among states in order

to ensure peace and stability in the world.

3. The case of Botswana's Democracy

Republic of Botswana is a landlocked country in the southern part of Africa which has so far enjoyed over 50 years of independence. With a population of 2.3 million people majority (75%) being of Tswana ethnic, Botswana is considered as the origin of modern human being (Maundeni, 2005). After independence, Botswana was one among the poorest countries in the world and having about 75% of its land as part of the Kalahari Desert, Botswana was seen as a country without prospects of quick economic growth.

Botswana is the oldest democratic African state with the president who is both the head of state and government and is directly accountable to the parliament which is made of the people's representatives from across the country. According to democratic index in 2021, Botswana was ranked as a stable and fast growing democratic state in Africa being the 30th out of 167 states. At that time it ranked even higher than Italy and Belgium which were considered among the best democratic states in Europe. By 2023 Botswana ranks 75th electoral democracy worldwide and according to Transparency International Botswana it is the least corrupt country in Africa.

The government of Botswana has made efforts to ensure that the parliament has total autonomy to supervise the president and his government. The government of Botswana stands as an organization that is different from many African states. When it comes to the question of power, many African governments use every opportunity to increase injustice and foster egoism and reach a point of destroy democracy completely, Dingake, (2009). These countries can have lessons to learn from Botswana.

4.0 Results and Discussion

The paper has highlighted on the views in the works of Robert Dahl who discussed at length the features of liberal democracy. On the idea of minority rule and majority rights which were argued by Robert Dahl in his works, Botswana seems to have managed to raise the voices of the minorities for the constitution of Botswana allows political competition among all classes within the state, (Mafela, 2007). Although Dahl went beyond by including issue of equality of all

classes within the state to claim democracy, the constitution of Botswana remains silent on the issue of gender considering all citizens are equal without any group to claim more favours than the other.

The constitution of Botswana guarantees fundamental rights to the minorities and protects those rights through an independent judicial body. At the risk of passing a matter which might not work in favour of the minorities, the judiciary in Botswana is the only entrusted organ to say “no” to the majorities and even to their elected representatives. This power is what Robert Dahl viewed as the necessary steps that the government will take to ensure the happiness of the majorities and the satisfaction of the minorities.

Dahl, (2005) in his work *A Preface to Democratic Theory* brought that idea of Madisonian democracy which insists on the separation of power among the branches of the state. As articulated in the previous arguments, the separation of power would allow checks and balances and ensure accountability of the elected leaders. As for Botswana, the issue of power separation is clearly jotted in the constitution which highlights the roles of the executive, legislature and judiciary. Justice Dingake O.B.K who presented his paper to the Southern African Chief Justices’ Conference in 2009 insisted that, the constitution of Botswana is the one to be adopted by most African countries which still face the problem of power struggle. For Botswana, the legislative’s main function is to enact laws while the primary and basic role of the executive part is to take charge of the conduct of the affairs of the state. For the judicial body of Botswana, the main function is to adjudicate on disputes that may arise when the organs may collide and to have the final word on the interpretation of the law (Dingake, 2009).

The book *40 Years of Democracy in Botswana* by Maundeni (2005) highlights the role the institutions in emphasizing democracy within a state. Basing on Institutionalism theory which suggests on how the states institutions help in shaping actors’ behaviours, Maundeni puts more emphasis on the transparency of the Electoral Commission of Botswana which over 40 years has managed to transfer power from one leadership to another peacefully. After dilemmas on the whole process of electing officials to an independent electoral commission, the in 1997, the Parliament of Botswana amended the constitution through Act No 18/1997 section 66 and introduced a new section which will completely deal

with the introduction of the independent electoral commission.

The commission is mandated with independent powers of conducting (at any time) a referendum, giving instructions to the candidates, and ensuring that elections are conducted efficiently, properly, freely and fairly and perform all other duties as may be enacted by an act of the parliament of Botswana, (ibid).

Similar to what Robert Dahl explained about democracy, the democratic situation in Botswana seems to be of the Madisonian type which allows an intensive check and balance among the branches of the government, (Dingake, 2009). According to Dahl (2005) the Madisonian Democracy is the form of democracy which is more majoritarian and distributes powers among other branches of the state. The Madisonian doctrine as derived from James Madison, the 4th President of the United States of America, insists on compromise methods in reaching consensus rather than other ways of decision making.

The doctrine views democracy as an effort to bring a compromise between the power of minorities and the power of majorities, between the political equality of all adult citizens and the desire to limit their sovereignty. Unlike Plato's philosophical ideas on man and power which suggested that a single-person rule would provide solutions to the problems within the society, the Madisonian type deals with the separation of power and not to invest all powers on a single person which has the highest possibilities of causing tyranny. Plato's republic only needed a philosophical king to rule over men and to provide all the necessary needs of the society including freedom, liberty and equality as said by Plato, (Plato, 1970). On the contrary, Dahl's type sees the possibility of that king to be ignorant hence a room to tyranny. The fear here is that if all powers will be handled to an individual person it will prevent external checks and accountability of such individual to the people who put him in power.

5.0 Some criticism of Democracy in Botswana

Molomo (2000) has criticized the democracy of Botswana by questioning the supreme powers of the president. Tracing the changes of power in Botswana and the democratic transition in the region which witnessed the independence of Namibia in 1990, the multiparty elections in Zambia and Malawi and the historical election race in South Africa in 1994, Molomo found a need to limit the powers of the executive to avoid future possibilities of tyranny. Although he

showed how Botswana ranks high among the democracies in Africa and that it had enjoyed a stable multiparty democracy for the past 40 years, the author's fears are more based on the type of constitution. The constitution of Botswana is a Westminster parliament with 40 members who are largely dominated by the ruling party Botswana Democratic Party. The BDP dominates both the parliament and the executive and leaving much power to the office of the president.

Molomo went further by challenging the succession system developed in Botswana whereby, the vice presidents serving are more likely to succeed the presidents upon their retirement, deaths or any other reasons. History shows that, the presidency of Botswana started with Seretse Khama (1966 – 1980) and succeeded by Quett Masire after his death (Masire was the vice president during Khama's administration). Later on (1998 -2008) Botswana was led by President Festus Mogae who had also been the vice president during Masire's rule. Comrade Mogae was then succeeded by Lieutenant General Ian Seretse Khama and, as commented by Molomo, he was also the vice president of Mogae after his retirement as the Chief of Defence Forces of Botswana.

In a similar way, his last vice president Dr. Erick Mokgweetsi Masisi became the president of Botswana after the end of Ian Khama's term and he serves now as the current president of Botswana (Dingake, 2009). This is what is challenged by Professor Molomo. According to him, democracy should also consider things like the systems which channel power to people of a certain caliber. He suggests that, the proper channels should be left for everyone to have equal opportunity in leadership and things like hereditary and nepotism in leadership should be counted as out-dated, (Maundeni, 2005).

6.0 Conclusion and Recommendations

This paper has endeavoured to show that, so far, Botswana stands as a country of example in Africa which has managed to apply the liberal democratic standards in African way and maintained the majority happiness and minority satisfactions. As a state with that clean record, Botswana's future in human rights, minorities' role in governance as well as economic growth and development is clearly predicted to be good. The main recommendation is to consider a number of factors when assessing the features of democracy and democratization process of

states. Botswana has done so far a good job in maintaining liberal features hence praised as a democratic state in the region but there is a need to improve a political condition for opposition parties to fully participate in decision making. Given this reality, other African states have lessons to learn from Botswana.

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Impact of Telecommunications Technology on Human Security: A Case of Tanzania

By

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Abstract

This paper examines the impact of telecommunications technology to human security of Tanzania. The study employed a cross-sectional research design, and the sample size of the study was 120 respondents. Data were collected through open and close-ended questionnaires and semi-structured interviews administered to staff from Tanzania Communications Regulatory Authority (TCRA), the police, selected mobile operators as well as mobile phone subscribers. Descriptive statistical analysis was applied for quantitative data while content analysis was adopted for qualitative data. Results revealed that identity theft, terrorism, money laundering, online money theft, human trafficking and drug trafficking were security threats aggravated by telecommunications technology. Also, the motivation factors for committing cybercrimes include poverty (financial gain), religious and political ideologies, and violent extremism. It is concluded that telecommunications technology aggravates security challenges, and it is suggested that the government should take institutional measures in developing cyber security culture in the fight against security threats.

Keywords: human security, securitization, telecommunications.

1.0 Introduction

Development in the telecommunications industry has brought many blessings in sectors like transport, education, health, finance and businesses. Telecommunication services are key to national economies and critical to national security (EC-RRG, 2014). However, these benefits are facing many risks. For example, a survey conducted among banks in Kenya, Rwanda, Uganda, Tanzania and Zambia revealed that banks were at high risks of being hacked by their own employees and other malicious insiders (Kshetri, 2019). In Ghana, the major issues confronting the banking industry were data safety and lack of trust

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especially in Internet Banking. Fraudulent transactions and data robbery lead to perception and reputational problems (Ohene, 2015). Also, telecom networks which provide services integral to other sectors like finance, health and education are vulnerable to some risks (Bears, 2021). Increasingly, interconnected global supply chains make cyber-attacks and digital failures an ever present set of risks to business integrity (Adonis, 2018). Indeed, the world is depending on internet of things to meet different demands ranging from businesses, health, education and finance; however, as people and institutions go more 'online' the higher the risks they encounter.

2.0 Background to human insecurity in the digital age

Telecommunications infrastructure that provides the necessary backbone for information exchange such as voice, video, data, and Internet connectivity have been found to be vulnerable to various forms of attacks like denial of service, loss of integrity and lack of confidentiality of network services (Chukwudebe & Nosiri, 2015). For instance, countries such as Nigeria, India, Iraq, Syria, Nepal and Columbia experienced telecommunications infrastructural destruction due to insurgency or military conflicts. In 2012, Boko Haram (a terror group) in Nigeria destroyed about 530 base stations and killed staff (Agubor, et al., 2015).

The development of new accessible technologies and the expansion of the Internet have resulted in new forms of criminal behaviour. For example, Tropina (2016) stated that digital technologies facilitate the migration of traditional organised crime online and provide a number of opportunities for fraud, corruption, tax evasion and other criminal activities. It is easy to launch money laundering activities with the assistance of new technologies to include online banking and money transfers provided the criminals have all the necessary credentials to execute the transactions, and this is also possible for people or institutions with the intent of terrorist financing.

Also, gaining access to network databases containing customer information becomes a compelling target for cyber-criminals or insiders, whose aim may be to steal money, conduct identity theft, blackmail customers, or launch any other form of attack (Chukwudebe & Nosiri, 2015). Despite the intentions of the attackers, generally, cybercrimes cause vast damage to essential infrastructure. Gandhi et al. (2011) remarked that politically motivated cyber-attacks may be

carried out by members of extremist groups who use cyberspace to spread propaganda, attack websites, and steal money to fund their activities or to plan and coordinate terrorist activities. On the other hand, perpetrators of organised crime are typically focused on control, power and wealth (Gragido et al, 2012). According to Harshé (2021), the Al Qaeda and the IS extended their terrorist activities from the west Asian region (Afghanistan and Pakistan) to African countries like Mali, Nigeria, Somalia and Mozambique contributing to security threats to civilians and security agencies. For instance, in Africa, in 2015, there were 381 terrorist attacks targeting civilians with 1394 fatalities while in 2020 there were 7,108 attacks with 12,519 fatalities. Plotted crimes like terrorist activities in many countries impede national security as essential infrastructures are vulnerable to damage, and national demographics decrease leading to obstruction of national economy. It is costly to replace the essential infrastructure that can be destructed by cybercriminals.

DFID (2017) reported that failed and fragile states are home to more than 900m people, half of whom live in severe poverty, posing a significant threat to international security as states like DR Congo, Sudan, Chad, Central Republic of Africa and Somalia offer a safe haven for illicit trade, drugs-production and weapons-smuggling. Lack of governance in some African countries contributes to political instability, in turn, rebel groups establish strong networks, which are necessitated by communications services. These networks are used especially in getting new recruits and funding for aggravating internal conflicts through illegal transactions like human and drug trafficking, as well as kidnapping. Also, drug abuse affects the youth as they develop health problems and become unproductive. It is costly to the government to provide them medical treatment.

Worcester (2015) stated that strong presence of radical Islamic groups in Somalia and the growing presence of Iranian-backed groups tied to Hezbollah, at times cooperating with Al Qaeda in West Africa poses security threats in Africa. For instance, from the Sudanese province of Darfur in the east, across the Central Africa Republic, southern Chad, northern Cameroon, Mali and Niger are at risk of developing into a zone of entrenched social conflicts. Terrorist groups, which are present in West Africa, Central Africa and East Africa become much stronger due to networks with other rebels outside Africa, and pose security threats in neighbouring countries impeding foreign direct investments (FDIs)

which could boost national economies. It is remarked that causes of human trafficking in Africa include, but are not limited to, poverty, political instability, greed, peer pressure, and lack of legitimate and sustainable employment opportunities and corruption leading to enormous threats to peace and security on the African continent (Bello, 2015; Mollema, 2013; Bello & Olutola, 2020).

Human trafficking poses economic challenges as it affects the ability of countries to engage their citizens, especially the youth, to participate in economic and social development as this active group is exploited in other places or countries. Although empirical studies indicate a number of factors which lead to organised crimes like terrorism, human and drug trafficking, as well as extremist violence. Few researches have been conducted on the impact of telecommunications technology on national security of Tanzania, and the motivations for committing such crimes. Therefore, this study set out to examine the impact of telecommunications technology on human security of Tanzania focusing mainly on the influence of telecommunications technology on security threats like identity theft, money laundering, online money theft, human trafficking and terrorism.

3.0 Theoretical Framework

This study was guided by securitisation theory developed by the Copenhagen School in the mid-1990s. The theory assumes that securitization is evident when (i) the security character of public problems is established, (ii) the social commitments resulting from the collective acceptance that a phenomenon is a threat are fixed and (iii) the possibility of a particular policy is created (Balzacq et al., 2016). For example, human trafficking in Africa poses security threats. In this regard, each state should first consider and find a solution to the underlying or root causes of the crime as these factors are embedded in the countries' socio-economic, political, and cultural milieus (Bello & Olutola, 2020).

The problem of weak and failing states is significantly more dangerous than is generally understood as these unstable regions are a breeding ground for organised crime and terrorism. In order to avoid weakness in the face of security threats, states need strong and effective legal institutions. These institutions will help in building a cyber-security culture within the states. Indeed, the world cannot stop from using ICTs because many sectors are well networked to enable easy access to variety of services and products. But lack of cyber-security culture

gives criminals opportunities to launch crimes. This study used the securitisation theory because it contributes to the understanding of the threats, which have not been given much attention by the government institutions despite to be salient and posing security challenges such as identity theft and spam mails.

In practice, the theory focuses on stable and effective institutions. Taking the example of the greater Horn of Africa which includes Sudan, Ethiopia, Djibouti, Somalia, Kenya and Uganda, conflict emanating from specific states continues to destabilise the region. The interlocking rebellion in Sudan affects northern Uganda, eastern Chad and north-eastern Central African Republic (Worcester, 2015). Political institutions, which are government policies, should ensure stability in the society. Governments should put in place and initiate legal frameworks which aim to control threats impeding national security. In this case, the underlying factors for terrorism should be identified and intervening strategies be sought by the relevant authorities like policy makers of the individual countries and international community by establishing regulatory and legislative measures that intend to prevent such security challenges.

In addition, the established institutions should be able to cope with advances and changes in technology. For example, the advent of wireless mobile technologies has driven packet-based switching technology, which provides the type of network suitable for triple-play communications such as voice, data and video (Sif & Newell, 2004). Though, data centres as critical infrastructure are vulnerable to criminals, yet, they have not received much attention (Balzacq et al, 2016).

Notwithstanding its high value, the securitisation theory has limits. For instance, politicians who have authoritative power may use the theory to brand migrants as security threats instead of refugees, which may lead to racism (Gutierrez, 2018). For example, migrants crossing Mediterranean Sea to Europe have been framed as security threats in some European countries simply (Howell & Richter-Montpetit, 2019). In this case, politicians are likely to use securitisation to create difficult political environment for opposition parties for matters which do not pose security threats in order to keep such political parties outside the public sphere of influence. Nevertheless, the theory is important for this study as

it suggests that government institute regulations that lead to cyber security culture.

4.0 Methodology

4.1. Study Area and Study Approach

This study was conducted in Kinondoni district, Dar es Salaam region, in Tanzania. Kinondoni district is located in northwest of Dar es Salaam region. The district has a large number of reported crimes (Tanzania Police Force & National Bureau of Statistics, 2017). Also, the headquarters of the selected mobile phone companies (Airtel, Tigo, and Vodacom) are located in the district. The study employed a cross - sectional research design. Data were collected through open and close-ended questionnaires administered to 100 mobile phone subscribers from Airtel, Tigo and Vodacom networks.

Semi structured interviews were prepared for face-to-face interviews with twenty (20) key informants from Tanzania Communications Regulatory Authority (TCRA), mobile operators and the police for the purpose of getting insights on crimes committed through telecommunication services and the strategies being used to fight them. Review of documents on government legislative and regulatory frameworks as well as incidents of crimes was also conducted. Document review assisted the researcher to get insights on the effect of telecoms technology and factors influencing crimes. Descriptive statistical analysis was applied to quantitative data while content analysis was used for qualitative data.

4.2 Demographic characteristics of respondents

a. Gender of Respondents

Gender was included in this study so as to determine whether both categories of gender participated in the study to provide their views regarding to the impact of telecommunications technology to the national security of Tanzania.

Table 1: Respondents by gender

Variable	Frequency	Percentage
Male	70	58.3
Female	50	41.7
Total	120	100

Source: Filed work, 2023

The study findings indicated that 70(58.3%) out of 120 respondents were males while 50 (41.7%) were females. Table 1 gives the summary of results.

4.3 Age of Respondents

Age was included in this study. Out of 120 respondents, 15(12.5%) were in age group of 20-25 years; 43(35.8%) were aged between 26-30 years and 20(16.7%) were aged between 31-40 years. In addition, 22 (18.3%) were aged 41-50 years and the rest 20(16.7%) were aged between 51-60 years. Table 4.2 summarises the above data.

Table 2: Respondents by age

Variable	Frequency	Percentage
51 – 60 years	20	12.5
20 -25 years	15	35.8
26 - 30 years	43	16.7
31 – 40 years	20	18.3
41 – 50 years	22	16.7
Total	120	100

Source: Field work, 2023

4.4. Education of Respondents

Table 4.1 Respondents by education

Variable	Frequency	Percentage
Illiterate	5	4.3
Primary	50	41.7
Secondary	35	29.1
College	30	25.0
Total	120	100

Source: Field work, 2023

In this category of social demographic characteristics of respondents, the level of education of respondents assisted the researcher to determine the degree of understanding of study population regarding the impact of telecommunications technology to national security of Tanzania. Results showed that 5(4.2%) out of 120 of respondents did not have formal education and 50(41.7%) out of 120 respondents attained primary education. Moreover, 35(29.1%) out of 120

respondents completed secondary education while 8(6.7%) out of 120 respondents were diploma holders, 12(10%) out of 120 respondents had bachelor degree, 6(5%) had master degree, and 4(3.3%) out of 120 respondents were holders of PhD. Summary of findings is shown in Table 4.3.

5.0 Findings and disussion

In this objective, the respondents were asked to mention threats which are aggravated by telecommunications technology. Findings from questionnaires and interviews indicate that security threats resulting from telecommunications technology include theft of identity, online theft of money, money laundering, and human trafficking and terrorism.

5.1. Identity theft

Sahin et al (2017) asserted email and SMS phishing acquires unsuspecting subscriber's personal information such as usernames, passwords, credit card account information, and other sensitive information through the Internet. Many mobile subscribers have been vulnerable to cybercrimes through blackmail, in turn they fall in loss of money or become bankrupt as well as their reputation is tarnished by criminals. Preece (2014) established that fat finger attack occurs where devices are left in an insecure default state or configured insecurely by mistake. Since some enterprises like banks outsource services, human errors may cause unintentional attack because the system or database is vulnerable to criminals.

Moreover, findings from in-depth interviews with TCRA and police indicated that 14 out of 20 respondents mentioned identity theft as a security threat posed by telecommunications technology. In detail, one key informant said:

Criminals tend to steal personal information through emails for conducting unlawful acts like making unauthorized transactions and the victims are left with damage to their finance or reputation.

Another key informant pointed out that:

Criminals use high-technological methods to steal critical information for tarnishing a victim's reputation or stealing money.

Furthermore, another key informant said that:

Criminals commit crimes like financial identity theft and social security identity theft

to obtain credit or goods and services without knowledge of the victim. Sometimes, cybercriminals can obtain social security numbers of victims for receiving free medical care or applying for loans or combining fake data with stolen data to create a new identity for fraudulent acts like stealing money from credit cards.

In collecting data on identity theft, respondents were asked to provide their views to what extent identity theft is a security threat caused by telecommunications technology. Questionnaire responses were rated using a five-point Likert scale ranging from strongly disagree to strongly agree. In the research findings, 7(7%) out of 100 respondents strongly disagreed, 5(5%) disagreed and 11(11%) were neutral on identity theft as a security threat caused by telecommunications technology. Moreover, 45(45%) out of 100 respondents agreed and 32(32%) strongly agreed that identity theft is a security threat resulting from telecommunications technology. Summary of the findings is illustrated in Figure 1.




Figure 1: Identity theft

Source: Field work, 2023

The above findings on identity theft can be interpreted that, although telecommunications technology has brought blessings in many sectors like education, health and financial sectors; yet, the telecommunications technology causes security threats. It implies that telecommunications services can be misused by criminals to commit crimes. The findings are in line with Chukwudebe & Nosiri (2015) who said gaining access to network databases

containing customer information becomes a compelling target for cyber-criminals. Before the introduction of modern telecommunications systems Tanzanians experienced traditional crimes like mugging, armed robbery and burglary but today technology has enabled criminals to conduct cybercrimes from different parts of the world.

5.2. Online theft of money

Before the introduction of the new technologies people did not experience cybercrimes which are currently taking a rapid pace. Warner (2011) found that electronically based crimes were primarily related to credit card fraud. Karambu (2011) revealed only 40% of banks in Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania were prepared against cyber threats. A survey conducted among banks in Kenya, Rwanda, Uganda, Tanzania and Zambia revealed that banks were at high risk from threats, such as hacking and malicious insiders (Kshetri, 2019). Internet of things has prompted individuals and institutions to constantly use online transactions like internet banking, online marketing, and mobile money transactions; however, lack of security alert or cyber security preventive measures has given room to cybercrime.

Data collected through in-depth interviews with TCRA and the police revealed 18 out of 20 respondents viewed online theft of money as a security threat posed by telecommunications technology. Explicitly, one of the respondents stressed that:

Online theft of money is a criminal activity involving gaining illegal access to bank cards and personal identity through emails and filling in data on fake websites.

Another key informant commented that:

Cybercriminals tend to create and distribute Trojan spy programmes that collect data like passwords for stealing money from personal accounts.

Another respondent mentioned that:

Lack of proper cyber security practices, and lack of skills among Internet users, makes people victims to scam software and compromised websites which enable criminals to steal passwords and credit card numbers. Sometimes criminals intercept information exchanged with a victim's bank to commit unlawful acts.

Respondents were asked to determine to what extent online theft of money is security threat emerging from telecommunications technology. Questionnaire responses were rated using a five-point Likert scale ranging from strongly disagree to strongly agree. Research findings established 18(8%) out of 100 respondents strongly disagreed, 12(12%) disagreed and 7(7%) were neutral that online theft of money is a security threat resulting from telecommunications technology. Moreover, 20(20%) out of 100 respondents agreed while 43(49%) strongly agreed that online theft of money is a security threat caused by telecommunications technology. Figure 2 provides the summary of the findings.




Figure 2: Online theft of money

Source: Research Findings, 2022

The above mentioned findings can be described as testifying that telecommunications technologies contributed to online theft of money. This implies that as mobile phone users go online the more vulnerable they become to cybercrimes. It can be stated that cybercrimes like online theft of money have been fuelled by modern telecommunications technologies. With regard to online theft of money, Mostay (2010) remarked that people and institutions lost around USD 40 billion annually in online activity through ID theft and communication fraud.

5.3. Money laundering

Studies by Johari et al., 2016 and Friedrich & Quick, 2019, indicated that while laundering of criminal proceeds is mainly done through the banking and financial institutions and businesses, in some incidents non-financial entities,

intermediaries and professionals are used or facilitate money laundering. Previously, crimes experienced by people were mainly traditional ones like mugging, burglary and armed robbery; however, modern telecommunications technologies have changed the techniques launderers apply to plot cybercrimes like money laundering.

On the other hand, data collected through in-depth interviews with TCRA and the police revealed that 18 out of 20 respondents viewed money laundering online as a security threat posed by telecommunications technology. Explicitly, one of the respondents stressed that:

Money laundering impedes national security as it involves criminal activities like drug trafficking or corruption.

Another key informant said that

Money laundering is experienced in Tanzania through dishonest use of political power and influence.

Yet another key informant mentioned that:

Money laundering is a serious criminal activity involving tax evasion and corruption in the public sphere, and sometimes it is conducted through illegal financial transactions like drug and weapon smuggling, piracy, poaching as well as cyber terrorism involving insiders and outsiders.

Respondents were asked to estimate to what extent money laundering is a security threat emerging from telecommunications technology. Questionnaire responses were rated using a Likert scale of five-points ranging from strongly disagree to strongly agree. Findings revealed 14(14%) out of 100 respondents strongly disagreed 10(10%) disagreed and 8(8%) were neutral on the money laundering as a security threat caused by telecommunications technology. Likewise, 38(38%) out of 100 respondents agreed and 40(40%) strongly agreed that money laundering is a security threat caused by telecommunications technology. Figure 3 illustrates the findings.




Figure 3: Money laundering

Source: Research Findings, 2022

Findings on money laundering outlined above explain that telecommunications technology supports money laundering countries. Tanzania is also exposed to transnational money laundering threats arising from smuggling of goods, drug trafficking, human trafficking, and the criminal proceeds are suspected to be channeled through hospitality industry and real estate sector. Also, the country is used as a transit route for drugs to and from Asia, Latin America, Europe and Southern Africa (The Eastern and Southern Africa Anti-Money Laundering Group, 2021).

5.4. Human trafficking

Fourteen sources reviewed make reference to internal trafficking in Kenya, ten in Tanzania, and eight in Uganda. Certainly, before the development of modern telecommunications technologies, it was hard to conduct this illicit activity of human trafficking due to difficulties in communications and processing of travel documentation.

Data collected through in-depth interviews with TCRA and the police revealed 15 out of 20 respondents viewed human trafficking as a security threat caused by telecommunications technology. For example, one key informant among them stressed that:

The traffickers exploit marginalized groups like children by compelling them to perform labour or engage in commercial sex”,

Another key informant stated that

Human trafficking is involuntary and victims bear life threatening risks like paying smuggling debts or face slavery.

Likewise, one key informant pointed out that:

Tanzania is considered as a source, transit and destination country for men, women and children being trafficked for the purposes of forced labour and sexual exploitation, but trafficked girls and women are sent to Gulf countries like Oman and others for domestic works.

Respondents were asked to determine to what extent human trafficking is a security threat emerging from telecommunications technology. Questionnaire responses were rated using a Likert scale of a five-points ranging from strongly disagree to strongly agree. Findings illustrated that 15(15%) out of 100 respondents strongly disagreed, 10(10%) disagreed and 5(5%) were neutral that human trafficking is a security threat caused by telecommunications technology. Furthermore, 30(30%) respondents agreed and 40(40%) strongly agreed that human trafficking is a security threat. Summary of the findings is shown in Figure 4 below.




Figure 4: Human trafficking in persons

Source: Research Findings, 2022

In line with the above findings, it can be said that human trafficking has gained pace due to telecommunications technology. United States Department of State (2020) reported that human traffickers exploit domestic and foreign victims in Tanzania, and traffickers exploit victims from Tanzania abroad. Daghar (2020)

reported that Eastern Africa, Tanzania inclusive, was affected by both internal and international trafficking.

5.5. Terrorism

According to EAPCCO (2023), in Eastern Africa, the challenges that continue to perpetuate terrorism include the continued spread of religious fundamentalism and extremism; the growing threat of home grown terrorism; the existence of porous borders; inadequate sharing of intelligence among countries; and inadequacies in addressing radicalisation and violent extremism. Explicitly, ideology and radicalization have fuelled transnational terrorism which affects many countries, Tanzania inclusive. But one additional fact could be found in the use of new technologies, particularly telecommunication.

Data collected through in-depth interviews with TCRA and the police revealed that 15 out of 20 respondents viewed terrorism as a security threat supported by telecommunications technology. For instance, one key informant stated that:

Terrorism causes security challenges as the unlawful acts conducted by terrorists may cause risks to both the targeted victims and innocent civilians, especially when the attackers target crowded areas like markets or transport points.

In interview with one key informant from the police, it was noted that:

Terrorism is one among the security threats in many countries which evoke much fear and emotion to both security institutions and civilians as it is not easy to predict effectively the time the terrorists may launch a particular terrorist attack.

Respondents were also asked to determine to what extent terrorism is a security threat emerging from telecommunications technology. Questionnaire responses were rated using a Likert scale of five-points ranging from strongly disagree to strongly agree. Findings indicated 10(10%) out of 100 respondents strongly disagreed, 15(15%) disagreed and 5(5%) were neutral that terrorism is a security threat caused by telecommunications technology. Furthermore, 35(35%) respondents agreed and 35(35%) strongly agreed that terrorism is a security threat resulting from telecommunications technology. Summary of the findings is shown in Figure 5 below.




Figure 5: Terrorism

Source: Research Findings, 2022

It can be interpreted that modern telecommunications technology contributed to the emerging new techniques which accelerate terrorism. UNODC (2012) found that the Internet might be used for propaganda in the form of multimedia communications providing ideological or practical instruction, explanations, justifications or promotion of terrorist activities. OCBA (2010) reported that terrorist groups like Al Qaeda use different online techniques to launch unlawful acts. Also, terrorist groups steal IDs and fake passports to open bank accounts in which terrorist supporters are transferring money (Arterberry, 2005). In today's digital world, personal data are largely collected and shared online platforms leading to vulnerability, especially when criminals who use the stolen data to commit cyber terrorism.

6.0 Conclusion and Recommendations

Telecommunications technology has aggravated some crimes, which have impact on human security. Indeed, many people and institutions like banks have become victims of cybercrimes due to lack of cyber security among users of telecommunications services and products. The techniques being used by cybercriminals have transformed the traditional crimes to online crimes, which make the fight against cybercrimes to be difficult among individuals and institutions and governments. National governments and other institutions using telecommunication technology in offering their services are required to build a cyber-security culture by institutionalizing, not only legal regulations but also best practices in cyber security.

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Professor Honest Prosper Ngowi: In Memorium

By
Chris Maina Peter¹



On 28th March, 2022, Tanzania lost one of its prominent economists and academic Professors, Honest Prosper Ngowi, in a road accident which took place at Mlandizi in the Coast Region while on his way to attend a Meeting at Mzumbe University in Morogoro. He was with driver Innocent Mringo, who also perished in the accident. He was just 55 years old.

Professor Ngowi was an Associate Professor of Economics, researcher and consultant in Economics and Business at Mzumbe University, Tanzania. He was also the Principal of the Dar es Salaam Campus College of the Mzumbe University. Born in 1967, he did his Advanced Diploma in Economic Planning at the then Institute of Development Management (IDM) Mzumbe, Morogoro

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before joining the Agder University College in Norway for his Masters in Business and Economics. He was later awarded a doctorate by the Open University of Tanzania.

Professor Ngowi joined the teaching staff of Mzumbe University in 1994 rising steadily from the humble position of Tutorial Assistant to Associate Professor in 2014. This was not accidental but rather through hard work. He was a prolific writer. In the course of years, he researched, consulted and published over 100 academic works, 80 consultancy reports, 2000 newspaper and magazine articles on economics and business.

His works and lectures covered a variety of issues including macro-and micro-economics; international trade; managerial economics; Foreign Direct Investments (FDIs); The new knowledge Economy; Entrepreneurship; Informal Sector; Privatization; Public Private Partnerships (PPPs); Executive Agencies in Service Delivery; Project Management; Unlocking Economic Growth Potentials; Shared Economic Growth; University-Industry Linkages; Funding Civil Societies; Mainstreaming HIV/AIDS in Curricula and Workplaces; East African Common Market; Economic Impacts of HIV/AIDS; Public Expenditure Review Systems (PETS) and Poverty; as well as the Current Global Financial and Economic Crisis.

Professor Ngowi did not confine his teaching to the University. He was fondly referred as a peoples' professor because of his desire to share his wide knowledge with the members of the public. In the process of demystifying economics, he spent time writing complicated concepts in daily newspapers and in simple English and Kiswahili. These were in *Mwananchi* Newspaper (Every Thursday), *The Citizen* (Every Saturday) and had a weekly programme on the Independent Television (ITV). He also produced an Online Videocast – Ngowi TV (www.Ngowitv.co.tz).

Professor Ngowi did not shy away from supporting the international community, government, the private sector as well as the civil society. He thus served on the Boards of several institutions including Economics Society of Tanzania; United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD); Virtual Institute; Organisation for Social Science Research in Africa (Ethiopia); Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa (Senegal); Norwegian Society for Business Administration (Norway); Association of African Public Administration and Management (AAPAM); Foundation for Civil Society;

Economic and Social Research Foundation (ESRF); Envirocare; Restless Development; Tanzania Investment Centre (TIC); SWISSAID; University of Stellenbosch Business School Company in the Republic of South Africa; and Southern Agricultural Growth Corridor of Tanzania (SAGCOT) Centre Limited.

Professor Ngowi was also working closely with the Catholic Church and the Interfaith Standing Committee on Economic Justice and Integrity of Creation in Tanzania (ISCEJIC). In this collaboration with Religious Leaders he assisted in the preparation of various policy publications under the Interfaith Union. These included: *Our People or Our Gold, Golden Opportunity*: How Tanzania is failing to benefit from Gold mining; *The One Billion Dollar Question*: How can Tanzania Stop Loosing So Much Tax Revenues; *The One Billion Dollar Question*: Revisited Five Years Later; How Much is Tanzania Now Losing in Potential Tax Revenue? *Uranium Scoping Study*: The state of uranium exploration and its economic potential; the *Environmental Study in North Mara and Geita*; *Make it Possible*: How Tax Commitments Can Move Tanzania Towards Universal Health Insurance Coverage; Social Market Economy Model for Tanzania: Towards Inclusive and Sustainable Economic Model; and *Policy Impact Assessment of the One Billion Questions Reports*. These policy documents contributed to major discussions in the country under religious leaders and facilitated the reform of various policies such as the Mining Policy 2009, the Mining Act 2010, International Tax Policies, Social Security Policy, Universal Health Insurance Policy and Law.

In his extensive academic, research and consultancy work, Professor Ngowi interacted and networked with colleagues and friends from across the globe and particularly from Norway, United Kingdom, India, Senegal, Kenya, Uganda, Ethiopia, Zambia, South Africa, Swaziland, Malawi, United States, Sweden, Denmark, Canada, Rwanda, Burundi, Nigeria and many others. This interaction opened the doors for his membership in various international professional associations including Associate Member of United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) Virtual Institute; Organisation for Social Science Research in Africa (Ethiopia); Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa (Senegal); Norwegian Society for Business Administration (Norway); Agricultural Economists Society of Tanzania; Association of African Public Administration and Management (AAPAM); International Academy of African Business and Development (IAABD); Lake Victoria Research Initiative

(VicRes); Editor of Development Southern Africa, HURIA, Kenyan Business Administration, Education Research (USA); and IAABD journals; and Participant in World Bank's Rapid Response Discussions and others.

Professor Ngowi did not only teach and lecture about business and economics. He practised what he taught. His home was like a mini-commercial farm with all sorts of stock and each and every animal and bird knew him and followed him around upon arrival from work. He would then take time to feed attend each of them personally to their satisfaction. That was typical Professor Ngowi who attended to everything that mattered - personally.

We on the Editorial Board of the *International Diplomatic Review Journal* and the Dr. Salim Ahmed Salim Centre for Foreign Relations feel honoured and privileged to have been associated with the life of our colleague Professor Honest Prosper Ngowi. Notwithstanding his busy and crowded schedule, Professor Ngowi still valued the Centre and its flag bearing Journal. He never missed a meeting and was always punctual volunteering to review and edit works of our contributors. While we join his wife Bahati and his children Alpha, Nana and Omega to mourn his departure, we believe that his legacy will live forever.

Fare thee well Professor Honest Prosper Ngowi – You will be genuinely missed!

Journal Policy and Instruction to Authors

Journal Policy

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